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There  have  been  few  efforts  to  evaluate  the  actual  and  perceived  effectiveness  of  
environmental  management  programs  created  by  consensus-­‐‑based,  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  
negotiation  or  negotiated  rulemaking.  Previous  evaluations  have  used  perceived  success  
among  participants  as  a  proxy  for  actual  effectiveness,  but  seldom  have  investigated  the  
ecological  outcomes  of  these  negotiations.  Fewer  still,  if  any,  have  compared  the  actual  
and  perceived  outcomes.  Here  I  evaluate  and  compare  the  social  and  ecological  
outcomes  of  the  negotiated  rulemaking  process  of  marine  mammal  take  reduction  
planning.  Take  reduction  planning  is  mandated  by  the  U.S.  Marine  Mammal  Protection  
Act  (MMPA)  to  reduce  the  fisheries-­‐‑related  serious  injuries  and  mortalities  of  marine  
mammals  (bycatch)  in  U.S.  waters  to  below  statutory  thresholds.  Teams  of  fishermen,  
environmentalists,  researchers,  state  and  federal  managers,  and  members  of  Regional  
Fisheries  Management  Councils  and  Commissions  create  consensus-­‐‑based  rules  to  
mitigate  bycatch,  called  Take  Reduction  Plans.  There  are  six  active  Take  Reduction  
Plans,  one  Take  Reduction  Strategy  consisting  of  voluntary  measures,  and  one  plan  that  
was  never  implemented.  It  has  been  20  years  since  marine  mammal  take  reduction  
planning  was  incorporated  into  the  MMPA.  Early  evaluations  were  promising,  but  
identified  several  challenges.  In  the  past  decade  or  more,  the  National  Marine  Fisheries  
Service  (NMFS)  has  implemented  measures  to  set  up  the  teams  for  success.  
    
v  
I  used  data  from  formal  Stock  Assessment  Reports  to  assess  and  rank  the  actual  
ecological  success  of  five  Take  Reduction  Plans  (Harbor  Porpoise,  Bottlenose  Dolphin,  
Atlantic  Large  Whale,  Pelagic  Longline,  and  Pacific  Offshore  Cetacean)  in  mitigating  the  
bycatch  of  17  marine  mammal  stocks.  In  addition,  I  employed  social  science  data  
collection  and  analytical  methods  to  evaluate  Take  Reduction  Team  participants'ʹ  
opinions  of  the  take  reduction  negotiation  process,  outputs,  and  outcomes  with  respect  
to  the  ingredients  required  for  successful  multi-­‐‑stakeholder,  consensus-­‐‑based  
negotiation  (team  membership,  shared  learning,  repeated  interactions,  facilitated  
meetings,  and  consensus-­‐‑based  outputs).  These  methods  included  surveying  and  
interviewing  current  and  former  Take  Reduction  Team  participants;  using  Structural  
Equation  Models  (SEMs)  and  qualitative  methods  to  characterize  participant  perceptions  
across  teams  and  stakeholder  groups;  and  identifying  and  exploring  the  reasons  for  
similarities  and  differences  among  respondents,  teams,  and  stakeholder  groups.  I  also  
employed  SEMs  to  quantitatively  examine  the  relationship  between  actual  and  
perceived  ecological  success,  and  contrasted  actual  and  perceived  outcomes  by  
comparing  their  qualitative  rankings.  
Structural  Equation  Models  provided  a  valid  framework  in  which  to  
quantitatively  examine  social  and  ecological  data,  in  which  the  actual  ecological  
outcomes  were  used  as  independent  predictors  of  the  perceived  outcomes.  Actual  
improvements  in  marine  mammal  bycatch  enhanced  stakeholder  opinions  about  the  
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effectiveness  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans.  The  marine  mammal  take  
reduction  planning  process  has  all  of  the  ingredients  necessary  for  effective  consensus-­‐‑
based,  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  negotiations  (Chapter  2).  It  is  likely  that  the  emphasis  that  the  
National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  places  on  empirical  information  and  keeping  
stakeholders  informed  about  bycatch,  marine  mammal  stocks,  and  fisheries  facilitated  
this  relationship.  Informed  stakeholders  also  had  relatively  accurate  perceptions  of  the  
actual  ecological  effectiveness  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  (Chapter  3).  The  long  
timeframes  over  which  the  teams  have  been  meeting  generally  have  increased  
cooperation.  The  professionally  trained,  neutral  facilitators  have  produced  fair  
negotiations,  in  which  most  individuals  felt  they  had  an  opportunity  to  contribute.  
Participant  views  of  fairness  significantly  influenced  their  satisfaction  with  Take  
Reduction  Plans,  which  significantly  affected  their  perceptions  about  the  effectiveness  of  
those  plans  (Chapter  2).  The  mandate  to  create  a  consensus-­‐‑based  output  has,  for  the  
most  part,  minimized  defections  from  the  negotiations  and  facilitated  stakeholder  buy-­‐‑
in.    
In  general,  marine  mammal  take  reduction  planning  is  a  good  negotiated  
rulemaking  process,  but  has  produced  mixed  results  (Chapters  1  and  2).  Successful  
plans  were  characterized  by  straightforward  regulations  and  high  rates  of  compliance.  
Unsuccessful  plans  had  low  compliance  with  complex  regulations  and  sometimes  
focused  on  very  small  stocks.  Large  teams  and  those  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  (Maine  to  
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North  Carolina)  were  least  successful  at  reducing  bycatch,  which  was  reflected  in  
stakeholder  views  of  the  effectiveness  of  these  teams.  Take  Reduction  Team  negotiations  
have  not  always  produced  practical  or  enforceable  regulations.  Implementation  of  take  
reduction  regulations  is  critical  in  determining  plan  success  and  identifying  effective  
mitigation  measures,  but  because  of  a  lack  of  monitoring,  has  not  been  characterized  
consistently  across  most  teams.  Additionally,  elements  like  the  “Other  Special  Measures  
Provision”  in  the  Harbor  Porpoise  Take  Reduction  Plan  have  undermined  the  
negotiation  process  by  allowing  the  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  to  alter  
consensus-­‐‑based  elements  without  consensus  from  the  team,  which  has  led  to  hostility,  
mistrust,  and  frustration  among  stakeholders.    
The  final  chapter  of  this  dissertation  provides  recommendations  to  improve  the  
outcomes  and  make  them  more  consistent  across  teams.  I  based  these  recommendations  
on  the  information  gathered  and  analyzed  in  the  first  three  chapters.  They  are  grouped  
into  four  broad  categories  -­‐‑  team  membership,  social  capital,  fairness,  and  plan  
implementation.  If  the  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  implements  these  suggestions,  
both  perceived  and  actual  ecological  effectiveness  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  
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1. Chapter 1: Evaluating a Negotiated Rulemaking 
Process:  Do Marine Mammal Take Reduction Plans 
Reduce Bycatch? 
1.1 Introduction 
The  tradeoffs  between  the  conservation  and  allocation  of  natural  resources  have  
historically  engendered  conflict.  These  conflicts  are  exacerbated  by  several  challenges:    
ecosystem  complexity  and  uncertainty;  wide-­‐‑ranging,  deep-­‐‑core  beliefs  of  affected  
parties;  confounding  jurisdictional  authorities;  politics;  and  long  timeframes  over  which  
they  occur,  leading  to  intractable  or  ‘wicked’  problems  (Balint  et  al.,  2011;  Dukes,  2005;  
Nie,  2003).  Environmental  disputes  often  revolve  around  common  pool  resources  in  
which  the  public  shares  the  costs  of  exploiting  the  resource,  but  only  a  few  resource-­‐‑
users  reap  the  benefits  of  such  exploitation  –  i.e.,  the  Tragedy  of  the  Commons  (Hardin,  
1968).  In  the  1970s,  the  U.S.  government  enacted  a  variety  of  command  and  control  style  
environmental  statutes  to  address  environmental  problems  by  targeting  pollution  and  
protecting  species.  Under  some  circumstances  this  approach  has  protected  natural  
resources  and  allocated  access  rights,  but  it  has  been  criticized  as  a  means  of  resolving  
environmental  conflict  and  supporting  decision-­‐‑making.      
Multi-­‐‑stakeholder,  consensus-­‐‑based  rulemaking  (negotiated  rulemaking)  can  
improve  the  quality  of  decision-­‐‑making  by  incorporating  public  values,  resolving  
conflicts  among  opposing  coalitions,  building  trust  in  institutions,  and  educating  the  
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public  (Beierle,  2002;  Beierle  and  Cayford,  2002).  Moreover,  this  approach  can  enhance  
acceptance  of  regulations,  which  can  then  increase  the  likelihood  of  compliance  
(Coglianese,  1997;  Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Newig,  2007).  Previous  evaluations  of  
environmental  stakeholder  negotiations  have  focused  on  process,  stakeholder  
perceptions,  impacts  on  litigation,  and  time-­‐‑saving  (Coglianese,  1997;  Leach  et  al.,  2002),  
with  a  particular  emphasis  on  participant  satisfaction  with  the  process.  These  criteria  can  
be  good  predictors  of  participant  satisfaction  with  the  outcomes,  but  they  may  not  reflect  
the  ecological  outcomes  (Coglianese,  2003;  Dukes,  2005;  Leach  et  al.,  2002;  Moore,  1996).  
In  fact,  environmental  policy  research  has  been  criticized  for  focusing  on  process  
measures  rather  than  environmental  outcomes  (Koontz  and  Thomas,  2006;  Niles  and  
Lubell,  2012).  
Without  a  formal  evaluation  of  the  effectiveness  of  environmental  interventions,  
practitioners  may  not  only  waste  time  and  resources  (in  the  case  of  ineffective  
measures),  but  the  unintended  consequences  of  such  interventions  may  cause  more  
harm  than  good  (Koontz  and  Thomas,  2006;  Pullin  and  Knight,  2009;  Weiss,  1972).  The  
cost  of  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  negotiations  also  emphasizes  the  need  for  regulators  to  
determine  their  effectiveness  (Newig,  2007).  In  addition,  feedback  regarding  ecological  
outcomes  of  environmental  management  is  the  cornerstone  of  adaptive  management.  
Despite  these  compelling  reasons,  ecological  evaluation  of  conservation  management  is  
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in  the  early  stages  (Pullin  and  Knight,  2009),  and  has  not  explicitly  considered  the  
impacts  of  participatory  processes  (Brogden,  2003;  Newig,  2007).  
There  are  several  challenges  to  conducting  such  evaluations.  First,  a  monitoring  
program  is  required  prior  to  establishing  any  environmental  intervention  to  provide  a  
baseline  against  which  to  measure  impacts  (Brogden,  2003;  Koontz  and  Thomas,  2006;  
Newig,  2007;  Pullin  and  Knight,  2009).  Often  such  baseline  data  do  not  exist,  or  if  they  
do,  are  not  readily  accessible.  Second,  stakeholder  groups  must  clearly  define  
measurable  objectives  that  can  be  used  for  future  evaluation  (Dukes,  2005;  Newig,  2007;  
Weiss,  1972).  Third,  to  account  for  environmental  variability,  monitoring  must  occur  
over  long  time  scales,  which  can  be  expensive  (Brogden,  2003;  Koontz  and  Thomas,  
2006).  Finally,  ecosystem  complexity  and  the  possibility  of  multiple,  simultaneous  
interventions  make  it  difficult  to  attribute  a  change  in  environmental  conditions  to  any  
particular  intervention  (Brogden,  2003;  Koontz  and  Thomas,  2006;  Newig,  2007).  
1.1.1 Case Study 
The  Marine  Mammal  Protection  Act  of  1972  (MMPA,  16  U.S.C.  1361  et  seq.)  is  the  
only  U.S.  environmental  statute  that  requires  a  negotiated  rulemaking  process  to  
address  a  specific  environmental  problem  –  the  incidental  mortality  of  marine  mammals  
in  fisheries,  termed  bycatch.  Marine  mammal  populations  are  vulnerable  to  bycatch  
because  of  their  life  history  characteristics  and  demography  (Lewison  et  al.,  2004;  Read,  
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2008;  Read  et  al.,  2006;  Soykan  et  al.,  2008).  They  have  long  lifespans,  late  ages  of  
maturity,  low  fecundity,  and  high  survival  rates  (Heppell  et  al.,  2000;  Heppell  et  al.,  
2005)  and,  consequently,  are  vulnerable  to  even  moderate  rates  of  mortality  (Heppell  et  
al.,  2000;  Heppell  et  al.,  2005;  Lewison  et  al.,  2004).  High  bycatch  rates  can  cause  marine  
mammal  populations  to  decline  over  very  short  timeframes  (Lewison  et  al.,  2004;  Taylor  
et  al.,  2000;  Wade,  1998).      
For  small  populations  of  marine  mammals,  bycatch  can  be  particularly  
pernicious  (Lewison  et  al.,  2004;  Read,  2008).  Even  rare  bycatch  events  can  dramatically  
affect  population  viability,  especially  if  mortality  impacts  reproductively  active  females  
(Read  and  Wade,  2000).  In  a  large  fishery,  each  fisherman’s  contact  with  such  animals  
may  be  extremely  rare,  so  protective  measures  can  be  both  expensive  and  politically  
unpopular  (Read,  2008).    
Here  I  present  a  case  study  in  which  I  evaluate  the  ecological  outcomes  of  the  
negotiated  rulemaking  process  implemented  to  reduce  marine  mammal  bycatch  in  U.S.  
waters  through  the  development  of  Take  Reduction  Plans.  This  research  augments  prior  
work  that  evaluates  perceived  success  of  stakeholder  negotiation  processes  by  focusing  
on  quantifying  ecological  success.  Geijer  and  Read  (2013)  describe  an  overall  decline  in  
marine  mammal  bycatch  in  the  U.S.  since  the  implementation  of  these  plans,  suggesting  
that  they  have  been  generally  successful  in  reducing  the  scale  of  bycatch  in  the  U.S.  This  
approach  builds  on  this  analysis  by  comparing  ecological  outcomes  to  the  criteria  
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mandated  under  the  MMPA.  I  create  a  simple,  objective  method  to  evaluate  the  
ecological  effectiveness  of  several  plans  by  comparing  their  outcomes  to  statutory  
mandates.  By  examining  the  history  and  attributes  of  each  plan,  I  also  propose  a  suite  of  
factors  that  may  contribute  to  their  ecological  outcomes.  Finally,  I  demonstrate  how  this  
method  can  be  used  to  prioritize  marine  mammal  stocks  that  are  not  regulated  through  
this  process,  but  may  require  regulatory  intervention.  
1.2 Methods 
1.2.1 Case Study Background 
The  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  (Service)  is  charged  with  protecting  
cetaceans  and  most  species  of  pinnipeds  in  the  U.S.  by  implementing  conservation  
measures  mandated  in  the  MMPA.  A  unique  feature  of  the  MMPA  is  the  formula  for  
estimating  the  maximum  allowable  number  of  animals  that  can  be  removed  from  a  stock  
by  human-­‐‑related  causes  without  causing  depletion  or  impeding  recovery,  called  the  
Potential  Biological  Removal  (PBR).  PBR  is  calculated  as  the  product  of  the  minimum  
estimate  of  the  population  size  (Nmin),  one-­‐‑half  of  the  maximum  potential  population  
growth  rate  (Rmax),  and  a  recovery  factor  (Fr),  which  considers  the  status  of  a  population  
and  addresses  uncertainty  caused  by  biases  in  mortality,  abundance,  and  Rmax.  If  bycatch  
of  a  stock  exceeds  PBR,  the  stock  is  deemed  “strategic”  (16  U.S.C.  1361(19)).  The  
“strategic”  designation  includes  stocks  listed  as  endangered  or  threatened  under  the  
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Endangered  Species  Act,  depleted  under  the  MMPA,  or  that  are  declining  and  likely  to  
become  endangered  or  threatened  (16  U.S.C.  1362  (19)).  
Under  Section  118  of  the  MMPA,  the  Service  must  compile  a  list  of  commercial  
fisheries  each  year  based  on  the  frequency  and  severity  of  their  interactions  with  marine  
mammals:    Category  I  (frequent  incidental  mortality  or  serious  injury);  Category  II  
(occasional);  and  Category  III  (remote  likelihood).  The  Service  prepares  Stock  
Assessment  Reports  for  each  stock  of  cetaceans  and  pinnipeds  (except  walruses)  that  
contain  information  on  population  structure,  abundance,  trends,  and  the  extent  of  
human-­‐‑caused  mortality  (16  U.S.C.  1387(d)).  Regional  scientific  review  groups  provide  
peer-­‐‑review  of  the  Stock  Assessment  Reports  and  make  recommendations  about  
research  priorities  (Read  and  Wade,  2000;  Taylor  et  al.,  2000).  If  a  “strategic”  stock  
interacts  with  a  Category  I  or  II  fishery,  the  Service  is  required  to  form  a  multi-­‐‑
stakeholder  group  of  fishermen,  researchers,  environmentalists,  and  state  and  federal  
managers,  known  as  a  Take  Reduction  Team  (16  U.S.C.  1387(f)(6)(A)(i)).    
Each  team  must  create  a  consensus-­‐‑based  suite  of  regulations  called  a  Take  
Reduction  Plan  (16  U.S.C.  1387(f)(7)(A)(ii)).  The  immediate  goal  of  each  plan  is  to  reduce  
bycatch  to  below  PBR  within  the  first  six  months  of  implementation  (16  U.S.C.  
1387(f)(2)).  The  long-­‐‑term  goal  is  to  reduce  bycatch  to  levels  approaching  a  zero  
mortality  and  serious  injury  rate,  termed  a  “zero  mortality  rate  goal”  (ZMRG),  which  is  
defined  as  10%  of  PBR  (50  CFR  §229).  If  the  team  does  not  reach  consensus,  the  Service  
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must  draft  a  plan  that  incorporates  any  consensus-­‐‑based  elements,  pursuant  to  16  U.S.C.  
1387(f)(7)(A)(ii).  
1.2.2 Data 
There  are  seven  active  Take  Reduction  Teams  (teams):    Atlantic  Large  Whale;  
Atlantic  Trawl  Gear;  Bottlenose  Dolphin;  False  Killer  Whale;  Harbor  Porpoise;  Pacific  
Offshore  Cetaceans;  and  Pelagic  Longline    
(http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/interactions/trt/teams.htm#gmhp).  The  Atlantic  Offshore  
Cetaceans  team  disbanded  because  the  fisheries  it  addressed  were  closed  by  regulation.    
I  extracted  data  from  marine  mammal  Stock  Assessment  Reports  from  1989  to  
2013  (http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/sars/species.htm)  for  the  17  stocks  that  are  managed  
under  a  Take  Reduction  Plan,  and  compiled  information  on  annual  bycatch,  PBR,  
ZMRG,  and  abundance.  For  the  stocks  identified  by  the  U.S.  Government  Accountability  
Office  (GAO,  2008)  as  requiring  intervention,  but  for  which  a  team  has  not  yet  been  
convened,  I  used  the  most  recent  decade  of  Stock  Assessment  Report  data.  The  methods  
used  to  collect  and  analyze  these  data  are  described  by  Geijer  and  Read  (2013).  
1.2.3 Established Plans 
I  used  two  metrics  to  estimate  the  effectiveness  of  each  plan  relative  to  MMPA  
goals  and  to  each  other.  The  first  metric  was  a  simple  determination  of  whether  or  not  
each  plan  was  successful  irrespective  of  statutory  deadlines,  i.e.  were  mortality  levels  
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reduced  and  maintained  below  PBR  or  ZMRG.  I  chose  not  to  use  the  statutory  deadlines  
because  they  have  been  characterized  as  unrealistic  (GAO,  2008;  RESOLVE,  1999;  
Young,  2001).  Moreover,  ecosystem  unpredictability  and  inter-­‐‑annual  variation  in  
fishing  effort  may  cause  bycatch  to  fluctuate  annually  and,  although  bycatch  might  drop  
below  PBR  within  six  months  (or  ZMRG  in  five  years),  it  may  exceed  PBR  or  ZMRG  in  
subsequent  years  (GAO,  2008).  Conversely,  establishing  regulations  that  reduce  bycatch  
often  requires  a  period  longer  than  six  months.  Thus,  it  is  more  relevant  to  ask  whether  
bycatch  was  maintained  at  levels  below  PBR  or  ZMRG  once  achieved  than  to  determine  
whether  statutory  deadlines  were  met.  Metric  1  is  thus  a  simple  categorical  measure  of  
whether  or  not  bycatch  was  reduced  and  maintained  below  PBR  or  ZMRG  as  follows:  
0  =  Bycatch  >PBR    
1  =  Bycatch  <PBR  and  >ZMRG,  and  remained  there  through  2011  
2  =  Bycatch  <ZMRG,  and  remained  there  through  2011  
Stocks  where  bycatch  fluctuated  above  and  below  ZMRG  were  assigned  a  score  
of  1,  while  stocks  that  fluctuated  above  and  below  PBR  were  assigned  a  0.  Ranks  of  all  
stocks  managed  under  a  single  plan  were  averaged  to  determine  a  mean  rank.  I  
excluded  stocks  that  were  below  ZMRG  prior  to  implementing  a  plan.  
Metric  2  was  the  mean  of  the  annual  difference  in  bycatch  from  PBR  divided  by  
PBR  itself.    
      Metric  2  =  mean[(PBR-­‐‑Bycatch)/PBR]  
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such  that:            1.00  implies  No  bycatch    
     0.90−0.99  implies  ≤ZMRG  (because  ZMRG  =  10%  of  PBR)  
     0.00−0.89  implies  >ZMRG  and  ≤PBR  
                   <0.00  implies  >PBR  
Ranks  of  all  stocks  managed  under  a  single  plan  were  averaged  to  determine  
mean  rank  and,  as  above,  I  excluded  stocks  that  were  below  ZMRG  prior  to  
implementation  of  a  plan.  
For  both  metrics,  higher  ranks  indicated  greater  success.  I  calculated  ranks  for  
the  following  plans:    Harbor  Porpoise,  Atlantic  Large  Whale,  Pelagic  Longline,  and  some  
stocks  managed  under  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  and  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  plans.  
Unfortunately,  I  was  unable  to  rank  several  stocks  and  teams.  For  example,  bycatch  
levels  for  all  stocks  considered  by  the  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  team  are  below  PBR,  none  of  
the  stocks  are  strategic,  nor  do  they  interact  with  any  Category  I  fisheries.  This  team  was  
created  as  the  result  of  a  lawsuit  brought  by  environmental  groups  (N.D.  Cal.  Apr.  30,  
2003).  In  this  case,  the  statutory  deadlines  do  not  apply  (National  Marine  Fisheries  
Service,  2008).  Furthermore,  this  team  created  a  Take  Reduction  Strategy  rather  than  a  
Plan,  which  is  restricted  to  voluntary  measures  involving  education,  outreach,  and  
research  (National  Marine  Fisheries  Service,  2008,  2012a).  Secondly,  the  stocks  
considered  by  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  Team  were  redefined  in  2010  and  data  were  
available  for  only  a  few  of  the  newly  defined  stocks.  The  Northern  and  Southern  Coastal  
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Migratory  Stocks  of  bottlenose  dolphins  are  not  strategic  but  were  included  in  the  
analyses  because  bycatch  exceeded  ZMRG  when  the  team  was  created.  Moreover,  these  
stocks  are  susceptible  to  periodic,  large-­‐‑scale,  unusual  mortality  events  that  can  decrease  
abundance  and  lower  PBR.  One  such  event  began  in  July  2013  and  continues  at  the  time  
of  writing.  In  addition,  the  Stock  Assessment  Reports  for  the  these  stocks  described  
bycatch  levels  in  terms  of  minimum  and  maximum  potential  values  due  to  uncertainty  
regarding  the  stock  identity  of  dolphins  taken  as  bycatch  in  gillnet  fisheries.  Thus,  I  
conducted  separate  rankings  with  these  minimum  and  maximum  values.  The  primary  
fisheries  considered  by  the  Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans  Team  have  been  closed,  making  
the  plan  irrelevant.  Finally,  the  False  Killer  Whale  plan  has  not  been  implemented  long  
enough  to  calculate  ranks  for  its  stocks.      
1.2.4 Covariates 
I  gathered  information  about  each  team  that  I  hypothesized  could  influence  the  
ecological  outcome  for  each  stock.  These  included  the  following  (Table  1):    team  size  
(members  plus  alternates);  team  age  (months);  PBR  in  2011  for  each  stock  (averaged  for  
each  plan);  the  number  of  amendments  to  each  plan;  and  geographic  region  of  the  
team/stocks.  
To  determine  whether  any  covariates  significantly  affected  these  results,  I  
conducted  a  multiple  regression  analysis  of  the  ecological  ranks  (metrics  1  and  2)  on  the  
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independent  variables  of  PBR,  U.S.  geographic  region,  and  Take  Reduction  Team  size  
and  age  using  Mplus  (Muthén  and  Muthén,  1998-­‐‑2010).  
Table  1:  Covariates  of  Take  Reduction  Teams  and  marine  mammals  stocks    
that  may  contribute  to  their  ecological  success.  
  
Take  Reduction  Team  and  Affiliated  
Marine  Mammal  Stock   PBR  in  2011














Atlantic  Large  Whale  
3.1  (average  of  
team  stocks) 82 221 28 Northeast
Western  North  Atlantic  Right  Whale   0.9
Gulf  of  Maine  Humpback  Whale 2.7
Western  North  Atlantic  Fin  Whale 5.6
Bottlenose  Dolphin  
39.6  (average  of  
team  stocks) 46 158 2 Southeast
  *Western  North  Atlantic,  Coastal,  
Northern  Migratory       86
  *Western  North  Atlantic,  Coastal,  
Southern  Migratory       63
Northern  North  Carolina  Estuarine  
System 7.9
  Southern  North  Carolina  Estuarine  
System 1.6
Harbor  Porpoise   625 42 227 2 Northeast
Gulf  of  Maine-­‐‑Bay  of  Fundy  Harbor  
Porpoise
Pacific  Offshore  Cetacean  
45.8  (average  of  








Northern  Right  Whale  Dolphin   48
California/Oregon/Washington  Long-­‐‑
beaked  Common  Dolphin 164
Pelagic  Longline  
143  (average  of  
team  stocks) 26 115 0 Southeast
Western  North  Atlantic  Risso'ʹs  
Dolphin   126
Western  North  Atlantic  Long-­‐‑  and  
Short-­‐‑finned  Pilot  Whale   159
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1.2.5 Unclassified Stocks 
The  Government  Accountability  Office  (GAO,  2008)  identified  several  marine  
mammal  stocks  that  are  not  currently  managed  under  a  Take  Reduction  Plan,  but  
warrant  intervention.  I  used  a  similar  two-­‐‑step  approach  to  rank  these  stocks  where  low  
scores  indicated  a  high  priority  for  plan  creation.  The  first  metric  used  the  statutory  
criteria  for  forming  a  team  and  prioritizing  stocks  when  agency  funding  is  limited  (16  
U.S.C.  1387(f)(1)  and  (3)).  I  excluded  the  criterion  for  “small  population  size”  because  
“small  population”  is  not  defined  in  the  statute  and  would  likely  depend  on  species-­‐‑
specific  demographics.  The  second  metric  employed  the  method  described  above  
(average  annual  difference  between  bycatch  and  PBR  divided  by  PBR).    
Bycatch  of  these  stocks  was  below  PBR  for  the  10  years  I  examined  and,  with  the  
exception  of  Western  North  Atlantic  beaked  whales;  all  stocks  were  “strategic.”  Metric  1  
was  calculated  as  the  sum  of  the  following  factors:    whether  the  stock  was  “strategic;”  
whether  the  stock  interacted  with  a  Category  I  or  II  fishery;  abundance  trend;  whether  
the  stock  was  <ZMRG  in  the  most  recent  Stock  Assessment  Report;  and  proportion  of  
years  that  bycatch  was  <  ZMRG.      
Metric  1  =  (strategic?)  +  (fisheries  interactions)  +  (abundance  trend)  +  (<  ZMRG)  +  
(n<ZMRG/10)  
where:    If  the  stock  is  strategic  =  −1  ,  if  no  =  0  
Fisheries  interactions  =    
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[(#  Category  I  fisheries)  x  (−1)]  +  [(#  Category  II  fisheries)  x  (−0.5)]  
Abundance  trend:    increasing  =  1,  decreasing  =  −1,  unknown  or  stable  =  0  
<  ZMRG:    if  the  most  recent  bycatch  is  <  ZMRG  =  1,  if  no  =  0  
n<ZMRG:    #  years  where  bycatch  <  ZMRG    
1.3 Results 
1.3.1 Existing Plans 
The  five  plans  I  assessed  deal  with  17  marine  mammal  stocks.  Ranks  for  Metric  1  
ranged  from  0  to  1.75  while  ranks  for  Metric  2  ranged  from  −0.5  to  0.89  (Figures  1  and  2,  
Table  2).  The  two  lowest  ranking  plans  (Harbor  Porpoise  and  Atlantic  Large  Whale)  had  
Metric  1  scores  less  than  0.5,  and  the  latter  had  a  negative  value  for  Metric  2  (Figures  1  
and  2,  Table  2),  indicating  that  average  annual  bycatch  fluctuated  above  and  below  PBR  
and  far  exceeded  ZMRG.  
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Table  2:    Metric  1  and  2  ranks  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans  and  
stocks.      
  
Take  Reduction  Team Marine  Mammal  Stock Metric  1
Rank
average[(PBR-­‐‑
BC)/PBR] Interpretation  of  M2
Harbor  Porpoise  
Gulf  of  Maine-­‐‑Bay  of  Fundy  
Harbor  Porpoise 0 0.13 <PBR  and  >ZMRG
Atlantic  Large  Whale     -­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑ 0.33 -­‐‑0.50 >PBR
Western  North  Atlantic  Right  
Whale   0 -­‐‑0.94 >  PBR
Gulf  of  Maine  Humpback  Whale 0 -­‐‑1.41 >PBR
Western  North  Atlantic  Fin  Whale 1 0.84 <PBR  and  >ZMRG
Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans     -­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑ 1.20 0.51   <PBR  and  >ZMRG
California/Oregon/Washington  
Short-­‐‑finned  Pilot  Whale 2 0.54   <PBR  and  >ZMRG
California/Oregon/Washington  
Sperm  Whale   0 -­‐‑0.28 >PBR
California/Oregon/Washington  
Humpback  Whale 1 0.51   <PBR  and  >ZMRG
California/Oregon/Washington  
Long-­‐‑beaked  Common  Dolphin 2 0.87 <PBR  and  >ZMRG
California/Oregon/Washington  
Northern  Right  Whale  Dolphin   1 0.90     =  ZMRG
Bottlenose  Dolphin  -­‐‑  minimum  
bycatch  estimate     -­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑ 1.75 0.89 <PBR  and  >ZMRG
*Western  North  Atlantic,  Coastal,  
Northern  Migratory       2 0.96 <ZMRG
*Western  North  Atlantic,  Coastal,  
Southern  Migratory       2 0.96 <ZMRG
Northern  North  Carolina  
Estuarine  System 1 0.76 <PBR  and  >ZMRG
Southern  North  Carolina  
Estuarine  System 2 0.86 <PBR  and  >ZMRG
Bottlenose  Dolphin  -­‐‑  maximum  
bycatch  estimate   -­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑ 1.50 0.51
*Western  North  Atlantic,  Coastal,  
Northern  Migratory       2 0.93 <ZMRG
*Western  North  Atlantic,  Coastal,  
Southern  Migratory       2 0.74   <PBR  and  >ZMRG
Northern North Carolina Estuarine 
System 1 -0.15 >PBR
Southern North Carolina Estuarine 
System 1 0.51 < PBR and > ZMRG  
Pelagic Longline  --- 0.50 0.51 <PBR and >ZMRG
*Western North Atlantic Long- and 
Short-finned Pilot Whale 0 0.07 <PBR and >ZMRG
*Western North Atlantic Risso's 
Dolphin 1 0.94 <ZMRG




Figure  1:    Rank  scores  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans,  Metric  1  by  
Metric  2.  
The  most  successful  plans  (Bottlenose  Dolphin  and  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans)  
scored  greater  than  1.0  for  the  first  Metric  and  above  0.5  for  Metric  2  (Figures  1  and  2,  
Table  2).  These  plans  reduced  and  sustained  bycatch  across  stocks  to  below  PBR,  and  at  
least  two  stocks  from  each  maintained  bycatch  below  ZMRG.  The  high,  positive  Metric  2  







Figure  2:  Ranks  for  Metric  2  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans.    Black  
(<0)=  high  bycatch  (>PBR)  and  gray  (0−0.89)  =  moderate  bycatch  (>ZMRG  and  <PBR).  
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Figure  3:    Ranks  for  Metric  2  of  17  marine  mammal  stocks  managed  by  Take  
Reduction  Plans.  Black  (<0)=  high  bycatch  (>PBR)  gray  (0−0.89)  =  moderate  bycatch  
(>ZMRG  and  <PBR),  and  white  (≥0.9)  =  low  bycatch  (≤ZMRG).  
For  individual  stocks,  scores  for  Metric  1  were  classified  as  0,  1,  or  2.  Values  for  
Metric  2  ranged  from  −1.41  to  0.96  (Figure  3,  Table  2).  Five  stocks  (Gulf  of  Maine  
humpback  and  North  Atlantic  right  whales,  California/Oregon/Washington  sperm  
whales,  Gulf  of  Maine-­‐‑Bay  of  Fundy  harbor  porpoises,  and  Western  North  Atlantic  long-­‐‑  
and  short-­‐‑fin  pilot  whales)  scored  zero  for  Metric  1,  indicating  they  were  above  PBR  or  
fluctuated  above  and  below  PBR.  Three  of  those  stocks  (humpback,  right,  and  sperm  
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whales)  had  negative  values  for  Metric  2,  indicating  that  average  annual  bycatch  
exceeded  PBR.  The  Northern  North  Carolina  Estuarine  Stock  of  bottlenose  dolphins  
(maximum  bycatch  estimate)  also  scored  negatively  for  Metric  2  (Figure  3).  Harbor  
porpoises  and  pilot  whales,  meanwhile  scored  under  0.5  for  Metric  2.  Sperm  whale  
bycatch  was  below  ZMRG  for  nine  of  13  years.  However,  in  2010,  it  experienced  very  
high  bycatch  (16  animals),  dramatically  affecting  its  average  annual  difference  from  
PBR.  
Based  on  Metric  1,  management  of  four  stocks  can  be  considered  a  success,  with  
scores  of  2  (bycatch  below  ZMRG).  Two  of  these  four  are  managed  under  the  Pacific  
Offshore  Cetaceans  plan  and  two  are  covered  under  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  plan  (Table  
2).  Bycatch  of  Pacific  short-­‐‑finned  pilot  whales  was  below  PBR  and  ZMRG  for  all  but  
one-­‐‑implementation  years.  Bycatch  of  the  two-­‐‑bottlenose  dolphin  stocks  also  was  below  
ZMRG  for  all  years  but  one,  while  that  of  long-­‐‑beaked  common  dolphins  was  below  
ZMRG  for  more  than  70%  of  the  years  following  implementation.  Five  stocks  scored  0.9  
or  above  for  Metric  2,  indicating  their  average  annual  bycatch  was  at  or  below  ZMRG  
(Figure  3).  Bycatch  of  all  five  stocks  was  below  PBR  when  their  teams  were  formed  and  
for  all  stocks  except  the  Northern  right  whale  dolphin,  was  below  ZMRG  for  more  than  
half  of  the  implementation  period.  
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1.3.2 Covariates 
Team  size  ranged  from  17  to  82  members,  including  alternates  (Table  1).  The  
Atlantic  Large  Whale  Team  is  the  largest  and  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  the  smallest.  
The  youngest  team  was  established  in  June  2005  and  the  oldest  two  teams  were  formed  
in  February  1996.  Most  plans  have  been  amended  a  few  times;  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  
plan  has  been  amended  28  times.  Mean  PBR  of  each  team  also  varies  greatly,  ranging  
from  3.1  to  625.  The  Western  North  Atlantic  right  whale  has  the  lowest  individual  PBR  
(0.9)  and  the  Gulf  of  Maine-­‐‑Bay  of  Fundy  harbor  porpoise  stock  has  the  highest  (625).  
The  northeastern  U.S.  was  a  significant  covariate  of  Metrics  1  and  2  with  a  
negative  regression  coefficient  (Table  3),  which  indicates  that  plans  to  regulate  stocks  in  
the  northeastern  U.S.  (Maine  to  North  Carolina)  were  less  successful  at  reducing  bycatch  
than  plans  created  by  teams  in  other  regions  (Table  3).  The  covariate  for  the  northeast  
accounted  for  85%  of  the  variance  in  Metric  1  and  76%  of  the  variance  in  Metric  2.    
Table  3:    Regression  coefficients  for  the  covariate  predictor  (northeast  U.S.)  of  
Metrics  1  and  2.  
Dependent  
Variable  





-­‐‑1.11   0.000   0.85  
Metric  2   -­‐‑0.76   0.000   0.76  
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1.3.3 Unclassified Stocks 
I  identified  two  stocks  for  which  plans  are  needed  (GAO  2008)  but  have  not  been  
created.  Stocks  with  the  two  lowest  scores  for  Metric  1,  Western  U.S.  Steller  sea  lions  
(−5.0)  and  Central  North  Pacific  humpback  whales  (−4.5)  interact  with  several  Category  I  
or  II  fisheries  (Table  4).  The  stock  with  the  lowest  ranks  for  Metric  2,  the  Western  North  
Pacific  humpback  whale  (0.74),  had  the  lowest  abundance  estimate  (938)  and  its  average  
annual  bycatch  exceeded  ZMRG  (Table  4).  
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Table  4:  Metric  1  and  2  ranks  of  stocks  identified  by  the  GAO  (2008)  as  
requiring  Take  Reduction  Teams  and  Plans,  SI/M  =  serious  injury  and  mortality.  
Marine  Mammal  Stock  
Total  
Metric  1  
Metric  2   Interpretation  of  Metric  2  
Western  North  Atlantic  
Mesoplodont  beaked  whales   0.9   0.96   <ZMRG  
Central  North  Pacific  
humpback  whale   -­‐‑4.5   0.88   >ZMRG  and  <PBR  
Western  North  Pacific  
humpback  whale   -­‐‑1.4   0.74   >ZMRG  and  <PBR  
Hawaii  sperm  whale   -­‐‑0.1   0.97   <ZMRG  
Western  North  Atlantic  
Cuvier’s  beaked  whale   0.9   0.97   <ZMRG  
*Bering  Sea  harbor  porpoise   -­‐‑0.5   0.9996   <ZMRG  
*Gulf  of  Alaska  harbor  
porpoise   -­‐‑1.7   0.97   <ZMRG  
Southeast  Alaska  harbor  
porpoise   -­‐‑0.7   0.95   <ZMRG  
Eastern  North  Pacific  northern  
fur  seal   -­‐‑2.5   1.00   <ZMRG  
Eastern  U.S.  Steller  sea  lion   1.5   0.98   <ZMRG  
Western  U.S.  Steller  sea  lion   -­‐‑5.0   0.89   >ZMRG  and  <PBR  
Gulf  of  Mexico,  Northern  
coastal  bottlenose  dolphin     SI/M  unk;  data  deficient  
Gulf  of  Mexico,  bay,  sound,  
estuary  bottlenose  dolphin   SI/M  unk;  data  deficient  
*Abundance  estimate  >  8  years  old  
Stocks  with  highest  scores  for  Metric  1  included  Western  North  Atlantic  Cuvier’s  
and  Mesoplodont  beaked  whales  (0.9),  which  do  not  interact  with  any  Category  I  or  II  
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fisheries,  and  the  Eastern  U.S.  stock  of  Steller  sea  lions  (1.5),  which  interact  with  only  one  
Category  II  fishery  (Appendix).  Stocks  with  highest  ranks  for  Metric  2,  Eastern  North  
Pacific  northern  fur  seals  and  the  Bering  Sea  harbor  porpoises,  had  the  two  of  the  three  
highest  abundance  estimates.  
1.4 Discussion 
This  analysis  suggests  that  performance  of  this  negotiated  rulemaking  process  
has  been  uneven.  The  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  and  Bottlenose  Dolphin  plans  were  
successful  in  meeting  at  least  one  statutory  goal  (reducing  bycatch  below  PBR  or  ZMRG)  
and  maintaining  these  reduced  bycatch  levels.  Following  implementation,  their  average  
annual  bycatch  was  consistently  below  PBR  and  periodically  below  ZMRG.  The  Harbor  
Porpoise  and  Atlantic  Large  Whale  plans  did  not  result  in  reduced  bycatch  levels.  For  
both  plans,  bycatch  was  below  PBR  for  only  half  of  the  years  following  implementation  
and  was  rarely  below  ZMRG.  This  variability  in  ecological  success  also  was  reflected  in  
the  rankings  of  individual  stocks.  Nine  of  the  17  stocks  can  be  considered  successfully  
managed,  with  Metric  1  scores  ≥  1  and  high  ranks  for  Metric  2  (>  0.7).  Five  of  these  stocks  
had  average  annual  bycatch  levels  below  ZMRG  (Metric  2  ≥  0.9).  Management  of  
bycatch  was  unsuccessful  for  five  stocks.  Average  bycatch  for  four  of  these  five  stocks  
was  above  PBR  (Metric  2  <  0).  Average  bycatch  of  the  remaining  three  stocks  ranged  
between  PBR  and  ZMRG.  
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1.4.1 Covariates 
The  longevity  of  a  plan  affected  the  availability  of  data  for  this  analysis,  but  did  
not  affect  success.  Three  plans  were  formulated  in  the  mid-­‐‑1990s  but  had  widely  varying  
degrees  of  success  (Table  1).  Team  size,  however,  did  appear  to  influence  the  success  of  a  
plan.  As  group  size  increases,  trust  among  participants  and  the  likelihood  of  achieving  
consensus  decreases,  participant  perceptions  of  outcome  efficiency  and  equity  also  
decreases,  as  well  as  the  likelihood  of  compliance  with  a  consensus-­‐‑based  agreement  
(Dukes,  2005;  Floyd  et  al.,  1996;  Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Leach,  2006;  Leach  and  
Sabatier,  2005;  Sipe,  1998).  The  MMPA  only  stipulates  the  stakeholder  groups  that  
should  be  included,  and  does  not  restrict  the  number  of  participants  
Teams  dealing  with  stocks  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  were  less  successful  than  
those  in  other  regions.  This  points  to  the  importance  of  compliance  with  and  
enforceability  of  regulations.  For  example,  the  Harbor  Porpoise  plan  (in  the  northeastern  
U.S.)  requires  the  use  of  acoustic  alarms,  called  pingers,  in  certain  times  and  areas.  When  
used  properly,  these  devices  can  reduce  harbor  porpoise  bycatch  by  more  than  90%  
(Bache,  2001;  Cox  et  al.,  2007;  Hardy  et  al.,  2012;  Palka  et  al.,  2008).  Fisheries  observers  
monitor  compliance  with  plan  measures  by  recording  information  about  the  gear,  catch,  
and  bycatch  when  nets  are  retrieved.  In  2010  and  2011,  Orphanides  and  Palka  (2012)  
estimated  that  only  41%  of  observed  hauls  were  in  compliance  with  pinger  regulations  
in  the  Gulf  of  Maine.  Moreover,  Palka  et  al.  (2012)  documented  only  19%  compliance  
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with  other  gear  requirements  in  the  mid-­‐‑Atlantic  between  2010  and  2012.  Geijer  and  
Read  (2013)  found  that  harbor  porpoise  bycatch  prior  to  implementation  of  the  plan  was  
directly  correlated  with  cod  landings  in  the  northeast  sink  gillnet  fishery.  There  was  a  
partial  de-­‐‑coupling  of  the  two  parameters  after  the  plan  was  implemented  until  2007,  
indicating  that  measures  in  the  plan  were  successful  in  reducing  harbor  porpoise  
bycatch.  However,  from  2008-­‐‑2012,  once  again,  there  was  a  high  correlation  between  cod  
landings  and  bycatch  (r  =  0.96,  p  =  0.008).  This  suggests  that  a  lack  of  compliance  with  
pinger  requirements  rendered  the  plan  less  effective  and  that  variation  in  fishing  effort  
was  driving  bycatch  levels.  Moreover,  recent  efforts  by  fishing  industry  members  to  
lobby  a  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  political  appointee  were  successful  in  altering  
plan  regulations  and  thus  undermining  the  negotiation  process  (Safina  and  Read,  2012).      
In  contrast,  compliance  with  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  plan  (western  U.S.)  
was  very  good.  Between  1998  and  2009,  Carretta  and  Barlow  (2011)  documented  that  
more  than  99%  of  observed  sets  in  the  California  drift  gillnet  fishery  used  pingers  
correctly.  In  addition,  there  is  20%  observer  coverage  in  the  California/Oregon  drift  
gillnet  fishery  and  at  least  50%  of  unobservable  vessels  are  boarded  at  sea  each  year  
(Long  and  Fahy,  2012).  This  relatively  high  level  of  observer  coverage  provides  precise  
estimates  of  bycatch,  and  a  conspicuous  enforcement  presence  deters  violations  of  plan  
regulations.  The  reasons  for  the  large  difference  in  compliance  between  the  two  plans  
are  not  understood  and  are  certainly  worthy  of  further  study.  
  25  
In  addition,  although  not  statistically  significant,  poor  performance  of  Take  
Reduction  Plans  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  also  appeared  to  be  associated  with  low  stock  
sizes,  broad  scope  of  the  plan,  difficulty  reaching  consensus,  and  participants  who  
undermined  negotiations.  For  example,  the  enormous  scope  and  scale  of  the  Atlantic  
Large  Whale  Team  makes  it  impractical  to  monitor  compliance  with  an  observer  
program.  Moreover,  the  team  has  never  reached  consensus,  which  has  confounded  the  
purpose  of  negotiated  rulemaking  and  increased  the  likelihood  that  the  negotiating  
parties  would  go  outside  of  the  process  to  achieve  their  goals  (Coglianese,  1997;  Funk,  
1997).  This  plan  has  spawned  five  lawsuits  and  Congressional  intervention  (Asmustis-­‐‑
Silvia,  2009;  Asmutis-­‐‑Silvia  and  Young,  2010).  Moreover,  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  plan  
focuses  on  bycatch  from  very  small,  endangered  stocks  that  have  very  low  PBR  values.  
Perhaps  as  a  result,  the  team  has  produced  myriad,  convoluted  amendments  to  the  plan  
that,  so  far,  have  been  unsuccessful  in  meeting  statutory  goals.    
The  MMPA  defines  conservation  targets  that  scale  directly  with  abundance,  so  
stock  size  is  an  important  driver  of  the  likelihood  that  a  plan  will  meet  those  targets.  
Three  of  the  four  lowest-­‐‑ranking  stocks  had  abundance  estimates  of  less  than  1,000  
individuals,  resulting  in  very  low  PBRs  (<  10).  The  PBR  for  right  whales  is  often  less  than  
one  individual  per  year  (Table  1).  Even  under  ideal  circumstances,  reducing  bycatch  to  
ZMRG  becomes  practically  impossible  for  such  stocks.  
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1.4.2 Unclassified Stocks 
This  analysis  identified  some  stocks  in  need  of  a  plan,  particularly  Western  U.S.  
Steller  sea  lions  and  Central  North  Pacific  humpback  whales.  Both  stocks  interact  with  
multiple  Category  I  or  II  fisheries.  Other  stocks  had  very  high  abundance  estimates  and  
consequently  high  PBR  estimates,  and  bycatch  of  these  stocks  was  below  PBR  by  
hundreds  to  thousands  of  animals.  This  simple  ranking  method  provides  managers  with  
an  objective,  quantitative  tool  for  prioritizing  marine  mammal  stocks  requiring  
management  action.  
1.4.3 Caveats 
This  method  provides  an  objective  means  of  evaluating  the  efficacy  of  Take  
Reduction  Plans,  but  data  limitations  presented  significant  challenges  to  this  approach.  
The  data  contained  in  U.S.  marine  mammal  stock  assessments  vary  in  amount,  precision,  
and  age  (GAO,  2008;  Geijer  and  Read,  2013;  Lewison  et  al.,  2004;  Read  et  al.,  2006).  
Abundance  estimates  older  than  eight  years  are  considered  unusable  because  stocks  size  
may  have  changed  considerably  over  such  a  period.  In  those  cases,  PBR  is  undefined  
(Moore  and  Merrick,  2011).  This  prevented  me  from  ranking  the  two  Gulf  of  Mexico  
bottlenose  dolphin  stocks.  Bycatch  estimates  are  extrapolated  from  observer  programs,  
when  such  data  are  available,  but  are  negatively  biased  when  derived  from  logbook  and  
stranding  data  (Geijer  and  Read,  2013;  Lewison  et  al.,  2004;  National  Marine  Fisheries  
Service,  2011;  Read  et  al.,  2006).  Observer  and  stock  assessment  survey  programs  are  
  27  
costly  and  their  implementation  varies  greatly  among  stocks.  Only  half  of  U.S.  fisheries  
are  observed,  which  limits  estimation  of  bycatch  levels  and  their  associated  uncertainty  
(GAO,  2008;  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service,  2011).  Defining  stock  structure  also  can  
be  challenging,  making  estimates  of  abundance,  PBR,  and  bycatch  imprecise  or  biased  
(Geijer  and  Read,  2013;  Read  et  al.,  2006).  Uncertainty  regarding  stock  boundaries  can  
lead  to  multiple  reconfigurations  of  stock  structure  over  time,  as  evidenced  by  
bottlenose  dolphins  in  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Finally,  this  evaluation  was  
limited  by  the  number  of  years  of  data  available  following  implementation  of  a  plan.  I  
was  unable  to  evaluate  the  False  Killer  Whale  plan  altogether.      
1.5 Conclusions 
Using  a  negotiated  rulemaking  process  mandated  by  the  MMPA  as  a  case  study,  
I  assessed  the  ecological  effectiveness  of  this  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  approach.  This  
evaluation  was  facilitated  by  statutory  goals  that  provided  measurable  benchmarks.  The  
expense  and  popularity  of  multi-­‐‑stakeholder,  consensus-­‐‑based  environmental  
management  needs  to  be  weighed  relative  to  their  ability  to  meet  these  ecological  goals.  
Results  from  this  case  study  suggest  that,  prior  to  implementation,  managers  should  
consider  and  plan  for  the  challenges  associated  with  such  evaluations.  
Regarding  this  case  study,  Take  Reduction  Plans  generally  have  had  an  uneven  
record  of  meeting  their  statutory  requirements.  Successful  plans  were  drafted  by  small  
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teams  and  produced  regulations  that  were  readily  monitored  and  enforced,  which  
facilitated  compliance.  Unsuccessful  plans  were  produced  by  large,  unwieldy  teams  in  
the  northeastern  U.S.  that  often  addressed  bycatch  of  small  stocks  and  crafted  
regulations  that  were  difficult  to  enforce  or  were  not  enforced.  A  comprehensive  
evaluation  of  the  elements  contributing  to  the  success  or  failure  of  Take  Reduction  Plans  
will  require  investigation  of  the  negotiation  process,  outputs,  socio-­‐‑political  outcomes,  
and  explorations  of  participant  attitudes.  A  comparison  of  these  social  factors  with  the  
ecological  outcomes  presented  here  is  critical  to  creating  a  comprehensive  evaluation  of  
this  process  and  for  suggesting  improvements  to  this  negotiated  rulemaking  process.  
Very  limited  evaluation  of  such  consensus-­‐‑based  rulemaking  processes  has  been  
conducted  to  date  and  more  research  is  needed  to  explore  whether  the  factors  associated  
with  ecological  effectiveness  of  this  participatory,  environmental  management  process  
hold  in  other  cases  both  within  and  outside  the  U.S.    
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2. Chapter 2:  Social Evaluation of Marine Mammal Take 
Reduction Teams 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Public Participatory Processes 
More  than  30  years  ago,  Phillip  Harter  (1982)  formally  introduced  the  idea  of  
incorporating  a  more  intensive  citizen  input  into  federal  rulemaking  processes  by  
employing  consensus-­‐‑based,  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  negotiation.  Although  the  (traditionally  
input  limited)  ‘decide,  announce,  defend’  approach  to  rulemaking  is  still  quite  common,  
the  Harter  approach  has  certain  advantages.  Specifically,  to  address  especially  
contentious  or  intractable  problems,  involving  the  affected  parties  in  creating  rules  can  
decrease  hostility  among  people  with  opposing  viewpoints  and  improve  the  quality  and  
legitimacy  of  agency  decisions  (Balint  et  al.,  2011;  Conley  and  Moote,  2003;  Dukes,  2005;  
Gunton  et  al.,  2003;  Harter,  1982;  Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Innes  and  Booher,  1999;  
Nie,  2003;  Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985).  This  approach  can  foster  buy-­‐‑in  and  facilitate  
implementation  of  negotiated  outputs,  increase  trust  in  institutions,  and  build  social  
capital  among  the  participants  (Birkhoff  and  Lowry,  2003;  Dietz  and  Stern,  2008;  Holmes  
and  Scoones,  2000;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004).  
Participatory  processes  have  been  described  by  a  variety  of  applied  and  
theoretical  frameworks  and  disciplines  including  game  theory  (Luce  and  Raiffa,  1957;  
Schelling,  1978,  1980);  the  Institutional  Analysis  and  Development  (IAD)  framework  
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(Ostrom,  1990,  1998,  2011);  the  Advocacy  Coalition  Framework  (ACF)  (Sabatier,  1988,  
2007;  Weible  et  al.,  2009);  applied  dispute  resolution  and  negotiation  (Fisher  and  Ury,  
2011;  Susskind  and  Cruikshank,  1987,  2006);  collaborative  natural  resource  and  
environmental  management  (Beierle  and  Cayford,  2002;  Gunton  et  al.,  2003;  Holmes  and  
Scoones,  2000;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004;  Renn,  2006);  and  law  (Coglianese,  1997,  2003;  
Funk,  1997;  Harter,  2000;  Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985).  These  frameworks  share  the  
following  concepts:    1)  behavior  and  knowledge  of  actors  range  from  rational  to  
boundedly  rational;  2)  who  participates  affects  the  likelihood  of  achieving  agreement  as  
well  as  compliance  with  outputs;  3)  focusing  on  empirical  issues  and  shared  learning  
increases  the  likelihood  of  agreement  and  improves  relationships  and  social  capital;  4)  
repeated  interactions  among  participants  increase  cooperation;  5)  the  use  of  a  neutral,  
third  party  improves  fairness;  and  6)  consensus  agreements  increase  buy-­‐‑in  and  
decrease  the  likelihood  of  defection.  Ideally,  these  ingredients  will  decrease  hostility  and  
increase  trust,  and  incorporate  multiple  viewpoints  into  lasting  agreements  that  are  
supported  by  the  affected  parties,  who  are  committed  to  the  process.  
2.1.1.1  Rational  or  boundedly  rational  actors  
Game  theory  models  negotiations  as  interactions  among  rational  actors.  A  
rational  actor  has  perfect  knowledge,  always  behaves  in  a  way  that  maximizes  his  own  
utility,  and  assumes  that  all  other  individuals  will  do  the  same  (Hardin,  1982;  Luce  and  
     31  
Raiffa,  1957;  Schelling,  1980;  Taylor,  1987).  He  calculates  a  pay-­‐‑off  structure  based  on  
past  interactions  with  others  and  this  pay-­‐‑off  structure  will  dictate  his  strategy  for  future  
interactions.  Maximizing  one’s  own  utility,  however,  can  result  in  an  irrational  outcome  
like  the  Tragedy  of  the  Commons  (Hardin,  1968).      
The  ACF  draws  from  the  social-­‐‑psychology  literature  to  characterize  participants  
as  boundedly  rational.  People  pursue  their  interests  and  policy  goals,  but  have  limited  
cognitive  abilities,  which  preclude  individuals  from  having  perfect  knowledge,  and  they  
filter  information  through  their  perceptions  and  values  (Allison  and  Zelikow,  1999;  
Jenkins-­‐‑Smith  and  Sabatier,  1994;  Leach  and  Sabatier,  1999;  Sabatier,  1988,  1999;  Sabatier  
and  Jenkins-­‐‑Smith,  1999;  Weible  et  al.,  2009).  In  comparison  to  rational  actors  who  seek  
out  information  that  supports  their  core  beliefs  and  policy  goals,  boundedly  rational  
actors  may  disregard  information  that  runs  counter  to  their  beliefs  and  goals  (Sabatier,  
1988,  1999;  Sabatier  and  Jenkins-­‐‑Smith,  1999;  Weible  et  al.,  2009).  People  may  remember  
losses  more  than  gains  and  because  their  worldview  is  colored  by  their  core  beliefs  and  
stakeholders  from  opposing  viewpoints  may  interpret  the  same  information  in  opposite  
ways  to  buttress  their  positions  (Sabatier,  1988,  1999;  Sabatier  and  Jenkins-­‐‑Smith,  1999;  
Weible  et  al.,  2009).  As  a  result,  actors  are  susceptible  to  “mutual  devil  shift”  in  which  
individuals  believe  their  opponents  are  more  malevolent  and  more  powerful  than  they  
truly  are  (Sabatier,  1988,  1999;  Sabatier  and  Jenkins-­‐‑Smith,  1999;  Weible  et  al.,  2009).  This  
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“devil  shift”  can  lead  people  with  the  same  core  beliefs  to  form  alliances  to  further  their  
policy  goals  (Sabatier,  1988,  1999;  Sabatier  and  Jenkins-­‐‑Smith,  1999;  Weible  et  al.,  2009).    
2.1.1.2  Who  participates  
Ideally,  participatory  processes  bring  together  a  variety  of  stakeholders  with  a  
wide  range  of  experiences  that  will  incorporate  citizen  values  and  help  generate  more  
realistic  policies  (Beierle  and  Cayford,  2002;  Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Renn,  2006).  
Limited  agency  resources  coupled  with  time  constraints  of  stakeholders  and  the  
practicality  of  implementation,  however,  restrict  who  sits  at  the  table.  More  intensive  
participatory  processes  may  exclude  members  of  the  general  public,  many  of  whom  will  
be  directly  affected  by  the  policies  created  during  stakeholder  negotiations  (Beierle  and  
Cayford,  2002;  Birkhoff  and  Lowry,  2003;  Coglianese,  2003;  Gunton  et  al.,  2003).  For  
practical  reasons,  the  agency  may  choose  interest  group  representatives  who  can  then  
relay  information  to  their  respective  constituencies.  As  pointed  out  by  Holmes  and  
Scoones  (2000),  agencies  may  invite  representatives  with  whom  they  already  have  an  
established  relationship,  which  could  limit  the  breadth  of  representation  and  thus  inhibit  
the  ‘ideal’  deliberative  process.  Nonetheless,  agencies  must  balance  the  number  of  
participants  with  the  practicality  of  generating  consensus-­‐‑based  decisions  (Holmes  and  
Scoones,  2000).  
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2.1.1.3  Shared  learning  
One  of  the  biggest  challenges  related  to  participatory  processes  pertains  to  the  
control  over  and  reliability  of  information  (Innes  and  Booher,  2004).  Discrepancies  
among  regulatory  science  (generated  by  the  agency),  research  science  (generated  by  the  
academic  community),  and  lay  knowledge  (generated  outside  of  the  government  or  
academic  paradigms)  can  generate  conflict  (Gray  et  al.,  2012;  Jasanoff,  1990,  1995;  
Kinsella,  2002).  Information  concerns  can  be  addressed  through  knowledge  sharing  or  
shared  learning  of  both  technical  information  and  citizen  knowledge.  Shared  learning  
occurs  when  participants  collectively  learn  about  relevant  issues,  exchange  data,  
question  existing  information,  and  identify  agreed-­‐‑upon  facts  and  data  needs.  Shared  
learning  and  a  better  understanding  of  the  issues  (technical  and  non-­‐‑technical)  facilitate  
creative  problem-­‐‑solving,  improve  decisions,  and  ultimately  improve  environmental  
outcomes  (Beierle,  2002;  Dietz  and  Stern,  2008;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004).  Shared  learning  
also  helps  participants  search  for  common  values,  which  can  decrease  conflict  while  
building  trust  and  social  capital  among  team  members,  as  well  as  between  participants  
and  government  institutions  (Gray  et  al.,  2012;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004).  Increased  
stakeholder  trust  in  natural  resource  institutions  improves  the  ability  of  those  
institutions  to  resolve  conflicts  and  environmental  problems  (Beierle  and  Cayford,  2002;  
Dietz  and  Stern,  2008).  Thus  through  shared  learning,  participatory  processes  can  end  
stalemates  and  decrease  hostility;  increase  knowledge  and  understanding  of  
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environmental  issues  and  opposing  viewpoints;  generate  creative,  new  options;  produce  
fair  outcomes;  and  create  beneficial  second-­‐‑order  effects  such  as  new  partnerships  and  
new  institutions  (Beierle,  2002;  Beierle  and  Cayford,  2002;  Birkhoff  and  Lowry,  2003;  
Dukes,  2005;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004;  Renn,  2006;  Webler  et  al.,  2001).  
2.1.1.4  Repeated  interactions    
The  likelihood  of  trust  and  cooperation  usually  increases  with  the  number  of  
interactions  among  stakeholders  (Gray  et  al.,  2012).  Reciprocity  can  bring  about  
cooperation,  and  a  person’s  reputation  over  previous  interactions  will  influence  the  
behavioral  expectations  of  others  (Axelrod,  1984).  The  shadow  of  the  future  plays  an  
important  role  in  a  rational  decision  to  cooperate.  If  the  number  of  interactions  is  
infinite,  maintaining  a  good  relationship  among  participants  into  the  future  may  be  
important  enough  to  induce  mutual  cooperation  (Axelrod,  1984).  Other  important  
factors  that  elicit  mutual  cooperation  include  communication  and  trust,  enforcement  of  
binding  agreements,  and  changing  the  payoff  structure  (Ostrom,  1990).  
2.1.1.5  Facilitated  negotiations  
To  maintain  fairness,  most  frameworks  advocate  using  a  neutral,  third  party  to  
facilitate  negotiations  (Beierle  and  Cayford,  2002;  Harter,  1982;  Holmes  and  Scoones,  
2000;  Sabatier,  1988;  Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985;  Weible  et  al.,  2009).  Facilitators  are  
content  neutral  and  process  advocates,  meaning  they  do  not  favor  one  position  over  
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another,  and  advocate  for  “fair,  inclusive,  and  open  processes  that  would  balance  
participation  and  improve  productivity  while  establishing  a  safe  psychological  space  in  
which  all  group  members  could  fully  participate”  (Doyle,  2007).  In  addition  to  ensuring  
the  process  is  transparent  and  open,  they  are  tasked  with  enforcing  ground  rules,  
providing  support  for  shared  learning,  summarizing  points  of  agreement,  and  moving  
the  negotiation  forward  to  help  participants  achieve  consensus  (Leach  and  Sabatier,  
1999).  Many  consider  facilitators  a  ‘key  resource’  in  managing  participatory  processes  
(Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985).  
2.1.1.6  Consensus-­‐‑based  negotiation  
Several  of  the  frameworks  advocate  for  using  consensus-­‐‑based  decision-­‐‑making  
(Beierle  and  Konisky,  2000;  Harter,  1982;  Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Sabatier  and  
Weible,  2007).  Requiring  consensus  increases  the  durability  of  the  decision  by  
incorporating  the  knowledge  and  values  of  multiple  interests,  and  therefore,  the  
likelihood  of  stakeholder  buy-­‐‑in  and  compliance  with  the  output  (Gunton  et  al.,  2003;  
Innes  and  Booher,  1999).  A  consensus  requirement  also  can  increase  the  quality  of  
deliberative  processes  by  increasing  fairness  and  facilitating  communication  among  
stakeholders  (Beierle,  2002;  Innes  and  Booher,  1999).  Despite  the  benefits  of  consensus-­‐‑
based  decision  making,  some  have  criticized  it,  pointing  out  that  it  can  create  a  less  than  
optimal  solution  that  reflects  the  lowest  common  denominator  or  “group  think;”  
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disempower  a  national  or  local  majority  in  favor  of  local  consensus;  satisfy  the  regulated  
participants  over  ensuring  the  greater  public  good;  and  cause  agency  officials  to  allocate  
less  time  and  fewer  resources  to  other  important  issues  while  focusing  consensus-­‐‑based  
processes  (Birkhoff  and  Lowry,  2003;  Coglianese,  2003;  Gunton  et  al.,  2003).  Moreover,  
unanimous  consensus  requires  agreement  by  all.  If  one  person  believes  his  best  
alternative  is  to  go  outside  the  process,  that  individual  has  the  ability  to  block  
agreement.    
Despite  these  criticisms,  consensus-­‐‑based  processes  can  create  second-­‐‑  and  third-­‐‑
order  benefits,  even  if  consensus  is  not  achieved,  such  as  external  collaborations,  
generation  of  innovative  ideas  and  social  capital,  increased  trust  and  communication,  
and  decreased  animosity  (Gunton  et  al.,  2003;  Innes  and  Booher,  1999).  Several  
environmental  agencies  employ  consensus-­‐‑based,  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  negotiations  to  
address  complex  environmental  problems  with  the  goal  of  combining  scientific  
expertise,  practical  knowledge,  and  public  values  (Conley  and  Moote,  2003;  Leach  et  al.,  
2002;  Niles  and  Lubell,  2012;  Renn,  2006).  One  such  agency  is  the  National  Marine  
Fisheries  Service,  which  has  used  consensus-­‐‑based,  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  processes  to  
mitigate  harmful  interactions  between  marine  mammals  and  fishing  gear.  
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2.1.2 Marine Mammal Bycatch and Multi-Stakeholder Negotiations 
The  unintentional  capture  or  entanglement  of  marine  life  in  fishing  gear  
(bycatch)  kills  thousands  of  marine  mammals  in  U.S.  waters  annually  (National  Marine  
Fisheries  Service,  2011;  Read  et  al.,  2006).  The  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  (NMFS),  
the  federal  agency  charged  with  protecting  marine  mammals  in  the  U.S.,  creates  and  
implements  regulations  subject  to  the  Marine  Mammal  Protection  Act  of  1972  (MMPA,  
16  U.S.C.  1361  et  seq.).  NMFS  quantitatively  evaluates  fisheries  impacts  on  marine  
mammals  and  identifies  marine  mammal  populations  that  are  vulnerable  to  fisheries  
bycatch.  When  bycatch  exceeds  statutory  thresholds,  NMFS  convenes  a  team  of  
stakeholders  (Take  Reduction  Team)  to  develop  consensus-­‐‑based  regulations  to  
minimize  marine  mammal-­‐‑fisheries  interactions.  Since  1996,  NMFS  has  convened  nine  
Take  Reduction  Teams  (Table  5).  Two  teams  were  combined  into  one  –  the  Gulf  of  
Maine  Harbor  porpoise  and  Mid-­‐‑Atlantic  teams  are  now  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  -­‐‑  and  
one  team  (Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans)  was  disbanded  because  two  of  the  three  fisheries  
it  addressed  were  closed.  Team  membership  includes  representatives  from  the  fishing  
industry  (fishermen,  lobbyists,  and  leaders  of  fishing  industry  associations),  
environmentalists,  scientific  researchers,  members  of  Regional  Fisheries  Management  
Councils  and  Commissions,  and  state  and  federal  environmental  managers.  The  
proportions  of  stakeholder  groups  vary  by  team,  but  for  all  teams  combined,  fishermen  
are  the  largest  stakeholder  group  with  37%  of  the  total  membership  
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(http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/interactions/trt/teams.htm).  The  False  Killer  Whale  and  
Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  teams  are  the  only  ones  in  which  fishermen  do  not  have  the  
greatest  proportion  of  the  membership.  Overall,  representatives  of  Regional  Fisheries  
Management  Councils  and  commissions  have  the  fewest  members  with  only  5%  of  the  
total  membership.  Conservationists  have  the  second-­‐‑lowest  average  representation  
(10%).    
  
Table  5:  List  of  Marine  Mammal  Take  Reduction  Teams  and  year  first  
convened.  
Take  Reduction  Team  
Year  
Initiated  
Atlantic  Large  Whale  (ALW)   1996  
Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans  (AOC)  a   1996  
Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  (ATG)   2006  
Bottlenose  Dolphin  (BD)   2001  
False  Killer  Whale  (FKW)   2010  
Gulf  of  Maine  Harbor  Porpoise  (HP)  b   1996  
Mid-­‐‑Atlantic  (HP)  b   1996  
Pelagic  Longline  (PL)   2005  
Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  (POC)   1996  
a  Disbanded  in  2001  
b  Merged  to  form  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  
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The  MMPA  requires  each  Take  Reduction  Team  to  generate  a  consensus-­‐‑based  
Take  Reduction  Plan  within  six  months  of  the  team’s  formation  (16  U.S.C.  
1387(f)(7)(A)(ii)).  These  plans  contain  agreed-­‐‑upon  actions  to  decrease  marine  mammal  
bycatch.  Consequently,  teams  meet  four  or  five  times  within  those  first  six  months.  
Thereafter,  teams  meet  annually,  or  when  data  show  increases  in  bycatch  that  exceed  
statutory  requirements.  The  plans  are  “living  documents,”  continually  modified  and  
amended  based  on  newly  available  information,  mitigation  study  results,  and  changes  in  
fisheries  management  practices.  Although  NMFS  is  obligated  to  use  the  consensus  
agreement,  if  no  such  agreement  exists,  the  agency  must  generate  its  own  regulations  
that  may  not  include  the  best  interest  of  all  parties  involved,  but  rather  regulations  that  
meet  statutory  mandates  (16  U.S.C.  1387(f)(7)(A)(ii)).  This  shadow  of  regulation  can  act  
as  an  incentive  for  stakeholders  to  reach  consensus.  In  addition,  despite  the  initial,  tight  
six-­‐‑month  deadline,  the  shadow  of  the  future  is  long,  greater  than  ten  years  for  most  
teams,  and  the  negotiations  are  professionally  facilitated,  which  encourages  
communication  among  team  members.    
2.1.3 Early Implementation of Take Reduction Planning 
2.1.3.1  Time  constraints  
The  MMPA  requires  the  Take  Reduction  Team  to  submit  a  draft  plan  to  NMFS  
within  six  months  (16  U.S.C.  1387(f)(7)(A)(i)),  and  that  NMFS  publish  the  proposed  plan  
in  the  Federal  Register  within  60  days  after  receipt  of  the  draft  plan  (16  U.S.C.  
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1387(f)(B)(i)).  The  agency  then  must  publish  the  final  plan  and  implementation  rules  
within  13  months  after  the  team  was  first  established  (16  U.S.C.  1387(f)(7)(C)).  NMFS  
missed  the  deadline  for  publishing  the  proposed  plans  for  five  teams  evaluated  by  the  
Government  Accountability  Office  (GAO,  2008),  and  missed  the  deadline  for  publishing  
the  final  plans  for  four  of  the  five  teams.  Agency  officials  attributed  these  failures  to  the  
time  needed  to  complete  rulemaking  and  respond  to  public  comments  (GAO,  2008).  
Missing  these  deadlines,  however,  created  mistrust  and  frustration  among  team  
members,  decreased  the  credibility  of  the  agency,  and  undermined  the  negotiation  
process  (RESOLVE,  1999;  Young,  2001).  For  two  particular  stocks  (Gulf  of  Maine  and  
mid-­‐‑Atlantic  harbor  porpoise),  the  environmental  stakeholders  felt  the  impacts  of  the  
rule-­‐‑making  delays  were  so  dire  they  filed  suit  to  compel  NMFS  to  adopt  the  plans  
(Young  2001).  This  defection  of  the  environmental  groups  engendered  mistrust  among  
other  stakeholders,  who  suspected  that  the  settlement  agreement  contained  additional  
language  that  was  not  agreed  upon  by  the  team  (Young,  2001).  Young  (2001)  described  
the  agency’s  failure  to  implement  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  within  the  required  
timeframes  as  “the  greatest  downfall  in  the  process”  (p.  345).  Sixty  percent  of  surveyed  
Take  Reduction  Team  members  were  dissatisfied  with  the  outcome,  largely  because  of  
time  constraints  and  lack  of  follow-­‐‑through  by  NMFS  (Coglianese,  2003;  RESOLVE,  
1999;  Young,  2001).  Many  believed  that  time  constraints  hampered  their  ability  to  
achieve  consensus.  
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2.1.3.2  Coordination  with  other  mandates  and  statutes  
While  learning  how  to  implement  the  take  reduction  planning  requirements  of  
the  MMPA,  the  agency  made  organizational  errors  reflective  of  Graham  Allison’s  second  
model  of  government  behavior  -­‐‑  there  was  a  noticeable  lack  of  coordination  with  other  
agency  divisions  (Allison  and  Zelikow,  1999).  Other  offices  within  NMFS  are  responsible  
for  implementing  fisheries  management  policies,  most  notably  those  prescribed  by  the  
Magnuson-­‐‑Stevens  Fisheries  Management  and  Conservation  Act  of  1976  (16  U.S.C.  1801  
et  seq.).  To  achieve  the  management  and  conservation  goals  of  the  statute,  eight  Regional  
Fisheries  Management  Councils  create  Fisheries  Management  Plans  to  regulate  fish  
stocks  within  their  jurisdictions.  Each  plan  must  be  approved  and  implemented  by  
NMFS.  Although  some  members  of  these  Fishery  Management  Councils  also  serve  as  
Take  Reduction  Team  members,  in  the  late  1990s  there  was  a  noticeable  lack  of  
coordination  between  the  Take  Reduction  Teams  and  Fisheries  Management  Councils,  
as  well  as  between  the  Office  of  Protected  Resources  (the  office  in  NMFS  that  
implements  MMPA  regulations)  and  the  NMFS  offices  working  on  fishery  management  
regulations  in  the  areas  overlapping  with  some  of  the  marine  mammal  take  reduction  
regulations  (Young,  2001).  These  overlaps  involved  the  Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans,  
Gulf  of  Maine  Harbor  Porpoise,  and  Mid-­‐‑Atlantic  Take  Reduction  Teams.    According  to  
Young  (2001),  these  fishery  management  regulations  overtook  the  Take  Reduction  Plans,  
requiring  the  teams  to  modify  portions  of  their  plans.  NMFS  also  changed  parts  of  all  of  
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the  plans  without  consulting  the  teams  for  consensus.  The  lack  of  coordination  within  
the  agency  (as  predicted  by  Allison)  sabotaged  the  conservation  and  consensus  efforts  of  
these  teams  (Young,  2001).      
In  addition  to  the  Magnuson-­‐‑Stevens  Fisheries  Management  and  Conservation  
Act,  Take  Reduction  Plans  are  subject  to  Section  7  of  the  Endangered  Species  Act  of  1973  
(ESA,  16  U.S.C.  1531  et  seq.)  to  ensure  they  do  not  jeopardize  the  continued  existence  of  
ESA-­‐‑listed  species;  analysis  under  the  National  Environmental  Policy  Act  of  1970  (42  
U.S.C.  4321  et  seq.)  to  evaluate  the  environmental  impacts  of  the  actions  resulting  in  a  
possible  environmental  assessment  or  environmental  impact  statement;  and  economic  
impact  analyses  under  the  Regulatory  Flexibility  Act  of  1980  (5  U.S.C.  §601  et  seq.).  Other  
statutes  to  which  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  must  conform  include  the  Coastal  Zone  
Management  Act  of  1972  (16  U.S.C.  §1461  et  seq.),  the  Information  Quality  Act  of  2000  (44  
U.S.C.  §3516),  and  the  Paperwork  Reduction  Act  of  1980  (44  U.S.C.  3501  et  seq.).      
2.1.3.3.  Data  deficiencies  
Data  deficiencies  also  were  problematic  in  creating  effective  Take  Reduction  
Plans  and  participant  buy-­‐‑in.  According  to  the  Government  Accountability  Office  (GAO,  
2008),  the  NMFS  marine  mammal  stock  assessment  data  from  which  bycatch  
information  and  statutory  thresholds  are  derived,  are  “incomplete,  outdated,  or  
imprecise”  (p.10).  Suspicions  about  the  credibility  of  the  data  hampered  several  
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negotiations  (RESOLVE,  1999;  Young,  2001).  According  to  RESOLVE  (1999),  nearly  70%  
of  the  team  members  surveyed  felt  the  data  were  insufficient.        
2.1.3.4  Early  lack  of  consensus  
Two  teams  failed  to  achieve  full  consensus,  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  and  the  
Mid-­‐‑Atlantic  teams.  At  the  time,  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  Team  had  32  members  
(RESOLVE,  1999).  It  has  since  grown  to  more  than  80  members  and  alternates  combined.  
In  1997,  NMFS  seemed  to  overlook  many  of  the  consensus  items  from  the  original  
negotiations  and  modified  the  proposed  plan  (Young,  2001).  First  the  agency  added  
restrictions,  which  generated  over  13,000  public  comments  opposing  the  rule.  In  
response,  the  agency  swung  the  other  way  and  substantially  weakened  the  proposed  
plan  (Young,  2001).  These  changes  polarized  the  team  and  created  mistrust  and  
animosity  (Young,  2001).    
The  Mid-­‐‑Atlantic  Team  was  one  of  the  teams  involved  in  a  lawsuit  filed  by  
environmental  organizations  to  compel  NMFS  to  meet  the  statutory  deadlines  (Young,  
2001).  This  team  failed  to  achieve  consensus  on  only  one  issue  regarding  funding  of  a  
scientifically  valid  acoustic  deterrence  device  experiment.  It  has  since  merged  with  the  
Gulf  of  Maine  Harbor  Porpoise  Team  to  form  the  Harbor  Porpoise  Take  Reduction  
Team.  
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After  investing  nearly  20  years  in  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  planning  and  
in  light  of  the  early  challenges  described  above,  some  key  questions  have  emerged.  Has  
the  NMFS  addressed  these  challenges?  Do  these  teams  have  the  necessary  ingredients  to  
create  efficient  and  effective  Take  Reduction  Plans?  Do  the  members  believe  the  
negotiations  are  fair?  Have  these  teams  achieved  consensus  and  if  not,  why  not?  How  
satisfied  with  the  plans  are  the  members?  Do  the  members  believe  that  they  are  
mitigating  bycatch?  Do  these  plans  actually  reduce  marine  mammal  bycatch?  What  
factors  affect  actual  and  perceived  plan  effectiveness?    
2.1.4 Evaluation of Marine Mammal Take Reduction Teams 
There  are  currently  seven  active  Take  Reduction  Teams  (Table  5).  A  2008  review  
of  the  marine  mammal  take  reduction  planning  process  by  the  Government  
Accountability  Office  explicitly  identified  the  need  for  “a  comprehensive  strategy  for  
assessing  the  effectiveness  of  Take  Reduction  Plans  and  ...  regulations  that  have  been  
implemented”  (GAO,  2008,  p.  37).  In  addition,  Gunton  et  al.  (2003)  called  for  
investigations  of  the  “key  attributes”  of  consensus-­‐‑based,  environmental  decision-­‐‑
making  and  the  need  to  identify  the  prerequisites  for  success.  
This  research  aims  to  address  the  research  questions  described  above  through  the  
following  inquiries:    1)  evaluate  Take  Reduction  Team  participant  opinions  of  the  take  
reduction  negotiation  process,  outputs,  and  outcomes  with  respect  to  the  above-­‐‑
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mentioned  ingredients  required  for  successful  multi-­‐‑stakeholder,  consensus-­‐‑based  
negotiation  (participants,  shared  learning,  repeated  interactions,  facilitated  meetings,  
and  consensus-­‐‑based  outputs);  2)  compare  opinions  across  teams  and  stakeholder  
groups;  and  3)  identify  and  explore  the  reasons  for  similarities  and  differences  among  
respondents,  teams,  and  stakeholder  groups.  
 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Quantitative Data Collection- Survey Sample   
Social  capital,  or  the  benefits  of  creating  social  networks  through  repeated  
interactions  among  individuals,  embodies  trust,  reciprocity,  and  cooperation.  Social  
capital  combined  with  fairness  integrate  the  ingredients  of  shared  learning,  balanced  
team  membership,  repeated  interactions,  facilitated  meetings,  and  consensus-­‐‑based  
decision  making.  Thus,  using  social  capital  and  fairness  to  represent  these  ingredients  
required  for  successful  consensus-­‐‑based,  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  negotiation,  I  drafted  survey  
questions  to  evaluate  Take  Reduction  Team  participants’  perceptions  of  the  negotiation  
process.  I  also  included  questions  to  evaluate  stakeholders’  satisfaction  with  outputs  
(Take  Reduction  Plans)  and  outcomes.  To  inform  the  development  of  the  survey  
instrument,  I  conducted  two  focus  groups  consisting  of  5-­‐‑10  members  that  included  
fishermen,  environmentalists,  university  and  government  marine  mammal  scientists,  
and  Federal  marine  mammal  managers.  Participants  received  draft  survey  questions  
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and  provided  feedback  regarding  their  clarity  and  content  via  a  facilitated  discussion.  
Survey  questions  included  topics  about  the  Take  Reduction  Team  negotiation  process,  
outputs,  and  outcomes.  Participants  were  provided  dinner  as  compensation.  
Current  and  former  Take  Reduction  Team  participants  including  facilitators  and  
agency  staff  (n=219)  received  an  email  with  a  weblink  to  a  survey  (Qualtrics  Labs  Inc.,  
Provo,  UT)  containing  15  questions  using  a  5-­‐‑  or  7-­‐‑point  Likert  scale  about  marine  
mammal  Take  Reduction  Teams.  To  increase  response  rates,  I  supplemented  the  web  
survey  with  a  conventional  mail  survey  (n=25),  an  incentive  (i.e.,  chance  to  win  one  of  
two  gift  cards),  and  postcards  sent  via  conventional  mail  notifying  each  respondent  of  
the  upcoming  survey.  Web  survey  participants  who  had  not  taken  the  survey  received  
an  email  reminder  every  two  weeks  for  eight  weeks,  while  conventional  mail  
respondents  received  a  postcard  reminder  at  three  weeks  and  a  second  survey  at  six  
weeks.  Survey  data  were  exported  into  Microsoft  Excel  and  coded  for  ease  of  analysis.  
2.2.2 Qualitative Data Collection 
Semi-­‐‑structured  interviews  of  22  individuals  representing  each  stakeholder  
group  (Table  6)  supplemented  the  survey  by  providing  qualitative  information  about  
stakeholders’  experiences,  perceptions,  feelings,  and  insights  about  marine  mammal  
take  reduction  planning.  Face-­‐‑to-­‐‑face  interviews  were  recorded  using  an  Olympus  WS-­‐‑
700M  digital  audio  recording  device,  while  phone  interviews  were  conducted  using  
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Skype  and  recorded  using  Quick  Time  Player  version  10.3  (Apple,  Inc.).  I  then  
transcribed  (verbatim)  all  interviews  into  a  Microsoft  Word  document.  An  interview  
guide  prompted  respondents  to  describe  their  feelings  and  opinions  about  the  Take  
Reduction  Team  negotiation  process,  outputs  (Take  Reduction  Plans),  implementation,  
and  outcomes.  I  imported  interview  transcripts  and  open-­‐‑ended  survey  comments  into  
NVivo,  v.  10  to  detect  emergent  themes,  search  for  commonalities,  and  identify  
differences  among  the  stakeholders  and  teams.  To  facilitate  searches  for  commonalities  
and  differences,  I  arranged  the  interview  guide  similarly  to  the  survey,  which  helped  to  
organize  interview  responses  into  broad  topics.  I  extracted  key  points  from  the  
qualitative  data  generated  deductively  by  the  interview  guide  and  communicated  
inductively  by  the  interviewees,  and  grouped  similar  points  into  categories.  For  
example,  respondents’  views  about  law  enforcement  were  grouped  together,  as  were  
their  thoughts  about  compliance.  I  then  nested  these  concepts  into  a  broader  theme  of  
implementation  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans.  This  study  received  approval  from  Duke  
University’s  Institutional  Review  Board  (IRB)  for  Non-­‐‑Medical  Research  on  Human  
Subjects  as  exempt  research.    
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Table  6:  Interview  subjects  classified  by  stakeholder  affiliation  and  Take  
Reduction  Team.  ALW=Atlantic  Large  Whale,  AOC=Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans,  
ATG=Atlantic  Trawl  Gear,  BD=Bottlenose  Dolphin,  FKW=False  Killer  Whale,  
HP=Harbor  Porpoise,  PL=Pelagic  Longline,  and  POC=Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans.  
Affiliation   ALW   AOC   ATG   BD   FKW   HP   PL   POC   Total  
Environmentalists   3   2   1   2   1   3   2   1   3  
Facilitators   2   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   3  
Federal  employees   3   3   2   3   2   3   3   2   3  
Fishing  Industry   2   0   1   2   1   2   1   1   6  
Fisheries  managers   1   0   1   1   0   1   1   1   2  
Researchers   1   1   1   2   2   1   1   1   3  
State  managers   2   0   1   1   0   2   1   0   2  
Total   14   7   8   12   7   13   10   7   22  
Missing   0   3   0   0   2   0   0   1   6  
  
2.2.3 Survey Analyses 
The  original  survey  database  contained  139  records  (from  139  respondents).  
Several  respondents  were  members  of  more  than  one  Take  Reduction  Team,  however.  I  
separated  the  records  of  respondents  who  answered  questions  about  more  than  one  
team  so  that  each  database  record  contained  responses  for  only  one  team.  This  increased  
the  database  to  268  records/total  responses  and  created  a  one-­‐‑to-­‐‑many  relationship  in  
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which  each  database  record  corresponded  to  an  individual’s  responses  about  only  one  
team  (one  respondent  to  many  teams/records/responses,  Table  7).  
Table  7:  Survey  responses  by  stakeholder  affiliation,  including  the  number  
and  proportion  of  individuals  who  are  members  of  more  than  one  team  and  total  
number  of  responses  per  stakeholder  group.    
   Researchers  
Fishing  
Industry  
Environmentalists   State   Federal  
Fisheries  
managers  
Facilitators   Total  
#  individuals   30   41   8   21   30   4   5   139  
#  individuals  
on  >1  team  
10   14   6   11   17   2   1   61  
%  
individuals  
on  >1  team  





51   62   24   37   75   10   9   268  
  
Although  individuals  could  identify  themselves  as  belonging  to  more  than  one  
stakeholder  group,  multiple  stakeholder  groups  and  multiple  teams  per  respondent  
would  have  confounded  the  analyses.  In  addition,  only  15  stakeholders  identified  with  
more  than  one  stakeholder  group  so  I  employed  the  following  decision  rules  to  classify  
individuals  into  one  stakeholder  category:    1)  used  clarifying  comments  in  the  open-­‐‑
ended  section  of  the  survey  to  categorize  those  individuals  into  one  group;  2)  classified  
individuals  who  identified  themselves  with  a  known  category  and  “other,”  in  the  
known  group;  and  3)  used  the  affiliations  identified  in  the  most  recent  NMFS  Take  
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Reduction  Team  membership  rosters.  I,  therefore,  created  a  one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one  relationship  
between  respondent  and  stakeholder  affiliation.  There  was,  then,  a  one-­‐‑to-­‐‑many  
relationship  between  an  individual’s  stakeholder  affiliation  and  Take  Reduction  
Team/database  records,  but  for  every  team,  there  was  only  one  response  or  record  per  
individual.  Therefore,  from  this  point  forward  when  describing  the  data  by  stakeholder  
affiliation  (e.g.  fishermen,  researcher,  etc.),  I  will  discuss  the  results  in  terms  of  the  
proportion  of  total  RESPONSES  to  each  question  (N=  268).  On  the  other  hand,  because  
there  is  only  one  record  per  Take  Reduction  Team  (N=268,  Table  8),  when  discussing  the  
data  grouped  by  team,  the  number  of  RESPONSES  per  team  (N=268)  is  the  same  as  the  
number  of  RESPONDENTS  per  team  (N=268,  Table  8).  
Table  8:  Number  of  survey  responses  by  Take  Reduction  Team,  includes  
responses  by  individuals  on  more  than  one  team.  ALW=  Atlantic  Large  Whale,  
AOC=Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans,  ATG=Atlantic  Trawl  Gear,  BD=Bottlenose  
Dolphin,  FKW=False  Killer  Whale,  HP=Harbor  Porpoise,  PL=Pelagic  Longline,  
POC=Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  
  
ALW AOC ATG BD FKW HP PL POC TOTAL
Total2#2individuals2=2
responses2=2records2in2
database 65 14 23 53 19 54 29 11 268
#2individuals2on2>212team 43 11 20 37 7 48 21 4
%2individuals2on2>12team 66% 79% 87% 70% 37% 89% 72% 36%
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Responses  of  “I  don’t  know”  and  “N/A”  were  removed  from  the  database  for  
analyses.  I  generated  frequency  distributions  for  each  survey  question  grouped  by  
stakeholder  affiliation  and  Take  Reduction  Team.    
I  employed  Structural  Equation  Models  (SEMs)  with  latent  variables  to  analyze  
the  survey  data  using  MPlus,  v  6.1  (Muthén  and  Muthén,  1998-­‐‑2010).  As  described  
above,  the  survey  was  designed  to  capture  participants’  feelings  about  social  capital,  
fairness,  and  satisfaction  with  team  outputs  and  outcomes.  Prior  to  SEM  creation,  I  
conducted  an  Exploratory  Factor  Analysis  employing  Geomin  rotation  (Mplus,  v  6.1)  to  
help  identify  potential  latent  variables.  Factor  loadings  of  the  accepted  model  ranged  
from  0.532-­‐‑1.057.  Although  the  model  fit  was  best  with  five  factors,  it  placed  one  
variable  (NEWFRIENDS)  in  a  factor  by  itself  (Table  9),  which  was  not  theoretically  
relevant,  so  I  chose  to  use  the  following  four  latent  variables  based  on  the  results  of  the  
factor  analysis:    shared  learning  and  social  capital  (SOCAP),  fairness  (FAIR),  satisfaction  
with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  (TRP  SAT),  and  perceived  ecological  success  (PCD  ECO,  
Table  10).  The  software  would  not  run  the  factor  analysis  when  I  tried  to  include  a  
variable  about  the  effect  of  Take  Reduction  Plans  on  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen,  so  
those  results  are  discussed  separately,  outside  of  the  model.    
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Table  9.  Factor  loadings  with  five  factors.  It  depicted  NEWFRIENDS  in  a  factor  
by  itself.  
  
I  created  three  models  using  the  “CLUSTER”  command  to  correct  for  non-­‐‑
independence  of  the  observations  (i.e.,  multiple  Take  Reduction  Teams  per  respondent).  
All  models  used  a  Mean-­‐‑  and  Variance-­‐‑adjusted  Weighted  Least  Square  (WLSMV)  
estimator,  the  Mplus  default  for  complex  models  with  categorical  variables  (Muthén  and  
Muthén,  1998-­‐‑2010).  The  first  model  characterized  respondents’  opinions  about  the  
negotiation  process  and  their  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  (Figure  4).  The  
second  model  illustrated  stakeholder  perceptions  about  the  outcomes  or  success  of  the  
Take  Reduction  Plans  (Figure  5),  and  the  final  model  combined  the  first  two  to  provide  a  
generalized  conceptualization  of  stakeholder  perceptions  of  marine  mammal  Take  












NEWVIEWS 0.261 0.814 0.567 0.142 0.304
NWKNLFSH 0.215 0.898 0.414 0.161 0.386
NEWKNLBC 0.255 0.848 0.464 0.142 0.421
NEWFRIENDS 1.907 0.514 0.435 0.333 0.347
MYVIEWS 0.191 0.484 0.958 0.193 0.511
MYVWSEXP 0.179 0.310 0.820 0.151 0.429
OTRVIEWS 0.224 0.467 0.890 0.075 0.443
TRPVIEWS 0.199 0.314 0.428 0.382 0.739
TRPBETTR 0.145 0.407 0.463 0.237 0.872
BC 0.180 0.196 0.253 0.719 0.505




Figure  4:  Structural  Equation  Model  (SEM)  #1  of  the  marine  mammal  Take  
Reduction  Team  Negotiation  Process.  Circles  depict  latent  variables  and  squares  
depict  measurement  indicators  and  independent  predictors.  For  clarity,  error  terms  
were  omitted.  
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Figure  5:  Structural  Equation  Model  (SEM)  #2  of  stakeholder  perceived  
ecological  outcomes  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans.  Circles  depict  latent  
variables  and  squares  depict  both  measurement  indicators  and  independent  





Figure  6:    Full  conceptual  Structural  Equation  Model  (SEM)  of  the  marine  
mammal  Take  Reduction  negotiation  process  and  perceived  ecological  outcomes.  
Circles  depict  latent  variables  and  squares  depict  measurement  indicators.  Error  terms  
were  omitted  for  clarity.  
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In  this  study,  all  three  models  were  over-­‐‑identified,  allowing  for  testing  of  each  
model  fit.  To  facilitate  model  identification,  I  scaled  each  latent  variable  to  one  
measurement  indicator,  meaning  that  the  factor  loading  of  one  measurement  indicator  
for  each  latent  variable  was  set  to  one.  To  test  for  the  consistency  or  reliability  of  the  
survey  questions  (measurement  indicators),  I  used  the  squared  multiple  correlation  
coefficient,  r2  (Bollen,  1989)  for  each  observed  indicator,  which  explains  the  systematic  
variance  in  each  indicator  (see  Appendix  A  for  description  of  measurement  models).    
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Survey Responses 
Nearly  half  of  the  respondents  (61,  44%)  were  members  of  more  than  one  Take  
Reduction  Team  (Tables  7  and  8).  The  fishing  industry  (fishermen,  lobbyists,  and  leaders  
of  fishing  industry  associations)  had  the  largest  number  of  individual  respondents  (41)  
with  62  total  responses  and  14  individuals  who  were  members  of  more  than  one  team  
(Table  7).  Federal  workers  (employees  of  the  Marine  Mammal  Commission  and  NMFS  
managers  and  scientists)  had  the  second  largest  number  of  individual  respondents  (30),  
but  the  largest  number  of  total  responses  (75),  and  17  people  participating  on  more  than  
one  team  (Table  7).  Members  of  Regional  Fisheries  Management  Councils  or  
commissions  and  facilitators  made  up  the  fewest  respondents  with  four  individuals  (ten  
total  responses)  and  five  individuals  (nine  total  responses)  respectively  (Table  7).  
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The  combined  response  rate  for  the  web  and  mail  surveys  was  59%  (139  of  234).  
Response  rates  for  the  two  modes  differed  substantially,  however  (web  survey=60%,  
mail  survey  =36%).  The  Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  had  the  greatest  number  of  
respondents  (65),  while  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  had  only  11,  which  is  
consistent  with  the  relative  team  sizes.  Individuals  were  fairly  experienced,  with  66%  of  
the  responses  indicating  participation  in  four  or  more  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  or  
webinars.    
2.3.2 Structural Equation Model 
2.3.2.1  Model  1:    Negotiation  process  and  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  
2.3.2.1.1  Latent  Variable  Model  
This  model  contains  three  latent  variables  that  represent  the  following  concepts:    
1)  shared  learning  and  social  capital  (SOCAP);  2)  fairness  of  the  negotiation  process  
(FAIR);  and  3)  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  (TRP  SAT).  All  three  latent  
variables  were  regressed  on  covariate  predictors  that  included  the  Take  Reduction  Team  
identity,  team  size  and  age,  stakeholder  affiliation,  and  U.S.  geographic  region.  To  
improve  model  fit,  I  discarded  insignificant  covariates.  None  of  the  covariate  predictors  
(team  identity,  age,  or  size,  stakeholder  affiliation,  or  region)  significantly  influenced  the  
fairness  latent  variable  (FAIR).  In  addition,  I  initially  regressed  satisfaction  with  the  Take  
Reduction  Plan  (TRP  SAT)  on  both  shared  learning/social  capital  (SOCAP)  and  fairness  
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(FAIR)  theorizing  that  both  aspects  of  the  negotiation  process  should  influence  
satisfaction  with  the  output.  However,  the  model  with  the  best  fit  showed  that  only  
fairness  significantly  influenced  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan,  but  there  was  
a  significant  covariance  between  FAIR  and  SOCAP  (ϕ  =  0.5,  p=0.000).    
2.3.2.1.2  Measurement  model  
The  latent  variable  SOCAP  was  measured  by  four  survey  questions  about  
stakeholder  learning  and  relationships  using  a  5-­‐‑point  Likert  scale  ranging  from  
“strongly  disagree”  to  “strongly  agree”  (Table  10).  I  designated  NEWVIEWS  as  the  
scaling  indicator,  meaning  that  the  factor  loading  for  NEWVIEWS  was  set  to  one  (Table  
10).  The  other  two  latent  variables  used  the  same  5-­‐‑point  Likert  scale.  Fairness  (FAIR)  
was  measured  by  three  questions.  I  assigned  MYVIEWS  as  the  scaling  indicator  for  
FAIR,  while  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  (TRP  SAT)  was  measured  by  
three  questions  with  TRPVIEWS  as  the  scaling  indicator.  In  addition,  satisfaction  with  
the  Take  Reduction  Plan  (TRP  SAT)  shared  the  measurement  indicator  NEWFRIENDS  
with  the  latent  variable  shared  learning/social  capital  (SOCAP)  (Table  10,  Figure  4).  
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Table  10:  Structural  Equation  Models,  latent  variables,  measurement  
indicators,  factor  loadings  (λ),  and  reliabilities  (squared  multiple  correlation  
coefficients).  SOCAP=shared  learning  and  social  capital;  FAIR=fairness;  TRP  
















































2.3.2.1.3  Reliability  and  Model  Fit  
Model  fit  was  excellent  (Table  11)  as  measured  by  chi-­‐‑square  difference  test  
(p=0.1394),  Root  Mean  Square  Error  of  Approximation  (RMSEA=0.011),  Comparative  Fit  
Index  (CFI  =0.999),  and  Tucker-­‐‑Lewis  Index  (TLI=0.999).  Reliability  (Table  10)  ranged  
from  0.26  (NEWFRIENDS)  to  1.00  (NEWKNLBC),  and  with  the  exception  of  
NEWFRIENDS,  reliabilities  were  good  (0.62-­‐‑.0.93).  The  independent  predictors  
explained  only  14%  of  the  variance  in  the  shared  learning/social  capital  (SOCAP)  latent  
variable,  but  explained  nearly  half  of  the  variance  (42%)  in  the  latent  variable  
representing  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  (TRP  SAT,  Table  12).  






















test 2.184 0.001 1.001
ChiBsquare%difference%
df 1 1 1
ChiBsquare%difference%
pBvalue 0.139 0.977 0.317
RMSEA 0.011 0.000 0.044
CFI 0.999 1.000 0.990
TLI 0.999 1.009 0.987
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Table  12:  Squared  multiple  correlation  coefficients  (r2)  for  the  latent  variables.  
SOCAP=shared  learning  and  social  capital;  FAIR=fairness;  TRP  SAT=satisfaction  with  
the  Take  Reduction  Plan;  PCD  ECO=perceived  ecological  success.  
Model   Latent  Variable   R-­‐‑Squared  
Model  1  
SOCAP   0.14  
TRP  SAT   0.42  
Model  2   PCD  ECO   0.24  
Model  3  
TRP  SAT   0.37  
PCD  ECO   0.30  
2.3.2.2  Model  2:    Perceived  ecological  success  
2.3.2.2.1  Latent  Variable  Model  
The  best  fitting  model  included  one  latent  variable  representing  perceived  
ecological  success  (PCD  ECO),  which  was  regressed  on  the  same  independent  predictors  
as  the  previous  model.  Again,  I  retained  only  those  variables  that  were  significant  (p  <  
0.05,  Figure  5).    
2.3.2.2.2  Measurement  Model  
PCD  ECO  was  measured  by  two  7-­‐‑point  Likert  scale  questions  about  effects  of  
the  Take  Reduction  Team  process  on  marine  mammal  bycatch  and  marine  mammal  
abundance  (“made  much  worse”  to  “made  much  better,”  see  Appendix  B).  I  chose  
BYCATCH  as  the  scaling  indicator.  
  62  
  
2.3.2.2.3  Reliability  and  Model  Fit  
Model  fit  was  excellent  as  measured  by  the  chi-­‐‑square  difference  test,  RMSEA,  
CFI,  and  TLI  (Table  11).  Reliabilities  of  the  measurement  indicators  for  the  latent  
variable  were  0.76  and  0.94  (Table  10).  The  independent  predictors  explained  24%  of  the  
variance  in  the  latent  variable  perceived  ecological  success  (PCD  ECO,  Table  12).  
2.3.2.3  Model  3:    General  conceptual  model  
2.3.2.3.1  Latent  Variable  Model  
This  model  combines  the  previous  two  and  thus  contains  all  four  latent  variables  
and  their  corresponding  measurement  indicators  (Figure  6).  It  characterizes  the  
relationships  between  participants’  views  of  the  negotiation  process  (social  capital  and  
fairness),  their  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  and  their  perceptions  of  how  
effective  the  plans  are  at  reducing  marine  mammal  bycatch  and  increasing  marine  
mammal  abundance.  Perceived  impacts  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  on  marine  mammal  
bycatch  and  abundance  were  influenced  directly  by  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  
Plan  (TRP  SAT,  β=0.66,  p=0.000)  and  indirectly  by  perceived  fairness  of  the  negotiation  
(FAIR,  γ=0.34,  p=0.000).  The  covariance  between  SOCAP  and  FAIR  also  was  significant  
(ϕ=0.50,  p=0.000).    
2.3.2.3.2  Measurement  Model  
Once  again,  TRP  SAT  and  SOCAP  shared  the  measurement  indicator  
NEWFRIENDS.  The  indicators  for  FAIR,  SOCAP,  and  TRP  SAT  were  measured  by  5-­‐‑
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point  Likert  scale  questions  (from  “strongly  agree”  to  “strongly  disagree,”  see  Appendix  
B)  while  the  PCD  ECO  measurement  indicators  were  derived  from  responses  to  
questions  with  a  7-­‐‑point  Likert  scale  (from  “made  much  worse”  to  “made  much  better,”  
see  Appendix  B).  I  retained  the  same  scaling  indicators  that  were  used  in  the  previous  
models  (Table  10).  
2.3.2.3.3  Reliability  and  Model  Fit  
The  chi-­‐‑square  difference  test,  RMSEA,  CFI,  and  TLI  revealed  good  model  fit  
(Table  11).  Reliability  indicators  ranged  from  0.37  (NEWFRIENDS)  to  0.98  (BYCATCH).  
The  latent  variable  fairness  (FAIR),  explained  37%  of  the  variance  of  satisfaction  with  the  
Take  Reduction  Plan  (TRP  SAT),  while  FAIR,  and  TRP  SAT  explained  30%  of  the  
variance  of  Perceived  Ecological  Success  (PCD  ECO,  Table  11).  
2.3.3 Social Capital and Shared Learning (SOCAP) 
Two  factor  loadings  for  the  measurement  indicators  about  shared  learning  
(NEWKNLFISH,  NEWKNLBC)  were  significant  and  similar  in  value  to  the  scaling  
indicator  (Table  10).  This  indicates  that  the  direct  effects  of  SOCAP  on  the  observed  
indicators  of  shared  learning  and  an  improved  understanding  of  the  viewpoints  of  
others  were  nearly  equivalent,  and  at  nearly  a  one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one  relationship.  This  suggests  that  
a  one-­‐‑unit  increase  in  SOCAP  would  cause  roughly  a  one  unit  increase  in  
NEWKNLFISH,  NEWKNLBC  and  NEWVIEWS.  The  other  measurement  indicator,  
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NEWFRIENDS,  was  significant,  but  its  factor  loading  was  substantially  lower  than  the  
others.  It  also  partially  loaded  on  another  latent  variable  (TRP  SAT),  meaning  that  
improvements  in  participant  views  of  social  capital  and  shared  learning  would  
somewhat  improve  their  views  about  creating  new  relationships,  and  that  
improvements  in  stakeholder  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  also  would  
mildly  improve  their  perceptions  about  creating  new  relationships.  There  was  a  
significant  association  (covariance)  between  SOCAP  and  the  latent  variable  for  fairness  
(FAIR,  ϕ  =  0.5,  p=0.000).  
Although  the  teams  rated  shared  learning  and  social  capital  fairly  highly  (83%  on  
average  agreed  or  strongly  agreed),  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  and  Atlantic  Offshore  
Cetaceans  teams  had  the  most  positive  attitudes.  Approximately  90%  of  their  averaged  
responses  to  the  four  questions  comprised  in  this  latent  variable  were  either  “agree”  or  
“strongly  agree.”  Conversely,  teams  with  the  lowest  averages  included  False  Killer  
Whale,  Atlantic  Large  Whale,  and  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear,  in  which  an  average  of  8%  
disagreed  or  strongly  disagreed  with  the  survey  questions  about  social  capital  and  
shared  learning.  
More  than  90%  of  the  responses  showed  stakeholders  had  a  greater  
understanding  of  the  viewpoints  of  others  during  the  negotiation  (NEWVIEWS).  
Members  of  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  team  and  responses  by  the  facilitators  most  strongly  
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agreed.  Stakeholders  with  the  least  enthusiastic  responses  included  members  of  the  
Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  team  and  responses  by  scientific  researchers  (Table  13).  The  
majority  of  responses  (69%)  indicated  stakeholders  agreed  or  strongly  agreed  they  had  
established  new  or  long-­‐‑term  relationships  with  members  with  opposing  viewpoints  
(NEWFRIENDS).  Members  of  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  and  responses  by  federal  
employees  scored  the  highest,  with  approximately  80%  agreeing  or  strongly  agreeing.  
Once  again,  members  of  the  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  team  and  responses  by  researchers  had  
dimmest  outlook  with  nearly  one-­‐‑third  of  disagreeing  or  strongly  disagreeing  (Table  14).  
Table  13:  Responses  to  the  question  if  stakeholders  have  a  better  
understanding  of  the  viewpoints  of  others,  by  Take  Reduction  Team  (top)  and  
stakeholder  category  (bottom).  
NEWVIEWS   ALW   ATG   BD   FKW   HP   POC   PL   AOC   Total  
Strongly  Disagree   1.6%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.4%  
Disagree   3.2%   0.0%   0.0%   5.6%   0.0%   0.0%   3.6%   0.0%   1.6%  
Neither   4.8%   18.2%   4.2%   5.6%   6.0%   9.1%   7.1%   0.0%   6.4%  
Agree   46.0%   59.1%   33.3%   38.9%   36.0%   45.5%   32.1%   45.5%   40.6%  





Environmentalist   State   Federal   FMC   Facilitator   Total  
Strongly  Disagree   0.0%   1.9%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.4%  
Disagree   6.3%   1.9%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   1.6%  
Neither   14.6%   5.6%   4.3%   2.8%   4.2%   11.1%   0.0%   6.4%  
Agree   35.4%   61.1%   47.8%   41.7%   31.9%   22.2%   11.1%   40.6%  
Strongly  Agree   43.8%   29.6%   47.8%   55.6%   63.9%   66.7%   88.9%   51.0%  
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Table  14:  Responses  to  the  question  if  stakeholders  established  new,  long-­‐‑term  
professional  or  personal  relationships  with  team  members  who  have  differing  
viewpoints,  by  Take  Reduction  Team  (top)  and  stakeholder  group  (bottom).  
NEWFRIENDS   ALW   ATG   BD   FKW   HP   POC   PL   AOC   Total  
Strongly  Disagree   0.0%   4.5%   0.0%   0.0%   2.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.8%  
Disagree   10.9%   22.7%   12.8%   11.1%   7.8%   0.0%   11.5%   11.1%   11.3%  
Neither   17.2%   36.4%   17.0%   16.7%   11.8%   27.3%   19.2%   33.3%   19.0%  
Agree   51.6%   31.8%   42.6%   50.0%   56.9%   54.5%   38.5%   33.3%   47.2%  





Environmentalist   State   Federal   FMC   Facilitator   Total  
Strongly  Disagree   0.0%   1.9%   4.2%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.8%  
Disagree   22.9%   13.2%   20.8%   5.6%   4.2%   0.0%   0.0%   11.3%  
Neither   22.9%   18.9%   12.5%   22.2%   15.5%   33.3%   14.3%   19.0%  
Agree   47.9%   47.2%   50.0%   50.0%   50.7%   22.2%   14.3%   47.2%  
Strongly  Agree   6.3%   18.9%   12.5%   22.2%   29.6%   44.4%   71.4%   21.8%  
  
Learning  about  marine  mammal  bycatch  and  the  fisheries  that  interact  with  
marine  mammals  was  rated  quite  high,  with  more  than  85%  agreeing  or  strongly  
agreeing  that  they  had  acquired  a  better  understanding  of  those  two  topics  as  a  result  of  
participating  in  the  negotiation  process.  Members  of  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  
and  responses  of  facilitators  and  federal  employees  had  the  highest  proportion  of  
responses  that  were  agree  or  strongly  disagree.  Roughly  one-­‐‑fifth  of  the  members  of  the  
Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  and  responses  of  scientific  researchers,  however,  were  
neutral,  disagreed,  or  strongly  disagreed.  
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2.3.4 Fairness (FAIR) 
General  perceptions  of  fairness  were  remarkably  high.  Averaged  perceived  
fairness  across  all  teams  was  93%,  and  all  members  of  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic  Offshore  
Cetaceans  teams  believed  the  process  was  fair.  Although  the  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  and  
Pelagic  Longline  teams  had  the  lowest  scores,  their  average  perceived  fairness  was  still  
quite  high  (90%).  Nearly  95%  of  the  responses  suggested  stakeholders  believed  they  
were  given  the  opportunity  to  express  their  views,  with  members  of  the  Pacific  Offshore  
Cetaceans  team  and  responses  by  fisheries  management  council/commission  members  
most  strongly  agreeing.  A  slightly  lower  percentage  of  responses  showed  members  took  
the  opportunity  to  express  their  views  (90%),  while  almost  96%  believed  that  others  had  
an  opportunity  to  express  their  views.  All  factor  loadings  of  the  measurement  indicators  
were  significant.  Factor  loadings  were  similar  to  the  scaling  indicator  MYVIEWS  
(Figures  4  and  6),  meaning  that  stakeholders’  opinions  of  fairness  of  the  negotiation  
directly  affected  their  opinions  about  expressing  their  views  and  the  opportunity  of  
others  to  express  their  views  in  nearly  a  one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one  relationship.  No  independent  
predictors  significantly  influenced  the  FAIR  latent  variable  (Figure  4),  indicating  that  
regardless  of  Take  Reduction  Team  membership  or  stakeholder  affiliation,  respondents  
had  similar  views  of  fairness.  
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2.3.5 Satisfaction with the Take Reduction Plan (TRP SAT) 
Perceived  fairness  of  the  negotiation  (FAIR)  significantly  influenced  stakeholder  
satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  (γ=0.44,  p  =  0.000).  The  SEM  identified  five  
Take  Reduction  Teams  as  significant  covariates  of  TRP  SAT  (Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans,  
False  Killer  Whale,  Bottlenose  Dolphin,  Pelagic  Longline,  and  Harbor  Porpoise  Plan).  All  
regression  coefficients  were  positive  (Table  15).    An  average  of  66%  of  the  responses  
indicated  stakeholders  were  satisfied  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plans.  The  Pacific  
Offshore  Cetaceans  and  Bottlenose  Dolphin  teams  had  the  highest  average  ratings  of  
89%  and  80%  respectively.  Members  of  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  were  the  least  
satisfied  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  (45%)  in  which  an  average  of  22%  disagreed  or  




Table  15:  Regression  coefficients,  standard  errors  and  two-­‐‑tailed  p-­‐‑values  of  
SOCAP,  TRP  SAT,  and  PCD  ECO  on  covariate  predictors  (Models  1  and  2);  and  
regression  coefficients  for  the  endogenous  latent  variables  TRP  SAT  and  PCD  ECO  
for  Model  3.  The  regression  coefficient  for  PCD  ECO  on  FAIR  shows  the  indirect  
effects  of  fairness  on  the  perceived  ecological  success.  BD=Bottlenose  Dolphin,  FKW=  
False  Killer  Whale,  HP=Harbor  Porpoise,  PL=Pelagic  Longline,  POC=Pacific  Offshore  








BD 0.55 0.19 0.003
HP 0.40 0.13 0.002
PL 0.48 0.20 0.014
Fed 0.55 0.20 0.006
TRP/SAT ON
BD 0.62 0.16 0.000
FKW 0.73 0.30 0.016
HP 0.45 0.15 0.003
POC 1.20 0.30 0.000
PL 0.48 0.23 0.038
PCD/ECO ON
Age 0.01 0.00 0.000
NE<U.S. ?0.67 0.17 0.000
Researcher ?0.77 0.25 0.002
Environmentalist ?0.68 0.30 0.022
TRP/SAT ON
FAIR 0.52 0.07 0.000
PCD/ECO ON
TRP<SAT 0.66 0.10 0.000







Less  than  60%  of  responses  indicated  participants  believed  the  Take  Reduction  
Plan  incorporated  their  views.  Members  of  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  were  the  least  
satisfied  (25%  disagreed  or  strongly  disagreed),  and  roughly  equal  proportions  of  
responses  by  environmentalists  and  fishermen  (18%  and  19%  respectively)  also  felt  the  
Take  Reduction  Plans  did  not  incorporate  their  views  (disagree  or  strongly  disagree).  
Conversely,  90%  of  the  members  of  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  agreed  or  
strongly  agreed.    
Despite  the  general  lackluster  views  of  plan  elements,  more  than  70%  of  the  
records  showed  stakeholders  believed  the  consensus-­‐‑based  Take  Reduction  Plan  was  
better  than  if  NMFS  created  the  plan  without  Take  Reduction  Team  input.  Of  these,  
members  for  the  False  Killer  Whale  and  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  felt  the  most  
positively,  while  18%  of  the  members  of  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  and  20%  of  
responses  by  environmentalists  disagreed.  
2.3.6. Perceived Ecological Success (PCD ECO) 
Both  factors  (marine  mammal  BYCATCH  and  ABUND)  loaded  significantly  on  
perceived  ecological  success  (PCD  ECO)  with  high  reliabilities  (Table  10),  indicating  that  
changes  in  the  latent  variable  would  directly  affect  each  observed  indicator,  the  latent  
variable  accounts  for  a  substantial  portion  of  the  variance  in  BYCATCH  and  ABUND,  
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and  the  internal  consistency  (r2)  of  the  responses  to  each  question  was  high.  Team  age  
was  the  only  covariate  that  had  a  significant,  positive  effect  on  the  latent  variable.  
Members  of  older  teams  viewed  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  as  more  effective  than  
members  of  newer  teams.  The  other  significant,  independent  predictors  (Northeastern  
U.S.,  researcher,  and  environmentalist)  had  negative  regression  coefficients  (Table  15).  
Members  of  these  groups  believed  the  Take  Reduction  plans  did  not  substantially  
reduce  bycatch  or  increase  marine  mammal  abundance.  
More  than  three  quarters  of  the  responses  indicated  participants  believed  the  
plans  were  at  least  slightly  successful  in  reducing  bycatch  and  increasing  marine  
mammal  abundances.  The  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  members  reported  the  
highest  perceived  ecological  success  (90%),  while  members  of  the  Pelagic  Longline  team  
had  the  lowest  average  ratings  (58%).  
Perceived  impacts  to  bycatch  were  nearly  identical  to  overall  perceived  
ecological  success;  more  than  75%  of  the  responses  indicated  that  effects  on  bycatch  
were  at  least  slightly  successful.  The  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  team  implemented  a  Take  
Reduction  Strategy  (voluntary  research  and  education  measures)  and  the  plan  for  the  
Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  was  never  implemented.  Therefore,  these  teams  did  
not  affect  bycatch  because  they  both  lack  an  active  Take  Reduction  Plan.  Removing  
responses  from  those  two  teams  (that  do  not  have  Take  Reduction  Plans)  increased  the  
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perceived  success  of  reducing  bycatch  to  83%.  Responses  by  fishermen  and  members  of  
the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  revealed  they  believed  the  plans  had  been  most  
effective  at  reducing  marine  mammal  bycatch,  while  nearly  half  of  the  environmentalist  
responses  did  not  believe  the  plans  had  any  effect  on  bycatch.    
Responses  revealed  that  stakeholders  were  much  less  certain  about  effects  of  the  
plans  on  the  abundance  of  marine  mammal  stocks,  with  over  25%  responding  “I  don’t  
know.”  Of  the  remaining  responses,  a  large  proportion  (80%)  of  the  Harbor  Porpoise  
and  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  teams,  fishermen,  and  state  managers  believed  the  plans  
have  increased  marine  mammal  abundance,  while  nearly  65%  of  responses  by  
environmentalists  believed  they  have  had  no  effect.  
2.3.7 Full Conceptual Model of Perceived Take Reduction Team/Plan 
Success  
Stakeholder  satisfaction  with  consensus-­‐‑based  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  
Plans  was  shown  to  directly  affect  their  perceptions  of  plan  success  (β=0.66,  p=0.000).  
Furthermore,  participant  beliefs  about  the  fairness  of  the  negotiation  were  shown  to  
directly  influence  their  satisfaction  with  the  plan  (γ=0.52,  p=0.000).  Thus,  opinions  about  
the  fairness  of  the  negotiation  were  shown  to  indirectly  affect  perceptions  about  plan  
success  as  mediated  by  satisfaction  with  the  plan  (γ=0.34,  p=0.000).  Shared  learning  and  
social  capital  (SOCAP),  however,  were  not  shown  to  directly  affect  perceptions  of  either  
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the  output  (plan)  or  outcome  (success).  There  is,  however,  a  significant  association  
between  the  two  latent  variables  SOCAP  and  FAIR  (ϕ=  0.50,  p  =  0.000).  
2.3.8 Perceived Economic Impacts to Fishermen 
Most  survey  responses  revealed  that  stakeholders  believed  the  Take  Reduction  
Plans  have  made  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen  at  least  slightly  worse.  They  showed  that  
fishermen  regulated  by  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  and  Harbor  Porpoise  teams  suffered  
the  greatest  economic  hardships,  while  a  third  of  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  
members  thought  that  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen  were  slightly  better  (Table  16).  
Nearly  all  of  the  responses  by  fishermen  and  three  quarters  of  those  by  state  managers  
and  fisheries  managers  thought  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  had  a  negative  economic  
impact  on  fishermen.  Responses  by  environmentalists,  however,  were  more  skeptical  




Table  16:  Responses  to  survey  question  about  the  effects  of  marine  mammal  
Take  Reduction  Plans  on  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen,  by  Take  Reduction  Team  (top)  




Most  stakeholders  who  participated  in  marine  mammal  take  reduction  planning  
believed  the  plans  were  at  least  slightly  successful  at  reducing  marine  mammal  bycatch  
and  increasing  stock  abundances.  Nearly  half  believed  they  were  somewhat  successful.  
Given  that  nearly  half  of  the  respondents  participate  on  more  than  one  team  and  the  
majority  have  participated  in  at  least  four  meetings  reveals  their  commitment  to  the  
process.  In  addition,  the  meetings  are  resource-­‐‑intensive  to  both  the  agency  and  
LIVLIHOOD ALW ATG BD FKW HP POC PL AOC Total
Much8worse 10% 0% 3% 0% 7% 10% 0% 10% 6%
Somewhat8worse 25% 6% 11% 42% 27% 10% 21% 30% 22%
Slightly8Worse 43% 18% 51% 8% 48% 20% 16% 10% 36%
No8Effect 14% 76% 23% 42% 14% 30% 58% 50% 29%
Slightly8better 4% 0% 3% 8% 2% 30% 0% 0% 4%
Somewhat8better 4% 0% 6% 0% 2% 0% 5% 0% 3%
Much8Better 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
LIVLIHOOD Researcher Fishing2Industry Environmentalist State Federal FMC Facilitator Total
Much2worse 0% 20% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 6%
Somewhat2worse 14% 45% 6% 24% 9% 38% 0% 22%
Slightly2Worse 38% 29% 17% 76% 26% 38% 25% 36%
No2Effect 32% 4% 78% 0% 53% 13% 25% 29%
Slightly2better 11% 0% 0% 0% 4% 13% 25% 4%
Somewhat2better 5% 2% 0% 0% 4% 0% 25% 3%
Much2Better 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 1%
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stakeholders.  It  stands  to  reason  that  members  would  believe  that  their  investment  has  
been  at  least  somewhat  worthwhile  (Coglianese,  2003).  
Stakeholder  opinions  about  ecological  success  were  influenced  by  their  
satisfaction  with  the  final  Take  Reduction  Plan  and  this  satisfaction  depended,  in  part,  
on  their  belief  that  the  negotiation  was  fair.  Irrespective  of  stakeholder  affiliation  or  team  
membership,  respondents  overwhelmingly  deemed  the  negotiations  as  fair.  In  addition,  
responses  indicated  that  most  participants  engaged  in  shared  learning,  had  an  improved  
understanding  of  the  viewpoints  of  others,  and  established  new  and  long-­‐‑term  
relationships  with  others  who  have  differing  opinions  from  their  own.  Team,  
stakeholder  affiliation,  and  U.S.  geographic  region  significantly  influenced  the  latent  
variables.  Members  of  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  and  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  teams  
consistently  had  high,  positive  ratings  of  all  the  latent  variables,  while  members  of  the  
Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  had  the  most  pessimistic  views  of  the  process,  outputs,  and  
outcomes.  
2.4.1 Shared Learning and Social Capital (SOCAP) 
Interview  subjects  discussed  factors  affecting  social  capital  including  
participants,  information,  creating  new  relationships,  and  leadership  (Ansell  and  Gash,  
2008;  Beierle  and  Konisky,  2000;  Dukes,  2005;  Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000).    
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2.4.1.1  Take  Reduction  Team  participants  
A  committed  membership  is  critical  to  the  success  of  consensus-­‐‑based  
negotiations  (Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004;  Susskind  and  
McMahon,  1985).  Absent  their  commitment,  participants  will  resort  to  their  best  
alternative  to  the  negotiation  by  going  outside  the  process  to  achieve  their  policy  goals  
(Susskind  and  Cruikshank,  1987;  Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985).  Although  the  MMPA  
broadly  defines  which  interests  sit  at  the  negotiation  table,  NMFS  chooses  the  individual  
participants.  Membership  criteria  focus  on  recruiting  participants  who  have  high  social  
capital  within  their  respective  constituent  groups,  are  knowledgeable  about  their  field,  
are  able  to  communicate  well,  and  are  capable  of  working  collaboratively  with  a  broad  
range  of  constituencies  (L.  Engleby,  pers  comm).  Almost  half  of  the  survey  respondents  
(44%)  participated  on  multiple  Take  Reduction  Teams.  These  experiences  can  be  helpful  
in  moving  the  process  forward,  especially  when  the  number  of  qualified  or  interested  
members  is  limited.  Members  commented  on  the  amount  of  experience  they  thought  
was  important  for  the  negotiations. 
“I  think  it'ʹs  important  to  have  good  people  on  each  team.  There’s  certainly  an  
incremental  benefit  to  serving  on  multiple  teams  because  you  understand  the  
way  the  process  unfolds…so  there'ʹs  certainly  an  advantage  to  being  on  multiple  
teams  but  I  don'ʹt  think  it'ʹs  necessary.  I  think  in  some  ways  it  might  be  healthier  
if  there  was  a  greater  diversity  of  people  on  different  teams,  but  there  is  a  limited  





Many  stakeholders  have  served  on  a  team  since  its  inception,  which  can  be  as  
long  as  18  years.  The  majority  of  survey  respondents  (66%)  participated  in  at  least  four  
meetings  and/or  webinars.  Because  of  the  complexity  of  information,  some  advocated  
for  maintaining  experienced  members.  
“I  think  it  really  makes  a  lot  of  sense  that  members  that  have  been  on  the  team  for  
a  while  remain  if  they  like  to  because  it  takes  a  while  to  understand  the  system  
and  how  it  works  and  to  understand  the  issues  and  what  you  need  to  do.  You  
can'ʹt  be  just  bringing  in  new  members  all  the  time  …  you'ʹd  just  be  starting  all  
over,  all  again,  all  of  the  time.”  –Researcher    
 
Others  feel  a  diverse  mix  is  best,  which  can  mitigate  "ʺgroup  think."ʺ  
“I  think  teams  benefit  from  having  a  certain  amount  of  that  membership  that  has  
institutional  memory,  but  I  also  think  that  it  gets  stale  if  there'ʹs  never  any  new  
blood  coming  in…So  I  think  it,  the  strongest  teams  have  both  elements.  They  
have  an  institutional  memory  that'ʹs  important  and  also  new  blood  coming  in.”  –
Environmentalist  
  
But  some  less  experienced  members  may  feel  frustrated  and  excluded.  
“Overall  the  Take  Reduction  Team  process  is  very  political.  Those  who  are  
advocacy  professionals  end  up  pushing  their  points  through  because  they  
repeatedly  are  on  the  teams  and  know  the  process  and  the  people  well…  Perhaps  
the  Take  Reduction  Team  process  does  not  operate  as  Congress  intended.  If  one  is  
not  a  professional  Take  Reduction  Team  operator,  it  is  very  difficult  to  be  as  
involved  in  it  as  those  who  do  it  for  a  living.”  –Researcher    
 
Due  to  the  large  number  of  stakeholders  involved  in  marine  mammal  bycatch,  
only  a  few  representing  each  interest  can  sit  at  the  table.  Including  all  affected  parties  
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can  result  in  a  very  large  group  that  is  unable  to  achieve  consensus,  like  the  Atlantic  
Large  Whale  team  (Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000).  
“It'ʹs  like  you  can'ʹt  really  get  to  know  those  individuals  and  really  understand  all  
of  their  perspectives  because  everyone  has  such  a  limited  amount  of  time  to  
actually  speak  when  you'ʹre  around  the  table  when  there'ʹs  that  many  people.  So  
personally  for  me  I  feel  less  connected  to  that  team  because  of  its  size,  I  mean  the  
sheer  size  of  the  team.”  –Federal  employee  
  
“It’s  so  large  that  it’s  difficult  to,  you  know,  you  don’t  get  some  sort  of  intimate  
camaraderie  going  because  of  the  sheer  number  of  people…  I  think  that  some  
people  shut  down  because  of  the  size  of  the  group.  They  don’t  like  speaking  in  
front  of  45  people.  They  feel  intimidated…  It  should  be  called  the  LARGE  
Atlantic  Large  Whale  Take  Reduction  Team.”  —Fisheries  Manager  
  
Team  membership  can  change  over  time.  Active  fishermen  who  retire  and  leave  
the  teams  are  often  replaced  with  fishing  industry  representatives  and  lobbyists,  which  
can  affect  the  consensus-­‐‑based  negotiation.  The  diminishing  number  of  active  fishermen  
concerns  some  stakeholders  who  feel  that  fishermen  are  critical  to  the  negotiation  
process.    
“I  feel  that  an  active  fisherman  should  be  at  the  table,  somebody  who'ʹs  got  a  lot  of  
self-­‐‑interest  and  understanding  of  where  the  fishery  is  going.”  –Fisherman  
  
“…  We  need  to  have  people  who  use  the  gear,  who  are  on  the  water,  who  could  
speak  to  the  way  the  gear  is  operated,  and  the  way  they  interact  with  gear  and  
animals.  And  if  that  doesn'ʹt  happen  also  I  think  the  process  will  fall  apart.”  –
Researcher      
  
“I'ʹve  observed  lobbyists  suppress  conversations  and  the  exchange  of  ideas.  
Fishermen  have  told  me  that  lobbyists…discourage  them  from  talking  or  




Moreover,  fishermen  were  viewed  as  valuable  problem-­‐‑solvers.  
  
“…when  it  came  down  to  developing  strategies  to  reduce  take,  that  was  
something  that  the  fishermen  could  do.  That  was  what  they  do.  They’re  problem  
solvers.  They  deal  with  problems  throughout  their  fishing  activities.  It’s  all  about  
solving  problems  and  so  when  it  came  down  to  that  aspect  of  it,  that’s  when  
they’re  in  their  territory.  That’s  what  they’re  good  at…”  –Fisherman  
  
“I’m  more  focused  on  how  the  to  fix  the  problem,  or  perceived  problem,  and  how  I  
could  show  that  if  I'ʹve  put,  done  something  with  our  gear  configuration  or  
something  that  the  whales,  like  putting  up  a  sign  hey  whale  don'ʹt  mess  with  me.  
I  focus  more  on  that.”  –Fisherman    
 
2.4.1.2  Information  –  empirical  issues 
Differences  in  lay  and  scientific  information  can  reduce  trust  among  the  
negotiating  parties  and  between  the  stakeholders  and  government  institutions  (Gray  et  
al.,  2012;  Skogen,  2001).  Shared  learning  helps  participants  search  for  common  values  
which  can  decrease  conflict  while  building  trust  and  social  capital  among  team  
members,  as  well  as  between  participants  and  government  institutions  (Gunton  et  al.,  
2003;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004).  Ideally,  this  increased  understanding  of  the  issues  also  
facilitates  creative  problem  solving,  improves  decisions,  and  ultimately  improves  
environmental  outcomes  (Dietz  and  Stern,  2008;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004).    
To  facilitate  knowledge  sharing,  approximately  one-­‐‑third  of  the  negotiation  time  
of  face-­‐‑to-­‐‑face  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  centers  on  discussing  empirical  issues  
about  fishing  effort,  marine  mammal  stocks,  serious  injuries,  and  mortalities.  Members  
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are  provided  with  myriad  pre-­‐‑meeting  materials  with  relevant  background  information.  
Most  interview  subjects  believed  that  despite  existing  data  gaps,  they  were  provided  
with  the  best  available  information.  The  best  available  information,  however,  may  not  be  
enough  to  enable  productive  negotiation  or  practical  outputs.  
“Yeah  I  think  that  the  hardest  thing  that  we  struggle  with  on  any  Take  
Reduction  Team  around  the  country  probably  struggles  with  is  that  there  is  very  
little  really,  really  good  population  data…  So  you  have  two  opposing  sort  of  
views  and  if  you  have  uncertainty,  especially  in  the  population  estimate,  then  
those  two  groups  can  use  the  uncertainty  as  an  arguing  point  for  their  side…  So  
it  just  makes  it  a  lot  more  potentially  contentious  and  much  more  uncertain  on  
how  we’re  doing  as  a  group  when  we  just  don’t  have  the  good  population  
estimates  and  the  trends.”  –Researcher      
  
“The  whole  notion  of  expanding  out  mortality  or  extrapolating  mortality  from  
catch,  from  landings,  has  irritated  everybody  since  day  one.  You  go  out  and  catch  
no  animals,  catch  no  fish  but  you  catch  a  dolphin  in  that  one,  and  that  
extrapolates  out  to  a  huge  number.”  –Researcher    
  
Members  of  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  team  stood  out  because  100%  of  respondents  
affirmed  that  as  a  result  of  the  negotiations,  they  gained  a  better  understanding  of  the  
fisheries  involved  and  despite  information  challenges  about  stock  structure,  nearly  all  
(98%)  gained  a  better  understanding  of  marine  mammal  bycatch  and  have  created  
measures  to  reduce  it.    
  “the  data’s  not  as  good  on  all  of  the  different  populations  of  bottlenose  dolphins  
we  have  to  work  with  but  I  think  the  fishermen  have  been  cooperative  in  trying  to  
come  up  with  useful  measures…”—Federal  employee  
  




“…  every  meeting,  I  gain  more  knowledge.  I  gain  more  knowledge,  and  we  have  
more  understanding  of  it.  And  for  someone  to  walk  in  green,  it’s  a  very  hard  
process.”  –Fisherman    
2.4.1.3  Establishing  relationships  and  a  sense  of  camaraderie  
As  they’ve  gotten  to  know  one  another,  many  respondents  noted  they  had  
become  more  comfortable  with  other  members  over  time,  which  has  altered  
preconceived  notions  about  particular  stakeholder  groups  and  facilitated  a  more  open  
dialog.  
“…rather  than  having  an  abstract  idea  of  what  that  person  represented,  you  were  
dealing  with  a  person  and  all  of  the  complexities  and  emotions  and  so  forth  and  
so  on,  that  comes  with  face-­‐‑to-­‐‑face  dealings.  So  I  think  it’s  much  harder  to  
maintain  kind  of  an  abstract  distrust  of  somebody  when  you’re  working  with  
them  and  that  distrust  doesn’t  really  manifest…”—Fisherman    
  
As  a  result  of  the  negotiations,  approximately  95%  of  survey  respondents  on  the  
Bottlenose  Dolphin  and  Harbor  Porpoise  teams  felt  they  had  a  better  understanding  of  
the  perspectives  of  others,  and  80%  of  Harbor  Porpoise  team  members  and  federal  
employees  made  new,  long-­‐‑term  relationships  with  members  who  had  differing  
viewpoints.  This  corresponds  with  the  findings  of  Leach  et  al.  (2002),  Frame  et  al.  (2003),  
and  Gunton  et  al.  (2003).  The  Harbor  Porpoise  team  evolved  from  a  working  group  
established  in  the  early  1990s  by  fishermen,  environmentalists,  and  scientific  researchers  
to  investigate  alternative  methods  to  reduce  harbor  porpoise  bycatch  (Smolowitz  and  
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Wiley,  1992).  Until  2012,  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  had  included  several  members  from  
this  initial  working  group  and  successfully  achieved  consensus-­‐‑based  plans.    
“I  would  say  that  the  strongest  sense  of  camaraderie  I'ʹve  had  was  early  on  with  
the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  when  it  was  first  formed.”  –Researcher  
  
“I  have  people  on  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  I  think  I  know  particularly  well  and  
work  with  well.”  –Federal  employee  
 
2.4.1.4  Leadership  
A  broad  range  of  interviewees  identified  fellow  teammates  other  than  facilitators  
who  took  on  a  neutral,  leadership  role  to  help  move  the  negotiations  forward.  Interview  
subjects  identified  these  people  as  being  respected  by  members  from  multiple  
stakeholder  groups  who  helped  to  focus  the  discussion  on  consensus-­‐‑based  items  and  
hammer  out  details  of  those  items.  They  have  a  reputation  for  working  well  with  
members  who  have  opposing  viewpoints  and  negotiating  in  good  faith.  
“I  certainly  have  seen  that  from  a  couple  of  people,  not  really  advocating  for  one  
position  or  the  other,  but  trying  to  get  us  to  the  kernel  of  the  issue.  I’ve  seen  that  
before.”  –Fishing  industry  
  
“I  think  in  any  of  these  processes  people,  even  when  everybody  at  the  table  has  an  
equal  voice  and  you'ʹre  operating  under  consensus,  leaders  tend  to  emerge  and  
…people  who  are  either  outspoken,  or  who  have  an  ability  to  synthesize,  or  an  
ability  to  articulate  a  position  well,  or  can  bring  members  together  to  form  a  
cohesive  block  within  one  of  the  teams  tend  to  emerge  as  leaders  and  get  listened  
to  more.  I  think  …  that  will  happen  in  any  group  process  whether  you’re  a  jury,  




2.4.2 Fairness (FAIR) 
Results  from  the  survey,  the  SEM,  and  the  interviews  confirmed  that  regardless  
of  stakeholder  affiliation  or  team  membership,  Take  Reduction  Team  members  
universally  believed  the  negotiation  process  was  fair.  The  survey  questions  
characterized  fairness  as  the  equal  opportunity  for  members  to  express  their  views.    
“Everyone  has  their  chance  to  speak.  And  if  you  don’t  speak…that’s  your  fault.”  
–Fisherman  
  
In  addition,  some  interviewees  interpreted  fairness  as  the  inclusive  process  of  
involving  multiple  stakeholders  to  reach  consensus-­‐‑based  decision.  
  “I  mean  the  fairness  comes  in  the  involvement,  comes  in  the  fact  of  getting  
everyone  in  the  room  and  having  a  negotiated  discussion  about  the  problem.  If  
there  is  a  problem  there,  I  think  that  the  process  is,  the  particular  Take  Reduction  
Team  process  is  the  best  problem-­‐‑solving  approach  the  NMFS  has  in  all  of  its  
fisheries  and  protected  resource  arenas.”  –Fisherman    
  
2.4.2.1  Facilitation  
Employing  skilled,  neutral  facilitators  is  critical  to  achieving  fairness.  Several  
theories  about  conflict  resolution  identify  the  importance  of  a  neutral,  third  party  in  
bringing  together  stakeholders  with  opposing  viewpoints  (Harter,  1982;  Sabatier,  1988;  
Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985;  Weible  et  al.,  2009).  The  facilitator’s  goal  is  to  help  the  
stakeholders  achieve  consensus  while  remaining  impartial.  To  help  achieve  consensus,  
one  role  of  facilitators  is  to  conduct  pre-­‐‑negotiation  interviews  to  determine  the  various  
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stakeholder  interests  (Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985).  During  the  negotiations,  they  
encourage  caucusing  and  establish  working  groups  consisting  of  the  full  range  of  
viewpoints  to  tackle  different  issues  (Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985).  After  the  
negotiations,  effective  facilitators  compile  and  circulate  detailed  minutes  for  review  and  
comment  by  the  members  (Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985).  Since  their  inception,  Take  
Reduction  Teams  have  been  facilitated  by  professionally  trained,  neutral,  third  parties  
hired  by  NMFS  as  government  contractors.  Previously,  facilitators  differed  by  team,  but  
currently  all  teams  are  facilitated  by  the  same  contractor.  The  current  facilitators  allow  
all  members  to  comment  on  and  provide  feedback  on  Take  Reduction  Team  meeting  
summaries  prior  to  finalizing  and  distributing  the  document.    
“…the  facilitator  was  a  professional  in  [that]  they  were  used  to  that  kind  of  
tension  and  sort  of  cross-­‐‑currents  of  negativity  or  whatever  that  were  probably  
pretty  typical  in  a  mediation/arbitration  kind  of  like  environment.  So  I  think  that  
they  helped  tremendously  in  keeping  the  process  moving  in  a  direction  and  not  
getting  hung-­‐‑up  whenever  it  did  breakdown  and  you  get  emotional  about  some  
particular  issue.  That  was  probably  the  most  important  aspect  of  the  process,  to  
me,  was  the  fact  that  there  were  professionals  mediating  it.”  –Fisherman    
 
2.4.3 Take Reduction Plan Satisfaction (TRP SAT) 
The  SEM  found  that  perceived  fairness  of  the  consensus-­‐‑based  negotiation  
significantly  influenced  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plans.  Interviews  
confirmed  this  finding.  
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“Yeah,  they’re  better  [the  Take  Reduction  Plans]  because  of  the  Take  Reduction  
Team  process.  They’re  better  because  of  the  TRT  process...”  –Fishing  Industry    	  
However,  satisfaction  with  the  plans  was  not  nearly  as  high  or  consistent  among  
stakeholders  as  their  views  of  fairness.  Survey  questions  showed  other  factors  that  
influenced  satisfaction  with  the  negotiated  agreement  included  general  opinions  about  
consensus-­‐‑based  decision-­‐‑making  and  feeling  listened  to  or  validated  by  having  one’s  
viewpoints  incorporated  into  the  final  plan.  
2.4.3.1  Consensus-­‐‑based  decision-­‐‑making  
As  defined  by  statute,  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Teams  make  decisions  by  
consensus.  Members  know  that  if  they  do  not  reach  consensus,  the  agency  will  create  
regulations  that  may  run  counter  to  their  interests.  Participants  are  largely  supportive  of  
this  consensus-­‐‑based  process  and  prefer  it  to  the  alternative  (Table  17).  Susskind  and  
McMahon  (1985)  found  that  stakeholders  preferred  to  help  create  a  rule  than  comment  
on  what  they  perceived  as  the  agency’s  predetermined  decision;  and  a  survey  by  Frame  
et  al.  (2003)  of  stakeholders  that  participated  in  collaborative  land-­‐‑use  planning  
documented  high  satisfaction  with  the  process  over  traditional  methods.  
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Table  17:  Percent  of  total  responses  to  the  question  if  marine  mammal  Take  
Reduction  Plans  are  better  than  if  NMFS  created  the  regulations  on  its  own.  
TRPBETTER   Total  
Strongly  Disagree   2.4%  
Disagree   5.2%  
Neither   19.3%  
Agree   41.0%  
Strongly  Agree   32.1%  
  
“…the  federal  people  would  do  more  than  just  like  a  scalpel,  they  would  use  a  broad  
sword.”  –Fisherman  
  
“Without  a  team  that  even  argues  for  another  side,  then  the  agency’s  going  to  go  with  
whatever  is  their  least  problematic  direction…  And  I  think  that'ʹs  what  happens  is  they  
figure  out  what  their  calculus  is.  They  do  it  all  the  time.”  –Environmentalist    
  
“…I  must  also  say  that  the  process  of  stakeholder-­‐‑driven  rulemaking  and  an  emphasis  on  
consensus  (with  the  threat  of  NMFS  writing  the  regs  if  consensus  was  not  reached)  are  
very  powerful  tools  and  they  should  be  used  more  in  federal  rulemaking,  especially  for  
complex  issues  that  have  potential  to  have  significant  effects  on  communities.  Involving  
stakeholders  in  discussions  with  regulators,  NGO,  and  scientists  helps  create  a  process  
whereby  different  needs,  values,  and  perspectives  are  taken  into  account  and  people  can  
work  together  to  solve  tough  problems.”  –Federal  employee        
 
Many  believed  that  engaging  the  affected  parties  to  help  create  the  regulations  to  
which  they  will  be  held  accountable  is  paramount,  
“…you  can’t  just  write  a  law  and  put  it  in  front  of  the  fishermen  and  say  this  is  
the  way  you’ve  got  to  do  business  or  you’re  out  of  business,  because  as  an  
industry  there  would  be  a  lot  of  pushback.”  –Fisherman  
  
“It  is  people  who  are  living  the  situation  [who]  have  an  understanding  that  
regulators  don'ʹt  have.  And  so  to  put  the  people  impacted  by  the  regulation  in  the  
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same  room  with  the  people  who  know  how  to  write  enforceable  regulations,  if  it'ʹs  
well  facilitated,  well  mediated,  will  lead  to  a  product  that  is  more  aligned  with  the  
realities  of  the  situation.”  –Facilitator      
  
While  supportive  of  consensus-­‐‑based  negotiation,  members  also  identified  some  
frustrations,  including  and  the  ability  of  an  individual  to  prevent  the  process  from  
moving  forward  and  the  pitfalls  of  agreeing  to  potentially  ineffectual,  low-­‐‑hanging  fruit,  
as  mentioned  by  Coglianese  (2003)  and  Holmes  and  Scoones  (2000).  
“…sometimes  the  whole  idea  of  consensus,  having  a  consensus  before  we  can  
move  forward  is  very  difficult  because  it  allows  somebody…  to  completely  hold  
up  the  ability  for  the  group  to  move  forward  in  any  manner  by  just  refusing  to  
agree  with  everybody  else  on  whatever  topic  you  are  talking  about.”  –
Researcher    
  
“I  do  think  there  tends  still  to  be  an  element  of  the  take  reduction  planning  
process  that  leads  to  meaningless  measures,  particularly  non-­‐‑regulatory  
measures,  that  people  feel  good  about  but  don'ʹt  actually  do  anything.  And  
sometimes  that  can  be  in  the  regulatory  processes  as  well.”  –Researcher    
  
In  addition,  some  fishermen  expressed  frustration  with  the  potential  for  other  
stakeholders  to  dictate  the  future  of  their  livelihoods.  
“I  have  trouble  with  it  [consensus]  because  when  you  got  20  people  discussing  
one  man’s  livelihood  and,  and  any  discussion  that  they  do,  that  livelihood  can  be  
taken  away  from  him,  with  people  that  doesn’t  have  any  idea  of  what’s  going  
on…”  –Fisherman    
  
“I  understand  consensus  but  I  also  understand  at  the  end  of  the  day  is  the  
sacrifice  that  the  fishers  are  giving  up,  or  could  be  giving  up,  based  on  somebody  





The  success  of  a  consensus-­‐‑based  agreement  relies  on  stakeholders  who  are  
committed  to  the  terms  of  the  final  outcome,  which  can  also  facilitate  adherence  to  those  
terms  (Balint  et  al.,  2011).  Ideally,  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  incorporate  the  concerns  and  
perspectives  of  all  members,  which  should  increase  the  likelihood  of  compliance  
(Gunton  et  al.,  2003;  Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000).  Interview  subjects  recognized  the  
importance  of  stakeholder  buy-­‐‑in  and  its  effects  on  implementation  of  the  plans.  
“It'ʹs  also  important  for  buy-­‐‑in,  in  terms  of  compliance.  If  they  feel  like  a  plan  was  
developed  with  their  input  and  it  took  into  account  the  things  that  were  
important  to  them,  then  they  would  be  theoretically  more  inclined  to  comply  with  
that  plan.”  –Federal  employee  
  
“Well  I  think  that  fishermen  buy-­‐‑in  is  a  huge  part  of  this  process.  If  the  fishermen  
don'ʹt  buy  into  it,  it'ʹs  a  lot  less  likely  to  have  any  real  impact,  produce  anything  
successful  I  think.”  –Fisherman    
  
2.4.3.3  Feeling  listened  to  –  stakeholder  opinions  included  in  the  final  plan  
Absent  buy-­‐‑in,  stakeholders  are  less  likely  to  have  a  sense  of  loyalty  to  the  
process  and  are  thus  more  likely  to  employ  political  or  legal  tactics  to  further  their  
interests  (Balint  et  al.,  2011;  Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985).  Although  members  
overwhelmingly  deemed  they  and  others  had  a  fair  opportunity  to  express  their  views  
and  took  that  opportunity,  fewer  believed  the  agency  listened  to  them  by  incorporating  
their  views  into  the  final  plan,  with  less  than  60%  of  the  responses  indicating  they  
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agreed  or  strongly  agreed.  More  than  60%  of  the  members  of  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  
team  were  neutral  or  felt  their  opinions  were  not  included  in  the  Take  Reduction  Plan.  
On  the  other  hand,  roughly  half  of  the  members  of  the  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  team  (who  
generated  a  Take  Reduction  Strategy  of  voluntary  measures)  and  the  disbanded  Atlantic  
Offshore  Cetaceans  team  felt  the  final  outputs  incorporated  their  views.  Members  of  the  
Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  responded  most  positively  where  90%  felt  the  final  plan  
comprised  their  ideas.  Among  the  stakeholder  groups,  the  most  frustrated  included  
fishermen  and  environmentalists,  among  which  nearly  20%  of  the  responses  for  each  
group  showed  they  did  not  believe  their  opinions  were  incorporated  into  the  final  Take  
Reduction  Plan.    
“I  mean  this  is  the  way  that  they  should  be  doing  it,  getting  the  perspective  of  the  
industry  and  the  scientists,  the  state  managers,  but  I  don'ʹt  think  that  they’re  
really  listening  to  us…We’re  in  such  a  quandary  with  lack  of  data  and  the  need  
to  do  something,  that  they  are  just  shooting  with  whatever  they'ʹve  got  and  I  just  
don'ʹt  think  they  are  thinking  clearly.  So  I  think  that  Large  Whale  plan  is  pretty  
unfair…”  –State  manager  
  
“I  think  to  a  certain  extent  recently  in  the  Harbor  Porpoise  plan...I  think  we  were  
close  to  making  recommendations  and  again  that’s  an  instance  where  they  
essentially  listened  to  the  fishermen…  the  Fisheries  Service  wanted  an  easy  out  
and  so  they  just  ignored  it  and  went  ahead  with  their,  a  proposal  that  they  
wanted  to  do.  In  essence  I  think  they  did  not  listen  to  what  the  majority  of  the  
team  recommended.”  –Federal  employee  
  
By  and  large,  however,  the  majority  of  people  believed  their  views  were  
incorporated  into  the  final  plan.    
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“Yeah.  I  think  everybody  gets  listened  to.”  –Fisheries  manager    
  
“We  end  up  writing  these  things  to  try  to  represent  the  general  consensus  of  
everybody  in  the  room,  and  by  and  large  I  think  it  really  does  capture  that.”  –
Researcher      
  
2.4.4. Implementation – Compliance and Law Enforcement 
Consensus-­‐‑based  outputs  only  can  be  effective  if  the  regulated  parties  comply  
with  them,  and  compliance  can  be  contingent  upon  enforcement.  Penalties  for  violating  
the  agreement  must  be  high  enough  to  elicit  compliance.  However,  if  the  regulated  
parties  know  the  outputs  will  not  be  enforced,  the  penalty  structure  becomes  irrelevant  
(Colby,  2003).  Interview  subjects  commented  on  their  perceptions  of  plan  
implementation,  specifically  in  reference  to  compliance  and  enforcement.  Plans  varied  
widely  in  their  perceived  enforceability  and  feasibility  of  implementation.  Most  
interview  subjects  of  the  Pelagic  Longline  team  (70%)  mentioned  that  one  of  the  plan  
requirements  (20  nautical  mile  mainline  length)  was  not  enforceable.    
“Probably  the  main  line  length  is  difficult  [to  enforce]  because  the  Coast  Guard  
doesn'ʹt  haul  gear.  We  don'ʹt  haul  gear.  There  are  sometimes  we  might,  but  we  
have  to  be  there  when  a  fisherman  is  hauling  it.  So  we’re  just,  we’re  using  
logbooks  essentially.”  –Federal  employee  
  
“The  biggest  problem  there  is  enforcement,  and  at-­‐‑sea  enforcement…  It’s  very  
difficult  to  determine  how  long  a  pelagic  longline  is  ‘cuz  they  set  a  buoy  here,  
they  set  a  buoy  here,  on  each  end  possibly,  and  then  you  get,  you  know,  bows  in  




Members  of  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  also  felt  that  their  plan  could  
not  be  enforced.  
  
“There  really  wasn’t  [enforcement]  because  the  Coast  Guard,  unless  they’re  there  
when  you’re  hauling  gear,  then  that’s  something  else,  but  they  have  no  way  of  
pulling  gear  themselves  and  looking  at  it.  So  there  was  really  very  little  
enforcement  of  any  of  these  provisions.”  –Environmentalist    
  
“The  Large  Whale  plan  is  very  challenging  to  fully  enforce  because  you’ve  got  
such  a  wide  geographic  spread.”  –Facilitator      
 
“I  think  that  the  Northeast  team,  for  the  Large  Whale  team,  I  think  those,  the  
plan  is  essentially  unenforceable.  It’s  just  too  complex.  They  make  up  regulations  
that  look  good  on  paper  but  are  virtually  impossible  to  enforce  like  how  many  
traps  you  have  on  the  end  of  a  line.  I  mean  the  Coast  Guard  will  tell  you,  you  
can’t  enforce  that.”  –Federal  employee  
 
The  Harbor  Porpoise  plan  had  a  different  problem.  The  requirement  to  use  
acoustic  deterrence  devices  (pingers)  on  gillnets  is  somewhat  enforceable.  Officers  can  
check  to  see  if  fishermen  have  the  required  number  of  pingers,  but  cannot  easily  
determine  if  they  are  functioning  properly.  There  was  low  compliance  with  the  pinger  
requirement  (Palka  et  al.,  2012)  that  the  team  members  attributed  to  a  lack  of  
enforcement.  
“On  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team,  they  get  really  gung  ho  about  using  the  pingers  
and  they’re  super  diligent,  but  then  nobody'ʹs  checking  them  and  so  whatever,  
you  know  they  just  kind  of  fall  off  the  wagon”  –State  manager  
  
“And  I  think  regardless  of  whether  something  that'ʹs  regulatorily  required,  if  you  





Regardless  of  enforceability,  stakeholders  widely  believed  that  enforcement  of  
most  Take  Reduction  Plans  was  lacking  because  of  limited  staff  and  resources,  and  
myriad  responsibilities  of  law  enforcement  officers.  
“Enforcement  is  basically  a  fantasy….	  Enforcement  is,  it'ʹs  just  a  big  ocean  out  
there.  The  Coast  Guard  has  taken  up  homeland  security  issues.  A  huge  amount  of  
their  time  is  occupied  by  competing  interests  with  homeland  security.  And  the  
NMFS  enforcement  has  very  few  real  enforcement  agents  on  the  water.  It'ʹs  just  a  
very  small,  a  handful  people  really  in  each  region.  And  it'ʹs  a  big,  big  ocean  out  
there.  So  the  reality  is  that  enforcement  is  not  a  real  big  deterrent.”  –Fisheries  
manager  
  
“NMFS  relies  way  too  heavily,  they  say  it  at  every  meeting,  well  we’re  going  to  
rely  on  our  state  partners  for  enforcement.  And  the  ability  of  the  states  to  do  that  
varies.”  –State  manager    
  
“…they  [fishermen]  just  know  that  the  Fisheries  Service  has  got  no  enforcement  
agents  and  it’s  probably  a  99%  chance  that  they’re  never  going  to  be  inspected  in  
the  first  place,  and  that  1%  chance  that  they  are  inspected  is  not  sufficient  to  
convince  them  that  they  need  to  comply  with  the  regulations.”  –Federal  
employee  
  
2.4.5 Perceived Ecological Success 
Most  significant  covariates  of  perceived  ecological  success  had  negative  
regression  coefficients.  These  included  researchers,  environmentalists,  and  teams  where  
the  stocks  range  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  (Atlantic  Large  Whale,  Harbor  Porpoise,  
Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans,  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear),  while  older  teams  had  a  positive  
regression  coefficient  (Figure  5,  Table  13).  Scientists  generally  tend  to  be  more  deliberate  
about  drawing  definitive  conclusions  from  uncertain  data,  often  to  avoid  committing  
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Type  I  statistical  errors  (i.e.,  claiming  Take  Reduction  Plans  are  effective  when  they  are  
not  –  a  false  positive)  (Buhl-­‐‑Mortensen,  1996),  and  environmentalists  tend  to  take  a  
cautious  position  in  the  face  of  ecological  uncertainty  (Cincin-­‐‑Sain  and  Knecht,  1998).  
These  traits  would  lead  them  to  respond  more  conservatively  to  questions  about  the  
success  of  Take  Reduction  Plans  (Myers,  1999).    
Members  of  teams  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  also  were  skeptical  about  the  
ecological  effectiveness  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans.  There  are  two  teams  in  the  
northeast  that  do  not  have  active  Take  Reduction  Plans  and  one  very  large  team  that  has  
never  come  to  consensus.  These  factors  may  have  negatively  influenced  perceived  
ecological  success.  Conversely,  members  of  older  teams  have  had  more  time  to  interact  
with  and  get  to  know  one  another,  thus  increasing  the  likelihood  of  social  capital  and  
trust  among  the  participants,  which  could  improve  perceived  success.    For  example,  
Leach  et  al.  (2002)  found  that  age  of  watershed  partnerships  was  an  important  predictor  
of  their  perceived  success,  where  older  teams  believed  they  were  more  effective  at  
addressing  ecological  problems  than  younger  teams.  
2.4.5.1  Marine  mammal  bycatch  
Overall,  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Team  participants  believed  the  Take  
Reduction  plans  have  been  at  least  slightly  successful  at  reducing  marine  mammal  
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bycatch.  The  degree  to  which  team  members  perceived  the  impacts  of  Take  Reduction  
Team  processes  on  bycatch  varied  by  team  and  stakeholder  affiliation.  More  than  half  of  
the  members  of  the  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  team  believed  bycatch  had  been  unaffected  by  
their  actions.  This  team  was  convened  as  a  result  of  a  lawsuit  settlement  agreement  
(N.D.  Cal.  Apr.  30,  2003).  Prior  to  convening  the  team,  NMFS  updated  its  marine  
mammal  stock  assessments  and  found  that  the  stocks  identified  in  the  lawsuit  did  not  
exceed  the  MMPA  threshold  for  convening  a  Take  Reduction  Team.  Consequently,  they  
created  and  implemented  only  voluntary  research,  education,  and  outreach  measures  as  
part  of  a  Take  Reduction  Strategy.  Likewise,  nearly  two-­‐‑thirds  of  the  respondents  from  
the  Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  believed  that  bycatch  has  been  unaffected  by  their  
actions  because  although  this  team  created  a  consensus-­‐‑based  Take  Reduction  Plan,  it  
was  never  implemented  due  to  closures  of  two  of  the  three  fisheries  that  helped  create  
that  plan.  Members  who  fought  for  consensus  expressed  disappointment  and  frustration  
about  what  happened.  
“I  think  the  one  that  was  probably  the  least  fair  and  poorly  handled  was  the  whole  
Atlantic  Offshore  team…  So  you  sit  there  and  you  negotiate  in  good  faith  and  
there’s  all  this  swirl  around  you,  which  really  undermined  the  process.  And  it  
tends  to  make  people  really  angry…  You  convene  us,  but  you’re  not  even  giving  
us  a  good  faith  opportunity  to  make  this  right.  And  you’re  not  even  





Of  the  teams  with  active  Take  Reduction  Plans,  the  least  optimistic  were  
members  of  the  Pelagic  Longline  and  Atlantic  Large  Whale  teams.  More  than  one-­‐‑third  
of  the  members  of  the  Pelagic  Longline  team  believed  their  plan  has  had  no  effect  on  
bycatch,  and  nearly  one-­‐‑quarter  of  the  respondents  on  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  
felt  their  plan  has  either  made  bycatch  worse  or  has  been  ineffective.  This  may  result  
from  their  perceptions  about  the  enforceability  of  their  plans  and  the  large,  complex  
nature  of  the  problem.    
“Well  for  large  whale,  I  don'ʹt  think  so.  I  don'ʹt  know  that  much  of  that  has  
worked…  Again  because  it'ʹs  a  huge,  I  mean  you  look  at  the  nature  of  the  
problem.  You  get  this  vast  amount  of  gear  out  there  and  no  matter  what  you  do,  
you'ʹre  going  to  have  entanglements,  even  if  you  have  the  best  gear  reductions  
just  because  of  the  way  the  ocean  works,  the  animal  behavior,  weather  conditions,  
all  these  things  coming  into  play.”  –Fisheries  manager    
  
“Unfortunately  I  don'ʹt  think  it  [the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  Plan]  has  been  
particularly  effective,  in  the  sense  that  we'ʹve  done  what,  20  rulemakings,  or  
however  many?  …I  also  think  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  plans  really  gets  down  
to  the  charge  that  NMFS  gives  the  team,  and  in  that  case  their  charge  was  
astronomical.  It  was  reducing  bycatch  of  three  stocks  in  a  gazillion  fisheries,  in,  
you  know,  the  entire  East  Coast,  and  it  was,  it  was  really  daunting.  And  it'ʹs  a  
huge  job.”  –Federal  employee  
 
On  the  other  hand,  all  members  of  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  team  believed  
marine  mammal  bycatch  was  somewhat  or  much  better  as  a  result  of  implementing  their  
plan.  More  than  half  of  the  respondents  on  the  Harbor  Porpoise  and  Bottlenose  Dolphin  
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teams  also  thought  that  implementation  of  their  plans  have  made  bycatch  somewhat  or  
much  better.  
“I  think  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  has  been  incredibly  successful.  I  mean  when  
they  first  got  together,  there  was  a  whole  bunch  of  bycatch  of  beaked  whales  and  
like  a  whole  bunch  of  other  small  cetaceans,  and  large  cetaceans.  It'ʹs  really  
tapered  off.”  –Federal  employee  
  
“I  mean  for  most  of  the  bottlenose  stuff,  the  bycatch  has  in  fact  dropped  
substantially,  just  with  the  restrictions  placed  on  the  methods  of  fishing.  And  
you  would  have  to  say  that  harbor  porpoise  was  working  for  the  same  reason.  
Whenever  they  enforced  it,  the  bycatch  went  way  down.  It  would  go  back  up  
when  they  didn’t,  but  then  it  would  go  down  again.”  –Environmentalist  
  
“I  mean  just  thinking  about  the  numbers  in  the  harbor  porpoise  plan.  We  are  
nowhere  near,  even  though  we’re  still  over  PBR…”  –State  manager  
  
The  most  optimistic  stakeholder  groups  regarding  Take  Reduction  Plan  effects  
on  bycatch  included  fishermen  and  the  facilitators.  Nearly  half  of  the  responses  by  
fishermen  revealed  they  thought  bycatch  was  somewhat  better  and  more  than  20%  
revealed  it  was  much  better,  while  60%  of  responses  by  facilitators  thought  bycatch  was  
somewhat  better  because  of  take  reduction  planning.  As  the  regulated  parties  who  have  
experienced  personal  and  financial  costs  of  altering  their  fishing  practices  and  modifying  
their  gear,  it  follows  that  fishermen  would  be  more  hopeful  that  their  efforts  were  not  
wasted  (Coglianese,  2003;  Leach  et  al.,  2002).  Although  they  never  mentioned  this  
during  their  interviews,  their  daily  experiences  on  the  water  may  indicate  to  them  that  
bycatch  has  decreased.  At  the  same  time,  the  facilitators  work  hard  to  help  the  teams  
  97  
  
reach  consensus-­‐‑based  decisions.  Their  optimism  about  the  outcomes  may  echo  their  
positive  views  of  the  process  and  outputs  (Coglianese,  2003;  Leach  et  al.,  2002).  
Moreover,  facilitators  tend  to  view  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  partnerships  as  more  successful  
than  do  other  stakeholders  (Leach  and  Sabatier,  1999).  
“Bycatch  has  diminished  greatly,  making  stocks  more  abundant,  thus  making  
avoidance  more  difficult”  –Fishing  industry  
 
“I  believe  that  if  we  hadn’t  done  anything,  you  would  see  a  whole  lot  more.”  –
Fisherman    
  
2.4.5.2  Abundance  of  marine  mammal  stocks  
Stakeholders  were  less  certain  of  the  effects  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  on  the  
abundance  of  marine  mammal  stocks,  in  which  more  than  one-­‐‑quarter  of  responses  
were  “I  don’t  know.”  This  mirrors  the  large  uncertainty  associated  with  the  stock  
assessment  data  discussed  earlier.  Of  the  remaining  responses,  nearly  40%  believed  that  
the  plans  have  had  no  effect  on  stock  abundances.  Responses  broke  down  into  patterns  
similar  to  those  for  the  effects  on  bycatch  wherein  a  large  majority  of  the  members  of  the  
Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  and  Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans  believed  their  plans  have  had  no  
effect  on  stock  abundances.  The  majority  of  the  Pelagic  Longline  team  participants  and  
over  one-­‐‑third  of  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  respondents  also  felt  their  plans  have  




“And  the  least  successful  plan  is  the  Large  Whale  plan.  And  that'ʹs  a  difficult  one  
to  solve.  And  even  in  the  stock  assessment  reports,  the  agency  cites  published  
scientific  literature  showing  that  what  they'ʹve  done  hasn'ʹt  worked,  and  yet  
getting  anything  to  change  is  difficult…  So  that  plan  is  like  the  old  joke  about  a  
camel  being  a  horse  that'ʹs  designed  by  a  committee.  It  just  isn'ʹt  functioning  the  
way  it  should  for  what  we  want  to  get  out  of  it  and  it'ʹs  not  going  to  because  the  
agency  cannot,  does  not  feel  politically  it  can  do  what  it  takes  to  make  that  
problem  go  away.  And  so  I  think  it'ʹs  not  going  to  work.”  –Environmentalist      
 
  “…there’s  no  question  in  my  mind  that  one  of  the  major  reasons  the  population  
of  right  whales  has  grown  as  slowly  as  it  has  is  because  of  the  bycatch  in  the  
gillnets  and  crab  pot  lines.  If  you  reduce  that,  you  would  increase  the  rate  of  
growth  and  increase  the  size  of  the  population.”  –Federal  employee    
 
Similar  to  the  views  about  bycatch,  members  of  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  
team  had  the  most  positive  views,  with  70%  of  their  respondents  believing  that  stock  
abundances  are  at  least  somewhat  better  as  a  result  of  their  Take  Reduction  Plan.  Just  
over  half  of  the  participants  in  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  felt  similarly.  
“Yeah  I  mean  you  can  watch  harbor  porpoise.  When  the  bycatch  goes  way  down,  
I  mean  that'ʹs  a  fairly  responsive  stock…they’re  very  responsive  because  of  the  life  
history  of  the  animals…you  can  see  if  you  use  PBR  as  an  indicator  of  stock  
abundance  it  will  go  up  when  the  abundances  up  and  go  down  when  the  
abundance  is  down.  You  can  watch  the  PBR  fluctuate…based  on  what  the  
bycatch  is,  and  the  bycatch  fluctuates  based  on  the  people  doing  what  they'ʹre  
supposed  to  in  the  plan.  So  I  think  that  species  has  given  us  hope  that  in  fact  
these  plans  are  doing  what  they'ʹre  supposed  to  do  which  is  help  species  recover.”  
–Environmentalist    
  
“I  think  the  plan  has  improved  abundance  of  harbor  porpoise,  but  I  am  not  sure  




The  two  stakeholder  groups  who  were  most  optimistic  about  the  effects  of  their  
plans  on  marine  mammal  stocks  included  state  managers  and  fishermen,  while  more  
than  half  of  the  responses  by  researchers  and  environmentalists  revealed  they  believed  
the  plans  have  had  no  effect  on  marine  mammal  abundance.  
“Look  at  the  increase  in  the  number  of  right  whales  in  the  north.  It'ʹs  incredible  
how  far  we'ʹve  come  and  yet  we  get  zero  credit  for  it  because  they  just  keep  
hammering  for  more  and  more  and  more.  We  went  from  I  think  under  300  
animals  when  we  started  and  we’re  at  probably  over  400  by  now,  I  don'ʹt  know  
but.  Anyway,  that'ʹs  a  big  increase  in  10  years.  So  something  is  working.”  –
Fisherman    
  
“They  should.  Yeah  they  should.  I  think  that  we  don'ʹt,  we  can'ʹt  point  to  any  
concrete  examples  of  that  because  of  the  limitations  in  the  stock  assessment  
process.  So  we  can'ʹt  point  to  any  empirical  evidence  to  suggest  that  that  is  the  
case.”  –Researcher      
  
“Yes.  I  do.  Simply  by  reducing  bycatch,  there  will  be  more  animals  out  there…”  
–State  manager    
  
2.4.5.3  Effects  of  other  fishing  regulations  and  fishing  effort  
Several  interview  respondents  commented  on  the  numerous  fishing  regulations  
to  which  fishermen  must  comply  notwithstanding  the  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  
regulations.  In  addition  to  affecting  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen,  changes  in  fishing  
effort  and  location  also  can  impact  marine  mammal  bycatch.  For  example,  closure  of  the  
Atlantic  pelagic  driftnet  and  pair  trawl  fisheries  and  modification  of  the  Atlantic  pelagic  
longline  fishery  put  many  fishermen  out  of  business  and  brought  about  the  demise  of  
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the  Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans  Take  Reduction  Team.  Geijer  and  Read  (2013)  found  
that  prior  to  implementation  of  the  Harbor  Porpoise  Take  Reduction  Plan,  bycatch  was  
significantly  correlated  with  cod  landings  in  the  Gulf  of  Maine  sink  gillnet  fishery.  Low  
compliance  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  requirements  can  mimic  conditions  prior  to  
plan  implementation.  I  conducted  the  same  analyses  for  the  period  of  2008-­‐‑2012  and  
found  that  bycatch  was  again  significantly  correlated  with  cod  landings  (r  =  0.96,  p  =  
0.008).  Participants  in  this  study  echo  these  findings:  
“So  the  amount  of  gear  in  the  water  has  been  reduced  quite  a  bit.  I  think  that'ʹs  
gone  a  long  way  to  reduce,  and  these  things  were  all  factored  into  the  Take  
Reduction  Plans.  I  think  some  of  the  benefits  that  we  see  comes  strictly  through  
effort  reductions,  and  that  the  effort  that'ʹs  left  out  there  is  a  much  more  difficult  
thing  to  regulate,  to  achieve  the  reductions  that  you'ʹre  looking  for.”  –Fisheries  
manager  
  
“I  think  the  problem  is  that  what  has  mostly  affected  the  effective  fishing  
industry  is  not  a  consequence  of  a  Take  Reduction  Plan.  It'ʹs  because  of  the  status  
of  the  stocks  they  are  targeting  that  has  required  dramatic  restrictions  and  
therefore,  any  additive  restriction  on  top  of  that  is  something  they'ʹre  going  to  
fight,  which  from  a  human  point  of  view,  I  don'ʹt  blame  them.”  –
Environmentalist    
  
2.4.6 Perceived Effect on the Livelihoods Of Fishermen 
Almost  two-­‐‑thirds  of  survey  responses  indicated  that  stakeholders  believed  that  
Take  Reduction  Plans  have  made  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen  at  least  slightly  worse.  
Similar  to  members’  perceptions  of  the  link  between  Take  Reduction  Plans  and  
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ecological  effects,  most  members  of  the  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  team  believed  their  Take  
Reduction  Strategy  has  caused  no  economic  impacts.  Half  of  the  members  of  the  Atlantic  
Offshore  Cetaceans  team,  however,  believed  that  the  team  made  the  livelihoods  of  
fishermen  worse,  a  likely  consequence  of  the  closures  and  changes  to  the  fisheries  
involved.  Teams  who  most  strongly  expressed  an  opinion  that  Take  Reduction  Plans  
economically  impacted  fishermen  included  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  and  Harbor  
Porpoise,  where  more  than  one-­‐‑third  of  the  respondents  believed  that  the  livelihoods  of  
fishermen  were  either  somewhat  or  much  worse  because  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  
(Table  16).  More  than  half  of  the  members  of  the  Pelagic  Longline  team  felt  their  plan  
had  no  effect  on  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen,  while  30%  of  the  Pacific  Offshore  
Cetaceans  members  thought  that  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen  were  slightly  better  (Table  
16).    
“I  think  probably  the  two  most  would  be  the  pingers  [Gulf  of  Maine  harbor  
porpoise  and  Pacific  Offshore  Cetacean]  and  the  sinking  groundline  [Atlantic  
Large  Whale]  and  all  that.  I  would  say  the  least  would  have  been  the  mid-­‐‑
Atlantic  harbor  porpoise  because  they  really  didn’t  have  to  do  anything.”  –
Environmentalist  
  
“I  think  probably  the  greatest  economic  hardship  is  from  the  Large  Whale  plan  
because  of  the  volume  of  the  rope  and  stuff  that  they  have  had  to  buy,  the  gear  
mods  that  they'ʹve  had  to  make  but  principally  in  the  way  they  deploy  and  mark  




“I  think  probably  the  most  expensive  cost  in  all  these  has  been  pingers.  I  think  
probably  the  harbor  porpoise  people  trying  to  comply  with  the  harbor  porpoise  
bycatch  problem  have  probably  borne  the  greatest  cost…”  –Federal  employee    
  
“I  don’t  think  the,  anyone  in  the  Pelagic  Longline  team  has  been  affected  at  all.”  
–Federal  employee  
  
Responses  of  nearly  all  fishermen  indicated  they  thought  their  livelihoods  have  
been  made  at  least  slightly  worse,  and  20%  of  responses  showed  they  believed  they  were  
much  worse.  Similarly,  all  responses  by  state  managers  and  most  fisheries  managers  
revealed  they  felt  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  have  caused  at  least  a  slight  economic  
decline  for  fishermen.  Nearly  80%  of  the  responses  by  environmentalists,  however,  
revealed  they  felt  the  plans  have  had  no  negative  impacts  to  the  livelihoods  of  
fishermen.  Responses  by  the  interview  subjects,  though,  were  more  muted.  The  
fishermen  and  fishing  industry  members  did  not  characterize  the  economic  impacts  to  
be  as  great  a  hardship  as  the  survey  respondents,  and  the  environmentalists  who  were  
interviewed  acknowledged  that  fishermen  have  experienced  negative  economic  effects  
as  a  result  of  the  plans.  This  could  be  a  consequence  of  interview  response  bias  or  social  
desirability  distortion,  in  which  interview  respondents  tend  to,  “answer  questions  in  a  
more  socially  desirable  direction  than  they  would  under  other  conditions  or  modes  of  
administration.”  (Richman  et  al.,  1999,  p.  755).  Telephone  interviews  also  can  create  
social  desirability  distortion,  eliciting  more  positive  responses  than  other  survey  modes  
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(Ye  et  al.,  2011).  It  is  also  possible  that  the  web  survey  responses  were  more  extreme  as  a  
result  of  the  anonymity  it  provides  in  the  absence  of  an  interviewer  (Kiesler  and  Sproull,  
1986).    
“I  believe  that  it’s  affected  it  some,  now  how  much,  because  I  mean  my  own  little  
niche,  in  my  general  area  right  now,  it’s  really  not  done  as  much  as  it  could  have,  
if  we  hadn’t  of  done  something  as  far  as  gotten  NMFS  without  our  input.”  –
Fisherman    
  
“Because  most  of  them  are  consensus,  you  have  to  think  that  the  fishing  industry  
wouldn'ʹt  agree  to  something  that  was  going  to  put  it  out  of  business.  So  I  would  
have  to  say  it  has  an  effect  and  there  may  be,  to  some  extent,  an  adverse  effect  but  
it'ʹs  sustainable  based  on  the  fact  that  the  industry  has  agreed  to  it.  I  certainly  
wouldn'ʹt  agree  to  something  that  was  going  to  put  me  out  of  business.  I  would  be  
fighting  it  tooth  and  nail.”  –Environmentalist    
  
“So  yeah,  I  mean  there’s  been  an  impact.  There’s  a  gear  cost.  There’s  operational  
costs.  There’s  changes  in  fishing  practices  but  I  think  that  it’d  be  hard  to  
completely  quantify  to  be  honest  with  you  because  it’s  the  cost  of  doing  business.  
As  long  as  it  hasn’t  been  anything  too  punitive  or  unjustified  scientifically  or  
otherwise,  then  guys  have  learned  to  live  with  it.”  –Fishing  industry  
  
2.5 Conclusions 
Results  of  the  three  modes  used  to  investigate  participant  views  of  marine  
mammal  take  reduction  planning  -­‐‑  survey,  SEM,  and  semi-­‐‑structured  interviews  -­‐‑  
converged  on  several  topics.  The  participants  in  this  study  felt  positively  about  the  Take  
Reduction  Team  negotiation  process.  Survey  results  indicated  that  more  than  80%  of  the  
respondents  learned  more  about  the  opinions  of  their  fellow  teammates,  created  long-­‐‑
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term  relationships  with  members  who  have  opposing  viewpoints,  and  through  shared  
learning,  learned  more  about  the  fisheries  and  marine  mammal  stocks  they  were  
regulating.  Interview  participants  also  expressed  feelings  of  camaraderie  with  their  team  
members.  This  built  trust  and  created  social  capital  during  facilitated  negotiations  in  
which  nearly  all  members  felt  they  and  others  had  a  fair  opportunity  to  participate.  
While  the  survey  showed  that  an  average  of  93%  of  the  participants  felt  the  process  was  
fair,  the  SEM  showed  that  these  feeling  did  not  differ  significantly  by  team  or  
stakeholder  affiliation.  The  SEM  also  revealed  that  participants’  feelings  about  fairness  
significantly  influenced  their  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plans,  but  despite  the  
consensus  requirement,  more  than  15%  of  participants  did  not  believe  their  opinions  
were  incorporated  into  the  final  plans  and  25%  expressed  no  opinion  (neither  agreed  nor  
disagreed).  In  addition,  the  SEM  revealed  that  stakeholder  satisfaction  with  the  Take  
Reduction  plans  significantly  influenced  their  perceptions  of  the  plan’s  ecological  
effectiveness.  Most  believed  the  plans  were  at  least  slightly  successful  at  reducing  
marine  mammal  bycatch  and  increasing  abundance  of  marine  mammal  stocks,  which  is  
unsurprising  given  that  majority  of  participants  are  satisfied  with  the  Take  Reduction  
Plans  as  well  as  the  negotiation  process.  
One  surprising  result  of  the  SEM  was  that  social  capital  and  shared  learning  do  
not  directly  influence  participant  satisfaction  with  the  Take  Reduction  Plans.  Rather,  
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changes  in  plan  satisfaction  directly  affect  stakeholders’  feelings  about  creating  
relationships  with  members  who  have  opposing  viewpoints:  the  greater  the  satisfaction  
with  the  plan,  the  more  positively  people  felt  about  their  relationships.  Moreover,  social  
capital  and  shared  learning  co-­‐‑vary  with  views  of  fairness,  but  one  does  not  influence  
the  other.  Limitations  of  the  SEM  prevented  inclusion  of  stakeholder  opinions  about  the  
effect  of  the  plans  on  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen.  
The  interviews  allowed  me  to  explore  topics  that  were  not  covered  by  the  survey.  
For  example,  stakeholders  discussed  team  membership  and  concern  over  the  decline  of  
active,  working  fishermen,  especially  on  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team.  I  also  was  able  to  
explore  some  themes  I  observed  during  the  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings.  
Interviewees  provided  some  insights  about  how  particular  members  take  on  neutral,  
leadership  roles  during  the  negotiations  and  how  that  affects  the  negotiation.  They  also  
elaborated  on  the  need  for  stakeholder  buy-­‐‑in  with  the  plans  and  frustrations  with  data  
limitations.  In  addition,  I  was  able  to  explore  stakeholders’  opinions  about  plan  
implementation,  compliance,  and  enforcement,  which  revealed  frustration  with  a  lack  of  
enforcement  and  dissatisfaction  with  the  enforceability  of  some  plans.  These  views  
about  implementation  likely  affect  their  views  on  plan  performance.  Stakeholders  also  
elaborated  on  the  impacts  of  fishing  regulations  to  fishermen,  marine  mammal  stocks,  
and  Take  Reduction  Teams.  Finally,  opinions  expressed  during  the  interviews  about  the  
  106  
  
effects  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  on  the  livelihoods  of  fishermen  were  not  as  staunch  
as  those  expressed  in  the  survey,  a  possible  consequence  of  response  bias  or  social  
desirability  distortion.  
Regarding  the  relative  differences  of  views  among  teams  and  stakeholder  
groups,  members  of  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  and  Bottlenose  Dolphin  teams  had  
the  most  positive  views  of  Take  Reduction  planning,  while  members  of  the  Atlantic  
Large  Whale  team  were  the  most  pessimistic.  Environmentalists  and  researchers  
believed  the  plans  have  been  neither  effective  nor  ineffective  at  reducing  bycatch  and  
increasing  marine  mammal  abundance.  Fishermen  and  facilitators,  on  the  other  hand,  
were  most  optimistic  about  plan  effectiveness.    
A  more  comprehensive  evaluation  of  marine  mammal  take  reduction  planning  
should  examine  the  perceived  effectiveness  in  conjunction  with  the  ecological  outcomes  
to  identify  areas  of  agreement  and  disagreement  and  how  the  process  may  be  improved.  
This  would  address  concerns  about  using  stakeholder  satisfaction  as  a  proxy  for  
ecological  success.  Satisfaction  does  not  necessarily  equate  with  good  policy  or  the  best  
environmental  outcome,  nor  does  dissatisfaction  equate  to  bad  policies  and  outcomes  
(Coglianese,  2003).    Researchers  should  examine  stakeholder  opinions  in  the  broader  




3. Chapter 3 
3.1 Introduction 
Disputes  about  the  use,  conservation,  or  protection  of  natural  resources  vary  in  
scope,  scale,  and  intensity  (Beierle  and  Cayford,  2002;  O'ʹLeary  and  Bingham,  2003).  
Environmental  conflicts  can  involve  clashes  over  wildlife  and  fisheries  management,  
land  and  water  use,  access  to  public  lands  and  waterways,  maintenance  of  ecosystem  
services,  and  air  and  water  quality.  These  conflicts  often  arise  because  the  public  shares  
the  costs  of  managing  the  resource,  but  only  those  individuals  who  exploit  the  resource  
experience  its  benefits  -­‐‑  the  Tragedy  of  the  Commons  (Hardin,  1968).  Options  to  mitigate  
the  Tragedy  of  the  Commons  can  include  privatization,  collective  action,  local  control,  
and  government  regulation  (Axelrod,  1984;  Hardin,  1968;  Ostrom,  1990).  In  the  U.S.,  the  
ways  in  which  the  government  chooses  to  regulate  the  use  of  natural  resources  can  be  
viewed  to  occur  along  a  continuum.  At  one  end  lies  the  “command  and  control”  method  
wherein  an  administrative  agency  proposes  regulations,  releases  them  for  public  
comment,  modifies  those  rules  in  response  (or  addresses  the  comments),  and  
implements  final  rules.  All  citizens  have  an  opportunity  to  submit  comments,  but  
commenting  is  typically  limited  to  those  individuals  and  groups  most  directly  affected  
by  the  regulation  and  have  spent  time  and  resources  staying  abreast  of  agency  actions.  
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Thus,  the  command  and  control  style  of  regulation  solicits  the  minimum  amount  of  
public  input.  At  the  other  end  of  the  continuum,  stakeholders  work  directly  with  
administrative  agencies  to  devise  regulations  through  consensus-­‐‑based,  multi-­‐‑party  
negotiation,  referred  to  as  negotiated  rulemaking  (Coglianese,  1997;  Funk,  1997).  Various  
environmental  agencies  in  the  U.S.  have  embraced  negotiated  rulemaking  including  the  
Environmental  Protection  Agency,  Department  of  Interior,  and  National  Oceanic  and  
Atmospheric  Administration  (NOAA)  (Leach  et  al.,  2002).  
As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  several  ingredients  are  required  for  successful  multi-­‐‑
stakeholder  environmental  regulation  or  negotiated  rulemaking.  The  first  is  deciding  
which  stakeholders  can  participate.  Who  is  included  or  excluded  from  the  process  
affects  the  likelihood  of  compliance,  buy-­‐‑in,  and  success  (Beierle  and  Konisky,  2000;  
Conley  and  Moote,  2003;  Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Rowe  and  Frewer,  2000).  Second,  
using  a  neutral,  third  party  to  help  guide  the  negotiations  to  focus  on  empirical  issues  
and  shared  learning  increases  the  likelihood  of  agreement  and  improves  relationships,  
social  capital,  and  fairness  (Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004;  Renn,  
2006).  Third,  conducting  several  meetings  in  which  stakeholders  can  interact  over  long  
timeframes  increases  cooperation  (Axelrod,  1984;  Gray  et  al.,  2012).  Last,  requiring  
consensus-­‐‑based  decisions  increases  stakeholder  investment  in  the  process  and  the  
likelihood  of  compliance,  decreases  the  probability  of  defection,  and  can  produce  
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second-­‐‑order  benefits  of  increasing  social  networks  and  cooperation  outside  of  the  
negotiation  (Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  Innes  and  Booher,  2004;  Renn,  2006).  Open  
communication  in  a  deliberative  process  reduces  information  asymmetries  and  increases  
the  transparency  of  how  institutions  make  decisions.  Direct  participation  by  the  affected  
parties  should  facilitate  creative  problem-­‐‑solving  and  produce  outputs  that  incorporate  
citizen  values  (Beierle  and  Konisky,  2000;  Conley  and  Moote,  2003;  Innes  and  Booher,  
2004;  Renn,  2006).      
The  environmental  conflict  resolution  literature  consists  of  a  plethora  of  
evaluative  case  studies  of  a  vast  array  of  conflicts  ranging  in  scope  and  scale  of  the  
dispute  (Bingham,  2003;  Dukes,  2005;  Leach  et  al.,  2002).  Some  studies  focus  purely  on  
the  negotiation  process,  while  others  focus  on  outputs.  Many  focus  on  participant  
satisfaction  with  the  process,  which  affects  satisfaction  with  the  outcomes  (Chapter  2).  
Participant  satisfaction,  however,  may  not  be  a  good  measure  of  actual  ecological  
outcomes  (Coglianese,  2003;  Dukes,  2005;  Leach  et  al.,  2002;  Moore,  1996).  Coglianese  
(2003)  points  out  that  to  avoid  cognitive  dissonance,  stakeholders  involved  in  more  
intensive  participatory  processes  like  negotiated  rulemaking,  may  have  a  more  positive  
view  of  the  outcomes  than  is  warranted.  To  increase  the  likelihood  that  stakeholder  
views  will  closely  track  actual  environmental  outcomes  requires  a  continuous  feedback  
loop  wherein  institutions  or  researchers  keep  stakeholders  informed  about  the  status  of  
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the  ecosystem  they  are  trying  to  influence.  This  feedback  loop  requires  implementation  
of  a  standardized  monitoring  program,  which  can  be  resource  intensive  and  logistically  
challenging  to  implement.    
Finally,  satisfying  the  regulated  parties  can  create  a  perverse  incentive.  
Coglianese  (2003,  p.  77)  argues  that  “the  kinds  of  regulations  necessary  to  improve  
overall  social  welfare  makes  participants  decidedly  dissatisfied.”  Thus,  participants  in  
negotiated  rulemaking  processes  may  be  reluctant  to  agree  upon  measures  that  could  be  
harmful  to  some  of  the  parties.  One  way  to  mitigate  this  perverse  incentive  would  be  to  
involve  a  variety  of  stakeholders  representing  different  and  opposing  interests  through  
negotiated  rulemaking.  One  such  program  is  mandated  by  the  Marine  Mammal  
Protection  Act  of  1972  (MMPA,  16  U.S.C.  1361  et  seq.),  which  requires  negotiated  
rulemaking  to  mitigate  the  incidental  capture  or  entanglement  of  marine  mammals  in  
fisheries,  a  process  called  bycatch.  
3.1.1 Marine Mammal Take Reduction Plans 
3.1.1.1  Marine  mammal  bycatch  
Each  year,  thousands  of  marine  mammals  in  U.S.  waters  incur  serious  injuries  or  
die  as  a  result  of  interactions  with  fishing  gear  (National  Marine  Fisheries  Service,  2011;  
Read  et  al.,  2006).  The  life  history  characteristics  and  demographics  of  many  marine  
mammals  make  their  populations  vulnerable  to  fisheries  bycatch  (Lewison  et  al.,  2004;  
  111  
  
Read,  2008;  Read  et  al.,  2006;  Soykan  et  al.,  2008).  Typical  of  “slow”  or  K-­‐‑selected  species  
(Promislow  and  Harvey,  1990;  Read  and  Harvey,  1989),  many  marine  mammals  mature  
late,  reproduce  slowly  (single  births)  over  long  lifespans,  invest  high  amounts  of  energy  
in  rearing  each  offspring,  and  have  high  survival  rates  (Heppell  et  al.,  2000;  Heppell  et  
al.,  2005).  This  strategy  is  resilient  to  long-­‐‑term  environmental  uncertainty  but  “slow”  
populations  are  vulnerable  to  even  moderate  rates  of  mortality  due  to  their  limited  
potential  for  population  growth  (Heppell  et  al.,  2000;  Heppell  et  al.,  2005;  Lewison  et  al.,  
2004).  Thus,  high  bycatch  rates  can  cause  marine  mammal  populations  to  decline  over  
short  timeframes,  but  such  declines  can  go  undetected  unless  monitoring  programs  are  
in  place  (Lewison  et  al.,  2004;  Taylor  et  al.,  2000;  Wade,  1998).      
Small  or  declining  stocks  are  especially  vulnerable  to  bycatch  because  they  are  
less  resilient  to  the  effects  of  environmental,  demographic,  and  genetic  stochasticity.  The  
bycatch  of  small  populations  is  a  relatively  infrequent  event,  but  even  a  few  fatalities  can  
have  a  dramatic  impact  on  the  health  and  persistence  of  the  population  (Read  and  
Wade,  2000).  Moreover,  because  fishermen  may  only  rarely  interact  with  or  even  
observe  these  animals,  implementing  protective  measures  can  be  politically  unpopular  
(Read,  2008).      
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3.1.1.2  Mitigating  marine  mammal  bycatch  
Addressing  marine  mammal  bycatch  is  challenging  for  a  number  of  reasons.    
First,  data  collection  frequently  relies  on  observer  programs  that  are  costly  and  often  
unpopular  because  they  require  government  observers  to  be  placed  on  fishing  vessels.  
Only  half  of  U.S.  fisheries  have  observer  coverage  of  any  kind,  and  many  fisheries  carry  
observers  on  only  a  small  percentage  of  vessels  (GAO,  2008).  Second,  enforcement  of  
existing  mitigation  rules  is  challenging,  even  for  near-­‐‑shore  fisheries.  The  federal  agency  
charged  with  protecting  most  marine  mammal  stocks,  NOAA,  has  only  146  special  
agents  and  17  law  enforcement  officers  to  cover  all  federal  waters  (3  to  200  miles  
offshore).  NOAA  relies  heavily  on  partnerships  with  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  and  state  law  
enforcement  agencies  to  enforce  fisheries  regulations  
(http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/ole_about.html).  However,  with  more  than  3  million  
square  miles  of  open  ocean  and  85,000  miles  of  U.S.  coastline,  the  amount  of  water  to  
patrol  far  exceeds  the  available  manpower  
(http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/ole_about.html).  
One  goal  of  the  MMPA  is  to  maintain  marine  mammal  stocks  at  levels  where  
they  experience  maximum  productivity  recognizing  the  environmental  health  and  
carrying  capacity,  a  concept  known  as  the  Optimum  Sustainable  Population  (OSP)  level  
(16  U.S.C.  1362(9)).  A  unique  feature  of  the  statute  is  that  it  provides  a  specific  formula  
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for  calculating  the  number  of  animals  that  can  be  removed  from  a  stock  by  human-­‐‑
related  causes  while  still  maintaining  OSP  (16  U.S.C.  1362(20)).  This  number  is  called  the  
Potential  Biological  Removal  (PBR)  and  the  formula  for  calculating  PBR  is  as  follows      
Nmin  x  ½  Rmax  x  Fr  
where  Nmin  is  the  minimum  population  estimate,  Rmax  is  the  maximum  potential  
population  growth  rate,  and  Fr  is  a  recovery  factor  that  accounts  for  endangered  or  
threatened  listing  status  of  the  species  and  uncertainties  in  the  population  estimate,  
mortality,  and  Rmax  (16  U.S.C.  1362(20)).  If  the  number  of  human-­‐‑related  deaths  exceeds  
PBR,  the  MMPA  defines  that  stock  as  “strategic”  (16  U.S.C.  1362(19)(A)).  Declining  
stocks  and  species  that  are  listed  as  endangered  or  threated  also  are  considered  
“strategic”  (16  U.S.C.(19)(B)(C)).  Examples  of  marine  mammal  stocks  currently  deemed  
"ʺstrategic"ʺ  include  several  large  whale  species,  Gulf  of  Maine/Bay  of  Fundy  harbor  
porpoises,  many  coastal  stocks  of  Atlantic  bottlenose  dolphins,  and  Hawaiian  false  killer  
whales.  
NOAA’s  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  (NMFS)  drafts  and  implements  
regulations  in  support  of  the  MMPA  for  cetaceans  and  all  pinnipeds  except  the  walrus.  
Each  year,  NMFS  creates  a  List  of  Fisheries  in  which  it  evaluates  the  severity  of  marine  
mammal-­‐‑fisheries  interactions  as  frequent  (Category  I),  occasional  (Category  II),  or  
remote  (Category  III)  (16  U.S.C.  1383a(b)).  The  agency  also  generates  annual  Stock  
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Assessment  Reports  in  which  it  describes  marine  mammal  abundance,  population  
structure  and  trends,  and  human-­‐‑caused  mortality  for  each  marine  mammal  stock  (16  
U.S.C.  1386).  Three  Regional  Scientific  Review  Groups  consisting  of  outside  experts  
provide  peer  review  of  the  Stock  Assessment  Reports  and  provide  recommendations  to  
the  agency  (16  U.S.C.  1386(d)).  If  bycatch  of  a  strategic  stock  interacts  with  a  Category  I  
or  II  fishery,  NMFS  forms  a  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  Take  Reduction  Team.    
Take  Reduction  Teams  are  charged  with  devising  a  consensus-­‐‑based  Take  
Reduction  Plan  comprising  regulatory  and  non-­‐‑regulatory  measures  to  mitigate  the  
bycatch  (16  U.S.C.  1387(f)(6)(A)(i)).  Take  Reduction  Teams  consist  of  environmentalists,  
members  of  the  fishing  industry  (fishermen,  lobbyists,  and  industry  group  
representatives),  scientific  researchers,  members  of  Regional  Fisheries  Management  
Councils  and  Commissions,  and  state  and  federal  managers  (16  U.S.C.  1387(f)(6)(C)).  
Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  are  facilitated  by  trained,  professional,  neutral,  third  
parties.  If  the  team  is  unable  to  achieve  consensus,  the  MMPA  requires  NMFS  to  create  a  
Take  Reduction  Plan  (16  U.S.C.  1387(f)(7)(A)(ii)).  The  short-­‐‑term  goal  of  Take  Reduction  
Plans  is  to  reduce  bycatch  to  below  PBR  within  six  months  of  implementing  the  Plan  (16  
U.S.C.  1387(f)(2)).  The  long-­‐‑term  goal  is,  within  five  years  of  implementation,  to  reduce  
bycatch  to  a  zero  mortality  or  serious  injury  rate  (ZMRG),  which  is  defined  as  10%  of  
PBR    (50  CFR  §229).    
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Since  1996,  NMFS  has  convened  nine  Take  Reduction  Teams  (Table  18).  One  
team,  the  Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans,  disbanded  in  2001  because  two  of  the  three  
fisheries  it  addressed  were  closed  by  regulation.  This  team  created  a  Take  Reduction  
Plan,  but  it  was  never  implemented.  Two  other  teams,  the  Gulf  of  Maine  and  Mid-­‐‑
Atlantic  Harbor  Porpoise  teams,  merged  to  form  the  Harbor  Porpoise  Take  Reduction  
Team.  The  Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  Team  was  established  as  a  result  of  a  lawsuit  (N.D.  Cal.  
Apr.  30,  2003).  Prior  to  team  formation,  NMFS  updated  the  relevant  stock  assessments  
and  found  that  the  stocks  were  not  strategic,  which  meant  they  did  not  warrant  
regulatory  action  (National  Marine  Fisheries  Service,  2008).  The  team,  therefore,  created  
a  Take  Reduction  Strategy  that  consists  of  voluntary  research,  education,  and  outreach  
measures  (National  Marine  Fisheries  Service,  2008).  Thus,  there  are  seven  active  Take  
Reduction  Teams  and  six  active  Take  Reduction  Plans  
(http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/interactions/trt/teams.htm).  Teams  range  in  size  and  age  
(Table  18).  The  oldest  teams  were  formed  in  1996,  while  the  most  recent  was  established  
in  2010  (http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/interactions/trt/teams.htm).    
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Table  18:    Marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Teams,  team  size,  and  age.  Data  
gathered  from  http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/interactions/trt/teams.htm.    







Atlantic  Large  Whale   82   221  
Bottlenose  Dolphin   46   158  
Harbor  Porpoise   42   227  
Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans   17   227  
Pelagic  Longline   26   115  
        
Atlantic  Offshore  Cetaceans*   18   62  
Atlantic  Trawl  Gear*   34   100  
False  Killer  Whale*   27   59  
  
*Not  analyzed  for  ecological  evaluation  
  
3.1.2 A Social and Ecological Evaluation of Marine Mammal Take 
Reduction Planning 
Without  monitoring  data  on  the  environmental  resource  targeted  for  
management,  it  is  nearly  impossible  to  verify  that  conservation  efforts  implemented  
from  stakeholder  agreements  result  in  actual  environmental  change.  Moreover,  as  
discussed  above,  there  are  limitations  to  extrapolating  participant  perceptions  of  
satisfaction  and  success  to  policy  outcomes  and  ecological  success  (Coglianese,  2003;  
Leach  et  al.,  2002).  To  better  understand  the  effectiveness  of  multi-­‐‑stakeholder,  
environmental  conservation  programs  and  the  relationship  between  participant  views  of  
ecological  outcomes  and  actual  outcomes,  researchers  should  examine  stakeholder  
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opinions  in  the  broader  context  of  policy  implementation  and  actual  outcomes  
(Coglianese,  2003;  Leach  et  al.,  2002).  
Birkhoff  and  Lowry  (2003)  list  the  following  four  purposes  of  evaluating  multi-­‐‑
party,  environmental  conflict  resolution  processes:    1)  assess  effectiveness  in  relation  to  
program  goals,  2)  contribute  to  political  or  social  theory,  3)  improve  negotiation  
processes,  and  4)  maintain  accountability.  This  chapter  speaks  to  Birkhoff  and  Lowry'ʹs  
first  purpose  by  examining  ecological  and  sociological  data  simultaneously  to  evaluate  
Take  Reduction  Plans  in  relation  to  statutory  goals.  By  quantitatively  and  qualitatively  
examining  the  actual  ecological  outcomes  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans  
(Chapter  1)  in  relation  to  the  ecological  outcomes  perceived  by  Take  Reduction  Team  
members,  as  described  in  Chapter  2,  this  study  will  characterize  the  relationship  
between  perceived  and  actual  ecological  success,  thereby  addressing  the  shortcomings  
of  using  participant  perceptions  as  a  proxy  for  actual  success.  
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Quantitative comparison 
3.2.1.1  Actual  ecological  success  
Using  data  from  Marine  Mammal  Stock  Assessment  Reports,  I  ranked  the  
ecological  outcomes  of  five  Take  Reduction  Plans  (Atlantic  Large  Whale,  Bottlenose  
Dolphin,  Harbor  Porpoise,  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans,  and  Pelagic  Longline)  by  
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comparing  marine  mammal  bycatch  to  the  MMPA  short-­‐‑  and  long-­‐‑term  goals  of  PBR  
and  ZMRG.  Chapter  1  provides  a  more  detailed  description  of  these  methods.  Below  I  
review  the  calculations  for  the  two  metrics  used  to  evaluate  ecological  success.    
Metric  1  is  a  simple  categorical  measure  of  whether  or  not  bycatch  was  reduced  
and  maintained  below  PBR  or  ZMRG  as  follows:  
0  =  Bycatch  >PBR    
1  =  Bycatch  <PBR  and  >ZMRG,  and  remained  there  through  2011  
2  =  Bycatch  <ZMRG,  and  remained  there  through  2011  
Stocks  where  bycatch  fluctuated  above  and  below  ZMRG  were  assigned  a  score  
of  1,  while  stocks  that  fluctuated  above  and  below  PBR  were  assigned  a  0.  Ranks  of  all  
stocks  managed  under  a  plan  were  averaged  to  determine  a  mean  rank.  I  excluded  
stocks  that  were  below  ZMRG  prior  to  implementing  a  plan.  
Metric  2  was  the  mean  of  the  annual  difference  in  bycatch  from  PBR  divided  by  
PBR  itself.    
      Metric  2  =  mean[(PBR-­‐‑Bycatch)/PBR]  
such  that:                      1  implies  No  bycatch    
         0.90−0.99  implies  ≤ZMRG  (because  ZMRG  =  10%  of  PBR)  
         0.00−0.89  implies  >ZMRG  and  ≤PBR  
                       <0.00  implies  >PBR  
  119  
  
Ranks  of  all  stocks  managed  under  a  single  plan  were  averaged  to  determine  
mean  rank  and,  as  above,  I  excluded  stocks  that  were  below  ZMRG  prior  to  
implementation  of  a  plan.  
To  determine  the  significance  of  independent  predictors  or  covariates,  I  
conducted  a  multiple  regression  analysis  of  the  ecological  ranks  on  the  independent  
variables  of  PBR,  U.S.  geographic  region,  and  Take  Reduction  Team  size  and  age  using  
Mplus  (Muthén  and  Muthén,  1998-­‐‑2010).  
3.2.1.2  Perceived  ecological  success  
I  administered  a  web  (N=219)  and  traditional  mail  survey  (N=25)  to  all  Take  
Reduction  Team  participants  (past  and  present)  to  capture  their  views  of  the  ecological  
outcomes  of  the  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans.  Chapter  2  describes  in  detail  the  
methods  used  to  create  and  administer  the  survey.  Two  questions  examined  participant  
views  of  the  ecological  outcomes.  One  asked  about  the  effects  of  Take  Reduction  Plans  
on  marine  mammal  bycatch  while  the  other  asked  about  effects  on  abundance  of  marine  
mammal  stocks.  By  using  frequency  tables  of  both  questions  combined,  I  compared  
survey  responses  across  teams.    
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3.2.1.3  Structural  Equation  Models  (SEMs)  
I  created  three  Structural  Equation  Models  (SEMs)  with  latent  variables  to  
analyze  the  survey  data  using  MPlus,  v  6.1  (Muthén  and  Muthén  1998-­‐‑2010).  Chapter  2  
and  Appendix  A  provide  detailed  descriptions  of  Structural  Equation  Models  in  general  
and  the  models  I  created.  To  analyze  the  ecological  data  with  the  survey  data,  I  used  
Structural  Equation  Model  #2  described  in  Chapter  2,  which  illustrates  stakeholder  
opinions  about  the  outcomes  of  Take  Reduction  Plans  (Perceived  Ecological  Success).  I  
incorporated  the  ranks  from  the  ecological  evaluation  (Metrics  1  and  2)  as  independent  
predictors  of  the  latent  variable  Perceived  Ecological  Success  (PCD  ECO).  I  ran  the  
model  first  using  a  database  with  all  of  the  Take  Reduction  Teams  and  then  a  model  that  
included  data  from  only  those  five  teams  on  which  I  was  able  to  conduct  the  ecological  
analyses.  Model  fit  was  best  with  the  smaller  database.  Therefore,  I  will  discuss  the  
results  from  the  database  with  only  those  teams  analyzed  in  the  ecological  evaluation.  
3.2.1.3.1  Latent  variable  model  
The  best  fitting  model  included  one  latent  variable  representing  perceived  
ecological  success  (PCD  ECO),  which  was  regressed  on  covariate  predictors  that  
included  the  Take  Reduction  Team  identity,  team  size  and  age,  stakeholder  affiliation,  
U.S.  geographic  region,  and  the  causal  indicators  Metrics  1  and  2  (from  the  ecological  
evaluation).  To  improve  model  fit,  I  retained  only  the  significant  covariates  and  causal  
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indicators,  which  included  Metric  2  (from  the  ecological  evaluation),  team  age,  
researchers,  and  environmentalists  (Table  19).  Significant  predictor  variables  of  Metric  2  
that  were  identified  in  the  regression  analysis  of  the  ecological  data  included  the  
northeastern  U.S.  and  team  size  (Table  3  –  Chapter  1).  These  were  included  in  the  model  
as  indirect  predictors  of  Perceived  Ecological  Success  (PCD  ECO,  Figure  7).    
Table  19:    Regression  coefficients  of  the  independent  predictors  and  the  
squared  multiple  correlation  coefficient  (r2)  of  the  latent  variable  Perceived  Ecological  
Success  (PCD  ECO).  
  
3.2.1.3.2  Measurement  Model  
  
PCD  ECO  was  measured  by  two  7-­‐‑point  Likert  scale  questions  about  effects  of  
the  Take  Reduction  Team  process  on  marine  mammal  bycatch  and  marine  mammal  
abundance  (“made  much  worse”  to  “made  much  better,”  see  Appendix  B).  I  chose  










Figure  7:    Structural  Equation  Model  fusing  Perceived  Ecological  Success  (PCD  
ECO)  as  the  latent  variable  (circle)  and  actual  ecological  success  a  causal  indicator  of  
PCD  ECO  (Metric  2).  It  depicts  team  size  and  the  northeastern  U.S.  as  predictors  of  
Metric  2.  Measurement  indicators  included  Take  Reduction  Plan  effects  on  marine  





3.2.2 Qualitative Comparison 
I  ranked  the  perceived  ecological  success  of  each  Take  Reduction  Plan  based  on  
the  response  frequencies  to  the  questions  about  the  effects  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  
on  marine  mammal  bycatch  and  abundance.  For  both  questions  combined,  I  calculated  
the  average  frequency  of  the  combined  responses  of  “made  slightly  better,”  ”made  
somewhat  better,”  and  “made  much  better”  and  ranked  each  team  relative  to  each  other  
based  on  these  average  frequencies.  I  then  compared  those  ranks  to  Metrics  1  and  2  from  
the  ecological  analysis  to  identify  similarities  and  discrepancies.        
3.2.3 Interviews 
Semi-­‐‑structured  interviews  of  22  Take  Reduction  Team  members  and  open-­‐‑
ended  comments  of  the  survey  helped  to  clarify  survey  responses  and  various  
stakeholder  opinions  about  the  effectiveness  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans.  
An  interview  guide  was  informed  by  the  survey  and  participant  observations  conducted  
during  14  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  and  webinars.  I  used  the  guide  to  direct  the  
conversation  and  insure  that  I  covered  all  topics  consistently  across  interview  




3.3.1 Ecological Analyses 
The  ecological  effectiveness  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans  varied  
considerably  among  teams  (Table  20).  Relative  rankings  among  the  plans  also  differed  
slightly  between  Metrics  1  and  2  (Table  20).  Metric  1  ranked  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  and  
Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  plans  as  the  two  highest  (most  effective  ecologically).  
Although  Metric  2  ranked  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  plan  (minimum  bycatch  estimate1)  as  
ecologically  best,  three  plans  were  tied  for  the  second  highest  -­‐‑  Bottlenose  Dolphin  
(maximum  bycatch  estimate1),  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans,  and  Pelagic  Longline.  Both  
metrics  ranked  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  and  Harbor  Porpoise  plans  as  least  successful  
ecologically,  but  their  rank  orders  were  reversed  (Table  20).    
                                                                                                              
  
1  The  Stock  Assessment  Reports  for  the  bottlenose  dolphin  stocks  described  bycatch  levels  in  terms  of  
minimum  and  maximum  potential  values  due  to  uncertainty  regarding  the  stock  identity  of  dolphins  taken  




Table  20:    Results  of  the  ecological  rankings  for  Metrics  1  and  2  and  Perceived  
Ecological  Success  (from  the  frequency  of  survey  responses  of  made  slightly  better  to  
made  much  better  –  see  Table  8).  Bycatch  of  bottlenose  dolphins  was  split  into  
minimum  and  maximum  estimates,  but  perceived  success  was  for  the  entire  
Bottlenose  Dolphin  Take  Reduction  Plan.  
Take  Reduction  Team   Metric  #1   Metric  #2   PCD  ECO  
Bottlenose  Dolphin  -­‐‑  min   1.75   0.89  
84.4%  
Bottlenose  Dolphin  –  max   1.50   0.51  
Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans   1.20   0.51   90.0%  
Pelagic  Longline   1.00   0.51   58.0%  
Atlantic  Large  Whale   0.33   -­‐‑0.50   69.0%  
Harbor  Porpoise   0.00   0.13   84.3%  
  
The  regression  coefficients  of  the  predictors  for  actual  ecological  success  (Metrics  
1  and  2)  were  negative  (Table  21).  This  suggests  that  large  teams  and  those  in  the  
northeastern  U.S.  were  less  successful  at  reducing  bycatch  than  plans  created  by  smaller  
teams  and  in  other  geographic  regions.  The  covariate  predictors  accounted  for  a  very  
large  proportion  (87%-­‐‑90%)  of  the  variance  in  Metrics  1  and  2  (Table  21).    
Table  21:    Regression  coefficients  for  the  covariate  predictors  of  Metrics  1  and  





Predictor Estimate P-­‐‑value R2
Metric  1 NE  U.S. -­‐‑2.18 0.000 0.87
Metric  2 Size -­‐‑0.02 0.000




3.3.2 Survey Results 
The  response  rate  for  the  web  survey  was  60%,  while  that  of  the  mail  survey  was  
much  lower  at  only  36%  for  a  combined  response  rate  of  59%.  The  number  of  responses  
by  team  also  varied  and  mirrored  team  size;  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  had  the  most  
and  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  had  the  fewest  (Table  22).  Most  respondents  were  
fairly  experienced  with  the  take  reduction  planning  process.  Almost  half  were  members  
of  more  than  one  team  and  two-­‐‑thirds  participated  in  four  or  more  meetings  or  webinars  
per  team.  
Table  22:    Number  of  survey  respondents  per  Take  Reduction  Team,  number  
and  percentage  of  respondents  of  more  than  one  team,  and  total  number  of  responses.  
  
The  majority  (77%)  of  the  members  of  the  five  teams  used  in  the  ecological  
analyses  believed  that  bycatch  and  abundance  were  at  least  slightly  better  as  a  result  of  













Atlantic%Large%Whale 65 43 66% 65
Bottlenose%Dolphin 53 37 70% 53
Harbor%Porpoise 54 48 89% 54
Pelagic%Longline 29 21 72% 29




better  (Table  23).  Members  of  the  Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans  Team  reported  the  highest  
perceived  ecological  success  (90%),  while  members  of  the  Pelagic  Longline  team  had  the  
lowest  average  ratings  (58%).    
Table  23:  Frequency  distribution  table  of  survey  responses  to  two  questions  
combined  about  Perceived  Ecological  Success.  ALW=Atlantic  Large  Whale,  
BD=Bottlenose  Dolphin,  POC=Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans,  and  PL=Pelagic  Longline.  
  
3.3.3 SEM Results 
The  best  fitting  model  showed  the  significant  causal  indicator  of  PCD  ECO  was  
Metric  2  from  the  ecological  analyses,  while  significant  covariates  were  team  age,  
researchers,  and  environmentalists  (Figure  7,  Table  19).  Team  age  and  Metric  2  had  
positive  regression  coefficients  (Table  19).  Members  of  older  teams  viewed  the  Take  
Reduction  Plans  as  more  effective  than  members  of  newer  teams,  and  increases  in  actual  
ecological  success  improved  the  perceived  ecological  success.  Team  size  and  the  
northeastern  U.S.  significantly  and  negatively  influenced  Metric  2  (Table  21)  and  
Response ALW BD HP POC PL Total
Made6much6worse 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%
Made6somewhat6worse 1.8% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9%
Made6slightly6worse 0.9% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6%
No6effect 27.0% 15.6% 13.5% 10.0% 41.9% 21.8%
Made6slightly6better 29.7% 29.9% 23.6% 5.0% 34.9% 27.4%
Made6somewhat6better 27.9% 42.9% 39.3% 50.0% 20.9% 34.7%
Made6much6better 11.7% 11.7% 21.3% 35.0% 2.3% 14.4%
Slightly6+6somewhat6+6
much6better 69.4% 84.4% 84.3% 90.0% 58.1% 76.5%
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therefore,  indirectly  affected  perceived  ecological  success  (PCD  ECO).  The  other  
significant,  independent  predictors  (researcher  and  environmentalist)  also  had  negative  
regression  coefficients  (Table  19).  Members  of  these  groups  believed  the  Take  Reduction  
plans  did  not  substantially  reduce  bycatch  or  increase  marine  mammal  abundance.  The  
independent  predictors  and  causal  indicators  explained  29%  of  the  variance  in  the  latent  
variable  perceived  ecological  success  (PCD  ECO,  Table  19).  
The  factor  loadings  for  both  measurement  indicators  (marine  mammal  
BYCATCH  and  ABUND)  on  perceived  ecological  success  (PCD  ECO)  were  significant,  
with  high  reliabilities  (Table  24).  This  result  indicates  that  stakeholder  opinions  about  
the  impact  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  on  both  marine  mammal  bycatch  and  stock  
abundance  are  good  indicators  of  overall  perceived  ecological  success  of  the  plans.  In  
other  words,  a  change  in  perceived  ecological  success  would  directly  affect  perceived  
impacts  on  both  bycatch  and  abundance.  The  latent  variable,  PCD  ECO,  explains  a  
substantial  portion  of  the  variance  in  both  indicators  (bycatch  and  abundance),  and  the  
internal  consistency  of  the  responses  to  each  question  about  effects  on  bycatch  and  
abundance  was  high.  Model  fit  was  excellent  as  measured  by  the  chi-­‐‑square  difference  
test,  Root  Mean  Square  Error  of  Approximation,  Comparative  Fit  Index,  and  Tucker-­‐‑
Lewis  Index  (Table  25).    
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Table  24:    Measurement  indicators  (bycatch  and  abundance)  of  perceived  
ecological  success  (PCD  ECO),  factor  loadings  (λ),  and  reliabilities  (squared  multiple  
correlation  coefficients).  
  
Table  25:    Model  fit  statistics  for  the  Structural  Equation  Model  of  Perceived  
Ecological  Success  that  incorporates  actual  ecological  success  as  a  predictor.  
  
3.3.4 Qualitative Comparison of Ranks 
The  ecological  analyses  ranked  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  and  Pacific  Offshore  
Cetaceans  Take  Reduction  Plans  as  the  two  most  successful  and  the  Atlantic  Large  
Whale  and  Harbor  Porpoise  Plans  as  the  two  least  successful  (Table  20).  Perceived  
ecological  success  was  similar  to  actual  ecological  success  -­‐‑  the  Pacific  Offshore  
Cetaceans  and  Bottlenose  Dolphins  teams  ranked  highest  and  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  
















p-value RMSEA CFI TLI
0.142 1 0.7064 0.000 1.000 1.007
  130  
  
the  bottom  two  in  the  ecological  evaluation,  but  it  ranked  third  highest  in  perceived  
ecological  success,  on  par  with  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  plan  with  84%  of  respondents  
indicating  bycatch  and  abundance  were  at  least  slightly  better  as  a  result  of  
implementing  the  Take  Reduction  Plan  (Tables  20  and  23).  Ecologically,  the  Pelagic  
Longline  Take  Reduction  Plan  ranked  in  the  middle,  but  stakeholders  ranked  it  as  the  
least  successful  among  the  teams  with  active  Take  Reduction  Plans  (Tables  20  and  23).  
3.4 Discussion 
Both  perceived  and  actual  success  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Plans  vary  
considerably  across  plans.  The  quantitative  and  qualitative  comparisons  of  the  social  
and  ecological  data  revealed  many  similarities  between  actual  and  perceived  success  
and  established  that  actual  ecological  success  significantly  influenced  stakeholder  
perceptions  of  success.  Regression  analyses  confirmed  that  the  covariate  of  team  size  
significantly  influenced  actual  success  and  indicated  that  teams  dealing  with  stocks  in  
the  northeastern  U.S.  were  less  successful  than  those  in  other  regions.  This  outcome  
concurs  with  the  SEM  findings  in  Chapter  2  that  teams  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  also  had  
lower  perceived  ecological  success.  The  rankings  of  perceived  success  of  three  teams  
coincided  with  their  ecological  rankings  (Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans,  Bottlenose  Dolphin,  
and  Atlantic  Large  Whale).  Two  teams,  the  Pelagic  Longline  and  Harbor  Porpoise  
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differed  dramatically,  however.  Stakeholders  on  the  Pelagic  Longline  team  believed  it  
was  much  less  successful  than  the  ecological  data  indicated  and  the  reverse  was  true  for  
the  Harbor  Porpoise  team.  Members  ranked  the  latter  team  much  higher  than  what  the  
actual  ecological  data  revealed.  
3.4.1 Actual Ecological Success 
Team  size  negatively  affected  ecological  success,  meaning  that  as  the  number  of  
Take  Reduction  Team  members  increased,  actual  ecological  success  decreased  (Chapter  
1).  A  large  number  of  stakeholder  participants  reduces  the  likelihood  of  reaching  
consensus  and  compliance  with  the  negotiated  agreement  (Holmes  and  Scoones,  2000;  
Leach  and  Sabatier,  2005),  and  this  study  shows  that  the  number  of  negotiating  parties  
also  directly  affects  the  actual  ecological  success  of  negotiated  agreements.  For  example,  
the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  teams  has  not  been  able  to  reach  consensus,  so  NMFS  has  been  
enacting  regulations  to  mitigate  bycatch  for  the  affected  stocks.  This  suggests  that  plans  
created  by  the  agency,  like  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  plan,  are  less  effective  at  reducing  
bycatch  than  those  that  are  created  by  negotiated  rulemaking.  Furthermore,  large  teams  
may  only  be  able  to  agree  on  relatively  ineffectual  measures  that  are  easily  agreed-­‐‑upon    
that  may  not  be  as  impactful  as  more  contentious  measures  (Coglianese,  2003).  
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Teams  dealing  with  stocks  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  were  less  successful  than  
those  in  other  regions.  This  tracks  the  SEM  results  of  Chapter  2  –  survey  responses  
indicated  that  the  perceived  ecological  success  of  teams  in  the  northeast  was  
significantly  lower  than  teams  in  other  regions  (see  Chapter  2).  One  reason  posited  in  
Chapter  2  for  this  finding  was  that  the  largest  team  (Atlantic  Large  Whale)  has  never  
achieved  consensus  and  deals  with  stocks  primarily  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  
Stakeholders  also  proposed  that  the  politics  of  the  northeast  contribute  to  its  negative  
effect  on  ecological  success.  
“I  think  what  gets  in  the  way  of  being  able  to  resolve  those  issues  more  has  to  do  
with  the  lack  of  any  other  way  to  phrase  it,  politics,  than  it  does  our  inability  to  
come  up  with  ideas  that  could  reduce  the  severity  of  the  problems”  –
Environmentalist    
  
“I  think  it’s  a  mix  of  the  people  and  the  personalities  and  the  culture  of  the  region  
and  the  data  availability  and  the  nature  of  the  problem.  It’s  all  of  the  above  and  
they’re  intertwined.”  –Facilitator  
  
“It’s  primarily  the  Northeast  region;  [it]  clearly  gives  greater  weight  to  the  
fisheries  comments  than  comments  by  any  other  groups  and  I  think  that’s  just  a  
reflection  of  the  region.  I  think  there’s  a  regional  difference  in  the  way  that  the  
agency  pays  attention  to  comments  from  different  sides...  And  in  the  New  
England  region,  I  think  they  look  at  it  from  the  perspective,  well  if  you  follow  
fishery  management  restrictions  that  we  have,  we’ll  cut  you  lots  of  slack  on  any  
restrictions  that  would  otherwise  be  too  burdensome  under  the  MMPA.”  –
Federal  employee  
  
“I  would  say  especially  in  the  northeast  region,  there  is  a  lack  of  political  will  at  
the  regional  office  to  push  the  Coast  Guard  harder  to  do  enforcement.  I  think  
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there  is  a  long  and  acrimonious  history  of  enforcement  efforts  in  that  region  …”  
–Researcher  
  
“New  England  has  always  been  highly  political.  Whenever  the  [Fisheries  
Management]  Councils  would  try  to  put  something  like  that  in  place,  the  
politicians  would  step  in  and  put  it  on  hold,  convince  the  powers  that  be  that  this  
shouldn’t  be  done,  it  didn’t  need  to  be  done,  it  would  hurt  the  fishermen.”  –State  
manager  
 
3.4.2 Quantitative Comparison - SEM 
This  research  has  demonstrated  that  Structural  Equation  Models  can  successfully  
merge  ecological  and  social  data,  in  this  case  by  using  the  ecological  outcome  as  a  causal  
indicator  of  the  latent  variable,  Perceived  Ecological  Success.  The  model  with  the  best  fit  
used  ecology  Metric  2  as  the  predictor  and  incorporated  the  covariates  for  Metric  2  (team  
size  and  northeastern  U.S.)  as  indirect  predictors  of  perceived  ecological  success  (Figure  
7).  Actual  ecological  success  directly  influenced  perceived  ecological  success.    In  other  
words,  actual  changes  in  marine  mammal  bycatch  relative  to  PBR  and  ZMRG  
significantly  affected  stakeholder  perceptions  of  Take  Reduction  Plan  success  or  failure.  
One  explanation  is  that  at  least  one-­‐‑third  of  all  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  focus  on  
empirical  data.  In  addition,  between  in-­‐‑person  meetings,  NMFS  convenes  teams  via  
webinar  to  impart  new  information,  often  about  recent  bycatch  events.  Prior  to  Take  
Reduction  Team  meetings,  the  agency  provides  members  with  dossiers  of  background  
materials  that  include  information  about  marine  mammal  bycatch,  distribution  and  
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abundance  estimates,  compliance  with  and  enforcement  of  Take  Reduction  Plans,  results  
of  gear  testing  experiments,  and  outputs  from  working  groups.  Prior  to  any  discussion  
about  changes  to  the  Take  Reduction  Plans,  the  facilitators  solicit  members  for  clarifying  
questions  to  ensure  that  everyone  at  the  table  has  a  clear  understanding  of  the  relevant  
data.    
Results  from  Chapter  2  show  that  as  a  result  of  participation  in  take  reduction  
planning,  85%  of  members  believed  they  have  learned  more  about  marine  mammal  
bycatch  and  the  fisheries  that  interact  with  marine  mammals.  By  keeping  Take  
Reduction  Team  members  updated  on  empirical  information  and  focusing  on  shared  
learning,  NMFS  has  reinforced  the  positive  relationship  between  actual  and  perceived  
ecological  success.  
3.4.3 Qualitative Comparison of Ranks 
Qualitatively,  metrics  of  perceived  and  actual  ecological  success  were  nearly  
identical  for  three  of  the  five  Take  Reduction  Plans  (Pacific  Offshore  Cetaceans,  
Bottlenose  Dolphin,  and  Atlantic  Large  Whale,  Table  20).  This  follows  the  results  of  the  
quantitative  comparison  that  demonstrated  that  actual  ecological  success  positively  
affects  perceived  ecological  success.  The  two  outliers  included  the  Pelagic  Longline  and  
Harbor  Porpoise  Plans.  
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3.4.3.1  Pelagic  longline  plan  
The  perceived  success  of  the  Pelagic  Longline  Take  Reduction  Plan  was  much  
lower  (ranked  lowest)  than  its  actual  ecological  success,  which  ranked  it  in  the  middle.  
The  team  was  established  as  a  result  of  a  lawsuit  (N.D.  Cal.  Apr.  30,  2003).  At  the  time,  
neither  of  the  marine  mammal  stocks  (Western  North  Atlantic  pilot  whales  and  Risso’s  
dolphins)  was  strategic,  meaning  that  bycatch  was  below  PBR.  Until  recently,  NMFS  had  
been  unable  to  distinguish  which  pilot  whale  species  (long-­‐‑finned  or  short-­‐‑finned)  was  
interacting  with  the  longline  fishery,  so  it  combined  the  PBR  values  for  each  stock.  Pilot  
whale  bycatch  has  historically  been  highly  variable,  but  using  the  combined  PBR  kept  
estimates  of  pilot  whale  bycatch  below  PBR.  Recently,  the  agency  has  determined  that  
the  pelagic  longline  fishery  interacts  only  with  short-­‐‑finned  pilot  whales.  Thus,  bycatch  
is  now  compared  only  against  PBR  for  the  short-­‐‑finned  species.  In  2011,  short-­‐‑finned  
pilot  whale  bycatch  in  pelagic  longlines  exceeded  PBR.  Thus,  when  taking  the  survey,  
stakeholders  may  have  been  thinking  about  the  change  in  status  of  pilot  whales  -­‐‑  from  
non-­‐‑strategic  to  strategic.  The  change  in  bycatch  from  below  PBR  to  exceeding  PBR  
would  signal  that  the  plan  is  not  effective  at  reducing  bycatch.    
Second,  the  empirical  information  discussed  at  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  
centered  almost  exclusively  on  pilot  whales.  Presentations  by  NMFS  researchers  focused  
on  trying  to  distinguish  between  the  two  pilot  whale  species,  stock  assessments,  and  
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determining  which  of  the  two  interact  with  the  pelagic  longline  fishery.  Gear  research  
also  focused  on  pilot  whales  and  independent  researchers  used  pilot  whale  carcasses  to  
test  hook-­‐‑tissue  interactions.  Risso’s  dolphins,  which  are  below  ZMRG,  are  not  actively  
discussed  at  meetings.  I  used  data  from  Risso’s  dolphin  Stock  Assessment  Reports  to  
calculate  Metrics  1  and  2,  but  it  is  likely  that  stakeholders  were  not  thinking  about  
Risso’s  dolphins  when  answering  the  survey  questions  about  the  effects  of  the  Pelagic  
Longline  Take  Reduction  Plan  on  bycatch.  
Finally,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  many  respondents  believed  that  the  primary  
requirement  of  the  Pelagic  Longline  Take  Reduction  Plan  is  not  enforceable.  This  belief  
is  supported  by  the  statements  of  a  member  of  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  during  the  August  
2012  Take  Reduction  Team  meeting  (CONCUR,  2012).  The  survey  was  administered  in  
2013,  after  that  particular  discussion.  The  survey  did  not  inquire  about  plan  
implementation,  but  the  perceived  enforceability  of  a  plan  likely  affected  participant  
views  about  its  effectiveness.  
3.4.3.2  Harbor  porpoise  plan  
The  second  discrepancy  between  actual  and  perceived  success  was  with  the  
Harbor  Porpoise  Take  Reduction  Plan.  Annual  fluctuations  in  bycatch  since  2001  and  
political  events  beginning  in  2012  that  have  affected  the  ability  of  the  Harbor  Porpoise  
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team  to  achieve  consensus  did  not  appear  to  influence  the  survey  responses  of  most  
members  about  the  plan’s  ecological  success.  
Prior  to  creation  of  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team,  a  group  of  fishermen,  researchers,  
and  environmentalists  formed  the  Harbor  Porpoise  Working  Group  to  address  harbor  
porpoise  bycatch  in  the  northeast  sink  gillnet  fishery  (RESOLVE,  1996;  Smolowitz  and  
Wiley,  1992).  The  Working  Group  formally  became  the  Harbor  Porpoise  Take  Reduction  
Team  in  1996.  The  team  achieved  consensus  and  produced  the  first  Harbor  Porpoise  
Take  Reduction  Plan  in  December  1998.  Among  various  elements,  the  plan  required  
fishermen  to  use  acoustic  deterrence  devices,  called  pingers  on  gillnets  to  warn  
porpoises  of  the  presence  of  the  nets.  Pingers  were  experimental  when  the  plan  was  first  
drafted,  so  team  members  also  added  a  stipulation  to  the  plan  termed  the  “Other  Special  
Measures  Provision”  that  allowed  NMFS  to  modify  the  plan  without  reconvening  the  
team  if  the  agency  verified  that  pingers  or  the  other  plan  requirements  were  ineffective    
(50  CFR  229.34(d)).    
The  Harbor  Porpoise  Team  was  initially  very  successful  at  reducing  bycatch  
below  PBR,  nearly  to  ZMRG  (Geijer  and  Read,  2013),  but  six  years  later,  a  lack  of  
compliance  with  the  pinger  requirements  caused  bycatch  to  exceed  PBR  once  again  
(Geijer  and  Read,  2013;  Orphanides  and  Palka,  2012;  Palka  et  al.,  2012;  Palka  et  al.,  2008).  
In  late  2007,  the  team  reconvened  to  try  and  mitigate  bycatch  to  below  PBR.  The  team  
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agreed  to  a  consensus-­‐‑based  compromise  that  incentivized  pinger  compliance  by  
establishing  bycatch  thresholds  for  three  areas  that  experienced  high  bycatch,  termed  
Consequence  Closure  Areas  (CCAs,  50  CFR  229).  If  average  bycatch  over  a  two-­‐‑year  
period  exceeded  the  threshold,  a  seasonal  closure  would  be  triggered.    
The  2008  plan  amendments  were  not  implemented  until  March  2010  (75  FR  
7383).  During  that  time,  New  England  fisheries  were  reconfigured  into  fishing  
cooperatives  called  Sectors  (69  FR  22906,  74  FR  18262,  76  FR  23042).  Two  Sector  
Managers  and  the  Executive  Director  of  the  Northeast  Seafood  Coalition  (NSC)  were  
added  to  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team,  replacing  working  fishermen  who  had  resigned  
(http://www.greateratlantic.fisheries.noaa.gov/prot_res/porptrp/doc/Member%20List%2
0for%202007%20TRT%20Meeting.pdf).      
In  2010,  bycatch  exceeded  the  southern  Gulf  of  Maine  Consequence  Closure  Area  
threshold  by  more  than  double,  which  meant  that  the  closure  scheduled  for  October-­‐‑
November  2012  was  inevitable,  even  if  bycatch  in  2011  was  zero.  In  response,  the  Sector  
Managers  and  Northeast  Seafood  Coalition  sent  a  letter  to  the  NMFS  Northeast  Regional  
Office  requesting,  under  the  authority  of  the  “Other  Special  Measures  Provision,”  that  
the  agency  shift  the  southern  Gulf  of  Maine  closure  from  October-­‐‑November  2012  to  
February-­‐‑March  2013  (Northeast  Seafood  Coalition,  2012).  Several  Take  Reduction  Team  
members  submitted  written  comments  urging  NMFS  to  deny  the  request  (Northeast  
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Seafood  Coalition,  2012).  They  argued  that  the  Consequence  Closure  Areas  were  
recommended  by  consensus  and  modifying  them  would  both  undermine  the  Harbor  
Porpoise  Take  Reduction  Team  process  and  future  compliance  with  the  Take  Reduction  
regulations.  
NMFS  denied  the  request  in  a  letter  written  in  early  September  2012  (National  
Marine  Fisheries  Service,  2012b).  The  letter  was  signed  by  the  newly  appointed  
Northeast  Regional  Administrator  and  former  mayor  of  New  Bedford,  Massachusetts,  
John  Bullard.  Three  weeks  after  the  initial  denial,  Mr.  Bullard  reversed  his  decision  in  an  
announcement  at  the  Northeast  Fisheries  Management  Council  meeting,  shifting  the  
Gulf  of  Maine  Consequence  Closure  Area  from  October-­‐‑November  2012  to  February-­‐‑
March  2013  (Bullard,  2012).  As  a  result  of  this  decision,  three  people  who  were  members  
of  the  original  Harbor  Porpoise  Working  Group  have  resigned  and  the  team  has  not  
again  achieved  consensus  (CONCUR,  2013a,  b;  Read  et  al.,  2012).      
The  survey  for  this  dissertation  was  implemented  in  the  midst  of  the  fallout  that  
was  triggered  by  the  NMFS  reversal  of  its  decision  about  the  shifted  Consequence  
Closures.  Based  on  interviews  and  conversations  with  team  members,  however,  I  believe  
that  when  responding  to  the  survey,  many  of  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  members  were  
thinking  in  the  long-­‐‑term,  over  the  life  of  the  team.  The  Harbor  Porpoise  plan  was  
initially  very  successful  at  reducing  marine  mammal  bycatch  and  coupled  with  
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drastically  reduced  fishing  effort,  current  bycatch  levels  are  much  lower  than  when  the  
team  was  first  convened  in  1996,  and  have  been  declining  since  2009  (again,  resulting  
from  decreased  fishing  effort,  see  Chapters  1  and  2).  The  survey  asked  if  the  Harbor  
Porpoise  Plan  made  bycatch  better  or  worse,  rather  than  if  it  reduced  bycatch  to  below  
PBR  or  ZMRG.  Interviews  indicated  that  some  members  were  not  thinking  about  the  
recent  events,  but  rather  about  the  long-­‐‑term  trend  in  harbor  porpoise  bycatch.  
“…just  thinking  about  the  numbers  in  the  Harbor  Porpoise  Plan,  we  are  
nowhere  near…the  number  of  takes  that  we  had  back  in  whatever,  ‘94,’95,’  96.  
Whenever  those  plans  started  [takes]  were  way  higher  than  what  we  have  now.”  
–State  Manager  
  
“We  devised  a  plan  that  worked.  So  that  was  a  success.”  –Researcher    
  
“But  with  harbor  porpoises…  the  mortality  rate’s  going  down”  –State  manager  
  
“It  is  a  LOT  better  than  since  the  90'ʹs  but  is  up  and  down  since  about  2001  
when  it  has  bounced  from  ZMRG  to  over  1,000  animals  w/in  a  couple  of  years  




The  data  limitations  discussed  in  Chapter  1  affected  my  analyses  in  several  ways.  
I  was  unable  to  compare  participant  views  of  the  success  of  the  False  Killer  Whale  team  
to  actual  ecological  success  because  the  plan  was  implemented  in  2011.  Also,  I  was  only  
able  to  evaluate  4  of  the  18  stocks  covered  by  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  plan  because  of  
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changes  to  stock  delineations,  which  restricted  the  amount  of  data  for  the  analyses.  
However,  members  likely  thought  about  more  than  those  four  stocks  when  answering  
the  survey  questions.  While  participant  perceptions  track  the  ecological  data  in  this  
study,  discrepancies  between  the  social  and  ecological  data  show  that  participant  
perceptions  may  not  always  be  a  valid  proxy  for  actual  ecological  measures.  
Finally,  without  reliable  data  on  compliance  and  law  enforcement  collected  
methodically  and  consistently,  it  was  impossible  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  the  
implementation  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  in  reality  actually  affected  their  ecological  
success.  Data  from  the  Harbor  Porpoise  plan  suggest  a  direct  link  between  compliance  
with  Take  Reduction  Plan  requirements  and  bycatch  (Allen  et  al.,  1999;  Orphanides  and  
Palka,  2012;  Palka  et  al.,  2012).  But  this  is  not  surprising;  it  has  been  well-­‐‑established  
elsewhere  that  when  used  properly,  pingers  are  highly  successful  at  reducing  marine  
mammal  bycatch  (Carretta  and  Barlow,  2011).  The  effectiveness  of  other  Take  Reduction  
Plan  requirements  are  unknown,  and  thus  may  not  reduce  bycatch  simply  because  the  
measures  are  not  effective,  regardless  of  compliance  or  enforcement.  Moreover,  the  only  
information  about  compliance  and  enforcement  for  this  study  comes  from  the  semi-­‐‑
structured  interviews,  journal  articles,  and  government  reports.  Regrettably,  the  survey  
did  not  contain  any  questions  about  implementation  which  would  have  at  least  
provided  a  sense  of  how  the  stakeholders  felt  about  this  topic  and  how  it  may  have  
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affected  perceived  ecological  success.  For  effective  mitigation  strategies  like  pingers,  
implementation  of  the  regulations  is  critical  to  determining  success  of  the  plan.    
3.5 Conclusions 
This  research  is  the  first  to  examine,  in  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  fashion,  
the  ecological  outcomes  of  regulations  generated  by  negotiated  rulemaking  
simultaneously  with  stakeholder  opinions  about  those  outcomes.  Structural  Equation  
Models  provided  a  useful  framework  to  quantitatively  relate  the  two  types  of  data,  in  
which  the  actual  ecological  outcomes  were  used  as  independent  predictors  of  the  
perceived  outcomes.  This  analysis  indicated  that  the  ecological  outcome  was  a  good  
predictor  of  perceived  outcome.  In  other  words,  improvements  in  marine  mammal  
bycatch  enhanced  stakeholder  opinions  about  the  effectiveness  of  marine  mammal  Take  
Reduction  Plans.  It  is  likely  that  the  emphasis  that  the  NMFS  places  on  empirical  
information  and  keeping  stakeholders  informed  about  bycatch,  marine  mammal  stocks,  
and  fisheries  facilitated  this  relationship.  Other  independent  predictors  of  perceived  
ecological  outcomes  included  team  age  and  stakeholder  affiliation.  Older  teams  were  
perceived  to  be  more  successful,  while  researchers  and  environmentalists  had  a  more  
negative  view  of  the  ecological  outcomes  (see  Chapter  2).    
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The  quantitative  analysis  also  identified  two  significant  independent  predictors  
of  actual  ecological  success  –  team  size  and  those  dealing  with  stocks  in  the  northeastern  
U.S.,  both  of  which  were  inversely  related  to  ecological  success.  As  team  size  increased,  
actual  ecological  success  decreased.  In  addition,  teams  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  were  less  
successful  than  teams  in  other  regions.  One  reason  for  this  result  could  be  that  this  
region  contains  the  largest  team  –  one  that  has  never  reached  consensus.  Stakeholders  
also  identified  regional  politics  surrounding  fishing  as  a  reason  for  the  decreased  success  
of  these  northeastern  teams.  The  northeastern  U.S.  also  was  a  significant,  negative  
covariate  of  perceived  ecological  success  discussed  in  Chapter  2.  
The  qualitative  analysis  was  similar  to  the  quantitative  analysis  in  that  the  social  
and  ecological  rankings  were  the  same  for  three  of  five  Take  Reduction  Plans  (Pacific  
Offshore  Cetaceans,  Bottlenose  Dolphin,  and  Atlantic  Large  Whale).  The  two  plans  that  
differed  in  actual  and  perceived  outcomes  were  those  created  by  the  Pelagic  Longline  
and  Harbor  Porpoise  teams.    
The  Pelagic  Longline  team  includes  two  marine  mammal  stocks,  one  of  which,  
Risso’s  dolphins,  has  been  below  ZMRG  for  several  years.  Discussions  at  the  Pelagic  
Longline  team  meetings  focus  almost  exclusively  on  fisheries  interactions  with  short-­‐‑
finned  and  long-­‐‑finned  pilot  whales.  After  recent  findings  that  the  pelagic  longline  
fisheries  interact  with  only  short-­‐‑finned  pilot  whales,  bycatch  now  exceeds  PBR  (as  of  
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the  most  recent  Stock  Assessment  Report).  Moreover,  one  regulatory  measure  was  
viewed  as  unenforceable  by  team  members  and  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  (see  Chapter  2),  
which  may  have  influenced  members’  views  of  the  plan’s  ability  to  reduce  bycatch.  
The  Harbor  Porpoise  team  has  a  long  history  of  camaraderie  and  achieving  
consensus.  Before  the  team  was  officially  established  under  the  MMPA,  stakeholders  
took  it  upon  themselves  to  meet  and  generate  creative  solutions  to  mitigate  harbor  
porpoise  bycatch.  Despite  recent  political  events  that  eroded  stakeholder  trust  and  
damaged  the  team’s  ability  to  achieve  consensus,  team  members  were  optimistic  about  
the  ecological  success  of  the  plan.  When  responding  to  the  survey,  team  members  likely  
were  thinking  of  the  long-­‐‑term  history  of  the  team  and  the  fact  that  in  the  past,  the  plan  
was  able  to  substantially  reduce  harbor  porpoise  bycatch,  almost  to  ZMRG.  Porpoise  
bycatch  has  been  variable,  and  is  responding  more  to  fishing  effort  than  regulations  
implemented  by  the  Take  Reduction  Plan,  but  it  is  still  lower  than  it  was  in  the  mid-­‐‑
1990s  when  the  team  was  first  established.  
It  is  unknown  to  what  extent  plan  implementation  (i.e.,  compliance  and  
enforcement)  affects  both  perceived  and  actual  ecological  success,  but  I  suspect  it  is  
significant.  Pinger  compliance  studies  related  to  implementation  of  the  Harbor  Porpoise  
plan  showed  that  when  a  measure  has  proven  to  be  effective,  compliance  is  critical  to  
reducing  bycatch.  Other  bycatch  mitigation  measures  may  not  be  as  effective  as  pingers,  
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but  without  reliable  compliance  and  enforcement  data,  it  would  be  impossible  to  tease  
apart  whether  the  measure  is  (1)  ineffective,  or  (2)  effective  when  implemented,  but  
suffers  from  a  lack  of  compliance.  
Finally,  the  only  reason  I  was  able  to  conduct  this  research  was  because  of  the  
long-­‐‑term  monitoring  of  marine  mammal  bycatch  provided  in  the  Stock  Assessment  
Reports  (http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/sars/species.htm).  Despite  its  data  flaws  and  
inconsistencies,  without  the  Stock  Assessment  Reports,  there  would  be  no  measure  of  
the  actual  ecological  effectiveness  of  these  plans.  This  underscores  the  importance  of  





4. Chapter 4: Recommendations 
4.1 Introduction 
The  marine  mammal  take  reduction  planning  process  has  all  of  the  objective    
ingredients  necessary  for  effective  consensus-­‐‑based,  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  negotiations  
(Chapter  2).  By  focusing  on  empirical  information  and  shared  learning,  NMFS  has  
decreased  hostility  among  opposing  coalitions,  improved  social  capital,  and  created  a  
group  of  knowledgeable  stakeholders  who  have  devised  creative  solutions  to  address  
marine  mammal  bycatch.  Informed  stakeholders  also  had  relatively  accurate  perceptions  
of  the  actual  ecological  effectiveness  of  the  Take  Reduction  Plans  (Chapter  3).  The  long  
timeframes  over  which  the  teams  have  been  meeting  generally  have  increased  
cooperation.  The  professionally  trained,  neutral  facilitators  have  produced  fair  
negotiations,  in  which  most  individuals  felt  they  had  an  opportunity  to  contribute.  
Participant  views  of  fairness  significantly  influenced  their  satisfaction  with  Take  
Reduction  Plans,  which  significantly  affected  their  perceptions  about  the  effectiveness  of  
those  plans  (Chapter  2).  The  mandate  to  create  a  consensus-­‐‑based  output  has,  for  the  
most  part,  minimized  defections  from  the  negotiations  and  facilitated  stakeholder  buy-­‐‑
in.  
However,  although  Take  Reduction  Teams  possess  the  nominal  ingredients  
required  to  be  effective,  their  success  both  from  an  ecological  and  social  perspective  has  
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varied  (Chapters  1  and  2).  Large  teams  and  those  operating  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  
(Maine  to  North  Carolina)  were  least  successful  at  reducing  bycatch,  and  this  fact  was  
reflected  in  stakeholder  views  of  the  effectiveness  of  these  teams.  While  participants  
believed  they  have  had  an  opportunity  to  express  their  views,  they  have  not  always  felt  
the  agency  listened  to  their  views  (Chapter  2).  Moreover,  consensus-­‐‑based  negotiations  
have  not  always  produced  practical  or  enforceable  regulations  (Chapters  2  and  3).  
Implementation  of  Take  Reduction  regulations  is  critical  in  determining  plan  success  
and  identifying  effective  mitigation  measures,  but  because  of  a  lack  of  consistent  
monitoring,  the  degree  of  success  has  not  been  characterized  for  most  teams.  
Additionally,  elements  like  the  “Other  Special  Measures  Provision”  in  the  Harbor  
Porpoise  Take  Reduction  Plan  have  undermined  the  negotiation  process  by  allowing  
NMFS  to  alter  consensus-­‐‑based  elements  without  consulting  the  team  or  requiring  their  
consent,  which  has  led  to  hostility,  mistrust,  and  frustration  among  stakeholders  
(Chapters  2  and  3).  
This  chapter  proposes  recommendations  to  improve  what  is  generally  a  
successful  negotiated  rulemaking  process.  These  recommendations  were  compiled  from  
semi-­‐‑structured  interviews  of  22  current  and  former  Take  Reduction  Team  participants,  
survey  responses  from  139  individuals,  and  participant  observations  of  marine  mammal  
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Take  Reduction  Teams  and  webinars  from  2010-­‐‑2014.  Chapters  1  and  2  provide  detailed  
descriptions  of  the  data  collection  methods.  
4.2 Membership  
4.2.1 Limit Team Size  
As  mentioned  in  previous  chapters,  the  number  of  negotiating  parties  in  an  
endeavor  such  as  a  Take  Reduction  Team  can  decrease  the  likelihood  of  achieving  
consensus.  Large  groups  are  more  likely  to  form  coalitions,  which  can  hinder  the  ability  
of  facilitators  to  manage  the  discussion  (Susskind  and  Crump,  2008).  In  addition,  as  the  
number  of  participants  increases,  negotiators  often  must  recalibrate  the  nature  of  
possible  alternatives,  and  the  outcomes  they  are  willing  to  accept  (Susskind  and  Crump,  
2008).    In  Chapter  3,  I  found  that  the  size  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Teams  had  
a  significant,  negative  effect  on  actual  ecological  success,  meaning  that  as  team  size  
increased,  ecological  effectiveness  decreased.  Take  Reduction  Team  participants  were  
confounded  by  the  logistics  of  participating  in  discussions  with  many  stakeholders.  For  
example,  all  members  have  name  cards  in  front  of  their  seats  at  the  negotiation  table.  
Rather  than  raise  their  hands,  team  members  tilt  their  name  cards  when  they  want  to  say  
something  or  ask  a  question.  When  several  members  have  their  cards  tilted  at  the  same  
time,  the  discussion  can  quickly  change  topics  and  become  hard  to  follow.  If  the  queue  is  
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long,  a  member  may  have  his  or  her  card  tilted  for  quite  a  while  and  therefore  have  
multiple  issues  he  or  she  wishes  to  address  by  the  time  he  or  she  is  called  on  to  speak.  
“Now  you'ʹve  got  17  cards  [requesting  permission  to  speak]  before  
anybody  gets  to  talk...”  –Environmentalist  
  
“Just  the  sheer  size  of  the  group  impeded…input  to  some  extent  because  
there’s  so  many  people  that  want  to  talk,  just  because  of  the  size  of  it,  it  is  
counter-­‐‑productive.”  –Fisheries  manager  
    
An  exception  to  this  general  rule  is  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  team,  which  is  large,  
but  has  received  high  marks  for  its  ecological  and  social  components.  This  might  be  
attributed  to  the  use  of  working  groups  to  resolve  specific  issues.  In  a  study  by  Susskind  
and  McMahon  (1985),  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  conducted  successful  
negotiated  rulemakings  with  more  than  25  participants  by  breaking  up  the  participants  
into  smaller  working  groups  to  complete  tasks  that  the  larger  group  could  not.  Because  
actual  ecological  success  influences  perceived  success,  one  way  to  improve  both  
perceived  and  actual  success  would  be  to  reduce  team  size.  For  teams  that  have  trouble  
negotiating  because  the  logistics  of  negotiating  have  become  impractical  and  as  a  result,  
preclude  consensus,  I  recommend  the  agency  limit  the  number  of  negotiating  parties  
around  the  table.  The  Negotiated  Rulemaking  Act  of  1990  (5  U.S.C.  561  et  seq.)  limits  
participation  to  25  members  unless  the  agency  determines  more  are  necessary  for  a  
balanced  membership  (5  U.S.C.  565(b)).  One  way  to  maintain  representation  while  
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limiting  membership  could  be  to  employ  pyramiding  representation  where  stakeholders  
are  involved  indirectly  by  individuals  who  represent  a  larger  constituency.  For  example,  
one  voting  environmentalist  and  alternate  could  represent  all  environmental  groups  and  
likewise,  one  voting  fisherman  and  alternate  from  each  fishery  could  represent  all  
fishermen  in  that  fishery,  rather  than  one  from  each  fishery  in  each  state.  Susskind  and  
McMahon  (1985)  found  pyramiding  representation  was  successful  in  including  more  
stakeholder  groups  while  limiting  the  number  of  parties  at  the  negotiation  table.  One  
stakeholder  suggested  that  time  be  set  aside  for  caucusing  within  each  stakeholder  
coalition  so  that  all  members  can  voice  their  opinion  to  their  representative.  Only  one  
representative,  however,  would  participate  in  the  discussions  about  options  and  the  
consensus  vote.    
“Choosing  carefully  people  who  are  legitimately  going  to  be  able  to  represent  the  
interests  of  the  people,  and  allow  the  time  as  we  used  to  always  have,  for  people  to  
consult  with  their  constituent  base.  So  you  know  you'ʹve  got  breaks  and  things  
like  that.  You'ʹve  got  not  only  the  caucuses  but  also  people  can  call  and  say  hey  
you  know  Mike  I  know  you'ʹre  not  here  but  can  you  agree  to  X  can  you  live  with  
that?  I  mean  that  used  to  happen  more  than  it  does  now  because  people  feel  like  
they'ʹre  at  the  table  they  don'ʹt  have  to  call  anybody.  And  so  I  think  make  them  
smaller  so  that  the  discussions  are  more  personal,  people  can  get  to  know  and  
trust  one  another  there,  and  make  sure  that  the  people  sitting  at  the  table  are  




4.2.2 Retain Working or Retired Fishermen 
As  fishermen  retire  and  leave  Take  Reduction  Teams,  they  are  replaced  by  
industry  representatives  and  lobbyists,  which  has  been  a  concern  for  many  stakeholders  
(Chapter  2).  For  example,  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  only  has  one  active  fisherman  and  
one  retired  fisherman  on  a  team  with  42  members  and  alternates  
(http://www.greateratlantic.fisheries.noaa.gov/protected/porptrp/trt/index.html).  
Fishermen  have  been  critical  to  the  implementation  and  success  of  Take  Reduction  
negotiations.  They  have  worked  with  researchers  to  create  and  test  new  gear,  and  based  
on  their  working  knowledge  of  gear,  boats,  and  oceanic  conditions,  provided  realistic  
feedback  and  input  regarding  the  feasibility  of  proposed  measures.  As  discussed  in  
Chapter  2,  buy-­‐‑in  from  fishermen  is  critical  to  implementation  and  compliance  with  
proposed  take  reduction  measures.  Moreover,  other  stakeholders  have  a  greater  level  of  
trust  in  fishermen  than  their  industry  representatives  and  lobbyists,  and  believe  that  the  
fishermen  are  more  willing  to  compromise.    
  “I  feel  that  an  active  fisherman  should  be  at  the  table,  somebody  who'ʹs  got  a  lot  
of  self-­‐‑interest  and  understanding  of  where  the  fishery  is  going.”  –Fisherman    
  
“You  need  to  have  active  fishermen  at  the  table  and  not  fishing  representatives,  
or  lobbyists  at  the  table.  It'ʹs  fine  if  those  lobbyists  are  there  too  but  we  need  to  
have  people  who  use  the  gear,  who  are  on  the  water,  who  could  speak  to  the  way  
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the  gear  is  operated,  and  the  way  they  interact  with  gear  and  animals.  And  if  that  
doesn'ʹt  happen  also  I  think  the  process  will  fall  apart.”  –Researcher  
  
“It  was  much  more  effective  actually  to  have  the  fishermen  there  …the  NGOs  
tended  to  trust  the  fishermen  more  than  they  trusted  the  advocacy  people,  in  
terms  of  representatives.”  –Fisheries  Manager  
  
“And  it'ʹs  harder  to  come  to  agreement  with  people  like  that  [industry  
representatives]  because  no  matter  how  you  know  them  personally,  they  don'ʹt  
have  that  on  the  water  knowledge  that  an  actual  fisherman  has  and  frankly  they  
are  much  more  willing  I  think  to  stand  their  ground  …  because  they  don'ʹt  know  
what  actually  is  feasible  for  the  industry  to  do  because  they'ʹre  not  on  the  water”  
–Environmentalist        
  
Two  different  stakeholders  also  told  a  story  of  a  fisherman  contradicting  a  
lobbyist  at  a  meeting.  This  increased  the  mistrust  of  industry  representatives  by  other  
stakeholder  groups.  
“I  remember  once  one  of  the  industry  guys  had  told  their  lawyer-­‐‑type  rep  …  to  
just  shut  the  hell  up  because  he  actually  did  want  to  have  this  discussion.  He  did  
actually  want  to  solve  something  …  or  at  least  talk  about  something,  as  opposed  
to  just  saying  nothing,  we’ll  figure  this  out  later  when  we  talk  to  Congress.”  –
Researcher    
  
“I'ʹve  had  some  embarrassing  situations  in  the  past,  for  example  the  Bottlenose  
Dolphin  team  we  had  some  real  fishermen  and  we  also  had  a  couple  of  industry  
reps.  And  they  didn'ʹt  agree.  Like  the  industry  rep  would  say  no  we  can'ʹt  do  that  
at  the  same  time  the  real  fisherman  is  going  yeah  I  can  do  that.  And  they’re  
looking  at  each  other  like  huh?”  –Environmentalist  
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4.3 Social Capital 
4.3.1 When Making Consensus-Based Decisions or Amending Plans, 
Hold Meetings In-Person, Encourage Time for Socializing, and Hold 
More Meetings within a Shorter Time Period 
Federal  budget  cuts  have  forced  agencies  to  look  for  ways  to  streamline  
programs  and  reduce  costs.  In-­‐‑person  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  can  be  very  costly  
to  convene.  To  facilitate  communication  in  a  more  cost-­‐‑effective  manner,  NMFS  has  
conducted  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  via  webinar.  While  these  can  be  an  
economical  means  of  updating  members,  but  they  are  not  an  adequate  substitute  for  in-­‐‑
person  meetings,  especially  when  major  amendments  or  consensus-­‐‑based  decisions  are  
required.  The  webinars  do  not  allow  participants  to  foster  relationships  outside  of  the  
meeting,  which  is  critical  for  building  trust  and  social  capital  among  people  with  
opposing  viewpoints.  
“I  think  it  is  honestly  better  for  teams  when  we  are  forced  to  meet  someplace  a  
little  bit  out  of  the  way  so  people  have  to  get  to  know  each  other  outside  of  the  
team  meeting,  meaning  if  you  meet  in  the  middle  of  Boston,  people  go  to  12  
different  restaurants  and  nobody  sits  down  and  has  a  beer  together,  and  those  
kinds  of  things  foster  collaboration  better  when  you  can  be  sociable  with  someone.  
…So  I  think  having  meetings  in  places  that  foster  people  staying  together  as  
opposed  to  scattering  is  useful  for  group  dynamics.”  –Environmentalist    
    
Webinars  also  do  not  allow  participants  to  read  body  language  and  often,  it  is  
difficult  to  know  who  is  speaking.  Technical  difficulties  such  as  poor  cell  phone  
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connections  and  feedback  can  make  it  challenging  for  members  to  hear  the  discussion,  
and  it  is  easier  for  members  to  be  distracted  and  tune-­‐‑out  of  webinars.  Repeated,  face-­‐‑to-­‐‑
face  interactions  increase  the  likelihood  of  cooperation,  creating  contingent  agreements,  
and  improving  outcomes  (Langbein  and  Kerwin,  2000;  Ostrom,  1998,  2011)  
"ʺIt’s  difficult  for  all  of  us  to  be  doing  this  in  a  bubble  or  in  a  dark  room  
essentially,  where  we  can’t  see  each  other,  interact  with  each  other.  You  can’t  see  
if  someone’s  in  the  queue."ʺ  –State  manager  
  
“The  other  thing  I  would  think  now  in  particular  that  is  critical  is  that  the  teams  
need  to  meet  in  person.  The  webinar  approach  will  kill  the  Take  Reduction  
process.  If  the  team  is  not  able  to  meet  in  person  and  negotiate  in  person,  the  
process  won'ʹt  work.  So  I  think  that  the  teams  need  to  meet  in  person  and  I  think  
we'ʹre  in  danger  of  having  the  process  kind  of  disintegrate.”  –Researcher    
  
“I  would  say  don'ʹt  do  any  sort  of  over  the  phone  type  process.  The  last  time  I  felt  
very  shut  out.  Whoever  ran  the  call  was  only  listening  to  one  or  two  individuals.  
That'ʹs  a  lot  harder  to  do  when  you'ʹre  face-­‐‑to-­‐‑face.  So  I  think  face-­‐‑to-­‐‑face  
meetings  are  much  more  important.”  –Fisheries  manager    
  
One  cost  saving  measure  suggested  by  an  interview  subject  is  to  have  in-­‐‑person  
meetings  at  predetermined  schedules  –  certain  teams  meet  certain  years  and  other  teams  
meet  in  the  off  years  (provided  nothing  urgent  has  occurred).  This  could  spread  out  
meetings  for  individuals  who  serve  on  multiple  teams,  and  could  also  allow  NMFS  
scientists  who  serve  as  technical  support  to  focus  on  preparing  data  for  one  team  at  a  
time  (see  4.5.3  below).  
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“I  think  that  [they]  might  want  to  have  some  kind  of  set  schedule,  like  in  these  
odd  years,  [they’ll]  deal  with  these  three  teams  and  have  meetings  …and  then  in  
the  off-­‐‑years  [they]  will  have  meetings  of  these  other  teams…  So  I  would  like  to  
see  [NMFS]  be  a  little  more  strategic  about  how  and  when  [they]  hold  meetings  
and  then  the  resulting  rulemakings  that  come  out  of  that  process.”  –Federal  
employee  
  
Finally,  participants  often  are  unable  to  reach  consensus-­‐‑based  agreements  in  the  
standard  3-­‐‑day  timeframe  of  in-­‐‑person  meetings.  Although  it  is  challenging  to  schedule  
these  meetings  and  maximize  attendance,  to  facilitate  consensus,  I  support  the  
recommendation  of  an  interview  subject  that  NMFS  hold  more  than  one  meeting  within  
a  6-­‐‑9  month  period.  This  would  allow  time  for  the  agency  to  update  members  on  new  
information,  answer  clarifying  questions  by  the  members,  and  have  substantive  
discussions  of  possible  plan  amendments.  
“I  think  that  with  a  little  more  time…that  we  could  have  actually  gotten  all  the  
way  to  consensus.”  –Facilitator    
  
“I  think  when  you'ʹre  looking  at  negotiations  you  want  to  have  more  meetings  in  
a  shorter  timeframe  and  then  build  off  each  meeting  and  finally  come  to  
agreement.  One  of  these  meetings  is  generally  not  enough  to  come  to  an  
agreement  when  you'ʹre  talking  about  substantive  amendments.  Sticking  with  the  
same  timeframe  within  six  months  or  something,  two  or  three  meetings  within  
six  months  and  then  bang  out  an  agreement  and  then  [NMFS]  can  go  forth  with  
the  rulemaking.  But  I  think  the  effectiveness  suffers.  I  think  implementation  
suffers.  The  stocks  suffer  if  it  takes  two  years  to  get  something  out  of  the  team  




4.3.2 Continue to Focus on Empirical Information and Shared-
Learning   
This  research  has  highlighted  the  benefits  of  incorporating  shared  learning  and  
focusing  the  negotiations  on  empirical  information.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  shared  
learning  decreases  hostility  among  members  with  opposing  viewpoints,  facilitates  
creative  problem-­‐‑solving  and  searching  for  common  values,  builds  trust  among  
participants  and  between  participants  and  the  agency,  and  increases  social  capital  
(Beierle  and  Cayford,  2002;  Dietz  and  Stern,  2008;  Dukes,  2005;  Gray  et  al.,  2012;  Innes  
and  Booher,  2004).  NMFS  should  continue  to  keep  members  informed  about  changes  to  
marine  mammal  stocks,  bycatch,  and  abundance  estimates,  as  well  as  about  fishing  
effort,  mitigation,  compliance,  and  law  enforcement.  While  the  webinars  may  not  be  a  
good  tool  for  consensus-­‐‑based  negotiation,  they  have  proven  useful  for  keeping  
members  current.  In  addition,  the  pre-­‐‑meeting  background  materials  help  to  focus  
meeting  discussions  and  allow  members  time  to  formulate  clarifying  questions.  The  
agency  should  continue  to  be  very  responsive  to  stakeholder  questions  during  meetings.  
This  engenders  trust  and  shows  the  agency’s  commitment  to  the  process.  
4.3.3 Strive for Consistent Stock Assessment, Abundance, and 
Observer Data Collection 
As  discussed  in  previous  chapters,  stock  assessment  and  abundance  data  vary  in  
precision,  age,  and  amount.  Survey  methods  and  tracklines  (predetermined  path  or  
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routes  followed  by  ship  or  aircraft  during  the  survey)  may  vary  from  one  year  to  the  
next,  depending  on  funding  sources  and  availability.  Moreover,  only  half  of  all  fisheries  
covered  by  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Teams  have  observer  coverage  and  the  
percentage  of  observed  vessels  varies  by  fleet,  fishery,  and  region  (NMFS,  2012).  Take  
Reduction  Team  negotiations  are  centered  around  data  collected  from  surveys  and  
observers.  Imprecise  bycatch  and  abundance  estimates  lead  to  lower  PBR  calculations  
and  uncertain  stock  delineations  can  result  in  multiple  reconfigurations  of  those  stocks.  
A  lower  PBR  can  limit  the  negotiating  options  (see  4.4.2).  Uncertainty  regarding  the  
boundaries  of  stocks  can  decrease  stakeholder  buy-­‐‑in  and  limit  the  ability  to  evaluate  the  
effectiveness  of  plan  implementation.  In  turn,  this  can  lead  to  frustration  and  mistrust  
among  Take  Reduction  Team  members.    
“I  think  observer  coverage  is  really  key  for  those  fisheries  that  can  be  observed.  
Information  is  always  going  to  get  you  farther.  If  you  know  where  the  bycatch  is  
occurring  and  you  know  why  the  bycatch  is  occurring,  you  can  solve  the  
problem.  If  you  don’t  have  the  data  to  support  rulemaking,  then  it’s  just  
guessing,  and  so  I  think  that  you’ve  got  to  continue  your  observer  coverage.  
You’ve  got  to  make  sure  that  it  is  representative  of  the  fishery,  so  everybody  bears  
the  burden  and  everybody  gets  monitored  and  none  of  this  kind  of  voluntary  
compliance  with  the  observer  requirements.  So  it’s  got  to  be  representative,  and  
it’s  got  to  be  at  a  level  high  enough  that  you  have  some  confidence  around  it.  But  
you  also  have  to  get  information  back  to  the  fishermen,  constantly,  about  what’s  
working  and  what  isn’t.”  –Federal  employee  
  
“Information,  information,  information,  data,  biological  estimates,  the  
assessment  process,  surveys.  I  believe  that  we  lose  a  lot  from  the  precautionary  
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principle  applied  just  to  the  abundance  estimate.”  –Fishing  industry  
representative  
  
“I  think  we  need  to  have  better  stock  assessment  data,  more  regular  stock  
assessments.  But  we  all  realize  the  chances  of  that  are  slim.”  –Federal  
employee  
  
“Where  we’re  hurting  is  information.  The  information  level  that  the  Take  
Reduction  Teams  are  given  to  work  with  is  pretty  paltry,  pretty  sparse.  And  so  
you'ʹre  left  with  trying  to  craft  rules  based  on  really  minimal  observations”  –
Fisheries  manager  
  
“I  think  the  one  thing  that’s  frustrated  all  of  us  is  that  there’s  a  lack  of  
information  in  a  lot  of  ways.  And  it  would  make  it  so  much  easier  on  the  part  of  
all  the  participants  if  we  had  less  uncertainty  about  things.  And  the  only  way  
you  get  less  uncertainty  is  to  have  more  data.  To  get  more  data  you  have  to  have  
more  money  and  we  don’t  have  more  money.”  –Researcher    
  
4.3.4 When Training New Fishermen, Include Experienced Fishermen 
to Assist with Conveying Information in a User-Friendly Manner 
Because  of  the  large  of  amount  of  information  that  members  must  assimilate,  
new  members  are  on  a  steep  learning  curve.  It  can  be  especially  challenging  for  
fishermen,  who  are  not  familiar  with  the  terminology  and  statistics.  
“I  mean  it  was  an  adequate  representation  of  what  was  involved  in  determining  
PBR  and  all  the  factors  associated  with  it,  but  nobody  understood  it,  I  mean,  it  
was  all  statistics.  These  fishermen  weren’t  versed  in  statistics.  They  didn’t  
understand  what  20th  percentile  [of  the]  log-­‐‑normal  distribution  meant,  and  
neither  did  I.  But,  so  we  were  given  all  this  information,  but  it  was  like,  well,  
what  does  that  mean?...  You’re  introducing  fishermen  into  a  world  that  they’re  
not  well-­‐‑suited  to  deal  with  in  terms  of  the  bureaucracy,  the  noise,  this  huge  




To  get  everyone  up  to  speed,  NMFS  conducts  introductory  training  sessions  for  
new  members.  When  training  new  fishermen,  I  propose  the  agency  include  an  
experienced  fishermen  in  the  training  to  help  explain  some  of  the  terminology  and  
concepts  in  terms  more  easily  understood  by  the  fishermen.  One  interview  subject  
suggested  the  agency  explain  MMPA  requirements  and  data  using  layman’s  terms.  
“I  think  other  information  should  be…  reduced  to  the  layman’s  terms  for  the  
fishermen  …sometimes  …  you  get  lost  when  the  participant  says  good  
morning….  I’ve  seen  fishermen  in  these  boats,  a  million  dollar  boat  that’s  got  a  
half  a  million  dollars’  worth  of  electronics  in  front  of  them,  and  they  can  run  it  
better  than  any  person  I’ve  ever  seen.  That  means  that  person  can  learn,  but  
you’ve  got  to  give  him  a  chance  to  understand  it.    …we  need  to  get  them  to  talk  
at  a  lower  key  as  far  as  more  layman’s  terms.  I  mean  it’s  hard  to  do  it  when  
you’re  extrapolating  graphs  and  all  this  stuff…  it’s  just  they  need  to  talk  down  to  
earth…instead  of  talking  like  a  PhD,  talk  like  a  high  school  graduate.”—
Fisherman    
  
4.3.5 Improve Data Collection and Monitoring of Law Enforcement 
and Compliance and Communicate Findings to the Stakeholders 
Determining  the  effectiveness  of  Take  Reduction  Regulations  requires  both  
testing  of  experimental  gear  and  monitoring  of  compliance  and  law  enforcement  efforts.  
Many  regulations  restrict  fishing  effort,  which  preclude  experimental  testing  because  
one  cannot  experimentally  test  the  difference  in  bycatch  within  a  closed  area  before  and  
after  the  closure  unless  the  closed  area  is  closely  monitored  to  guarantee  that  no  fishing  
is  occurring.  This  leaves  compliance  and  enforcement  as  the  tools  to  ensure  positive  
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outcomes.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  without  monitoring  of  compliance  and  
enforcement,  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  between  an  ineffective  regulation,  and  an  
effective  regulation  that  is  not  being  implemented  properly  through  lack  of  compliance  
or  enforcement.    
Therefore,  I  recommend  the  Office  of  Protected  Resources  work  closely  with  the  
fisheries  observer  program  and  law  enforcement  agencies  to  create  a  robust  and  reliable  
program  to  monitor  compliance  with  and  enforcement  of  marine  mammal  take  
reduction  regulations.  A  centralized  database  that  is  shared  among  the  programs  would  
facilitate  analyses  by  NMFS  scientists.  I  recommend  the  database  include,  at  a  minimum,  
location  (latitude  and  longitude),  vessel  ID,  gear  type,  target  species,  fishing  effort,  
compliance  and  if  not  in  compliance,  the  nature  of  the  violation,  if  a  take  of  a  marine  
mammal  occurred,  and  a  description  of  the  take.  Members  of  the  observer  program,  
Office  of  Protected  Resources,  appropriate  Science  Center  researchers,  and  law  
enforcement  agencies  ought  to  have  access  to  this  database  and  enter  the  information  as  
close  to  real  time  as  is  feasible.  For  practical  reasons,  I  believe  only  one  of  these  entities  
should  be  responsible  for  the  database  quality  assurance/quality  control  (QA/QC).  To  
facilitate  information  exchange,  I  recommend  NMFS  conduct  the  QA/QC  every  six  
months  and  communicate  compliance  rates  and  takes  to  Take  Reduction  Team  members  
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after  the  biannual  QA/QC.  Close  coordination  with  law  enforcement  agencies  at  the  
highest  level  is  critical  to  achieve  consistency  among  regions  (see  4.5.3  below).  
“But  overall,  I  have  to  say  that  and  this  came  out  in  the  GAO  report,  there’s  just  
not  the  enforcement.  There’s  not  even  necessarily  always  a  follow-­‐‑up.”  –  
Environmentalist    
  
“They  didn'ʹt  have  enough  observer  coverage  so  it  was  very  hard  to  make  any  
statements  about  compliance  based  only  on  the  observer  coverage.  And  I  don'ʹt  
believe  that  enforcement  zeroed  in  on  the  requirements  of  the  Take  Reduction  
Team  as  much  as  they  did  perhaps  other  fishery  management  regulations...  I  
think  that  you  have  to  have  some  feedback  mechanism  to  the  fishermen,  both  from  
the  monitoring  and  then  communicating  what  the  results  are  back  to  the  
fishermen  saying  this  is  the  level  of  compliance,  and  this  is  how  it’s  affecting  the  
bycatch.”  –Federal  employee  
  
“I  think  anybody  who’s  been  through  this  has  been  frustrated  with  enforcement  
and  its  impact  on  compliance,  and  results…follow-­‐‑through  and  consistency  from  
the  final  rule  in  the  plan  is  really,  that’s  really  the  most  important.  That’s  really  
what  yields  almost  immediate  results.”  –Fishing  industry  representative  
  
“So  communication  is  key  and  I  think  communication  is  probably  one  of  the  least  
expensive  and  most  effective  ways  of  keeping  due  diligence  on  fisheries  after  you  
implement  a  plan.”  –Federal  employee  
  
4.4 Fairness 
4.4.1 Continue to Use Professionally Trained, Neutral Facilitators 
The  survey  results  indicated  that  regardless  of  stakeholder  or  Take  Reduction  
Team  affiliation,  nearly  all  respondents  believed  the  process  is  fair  (Chapter  2).  This  is,  
in  large  part,  a  result  of  using  skilled,  professionally  trained,  neutral  facilitators.  In  
addition  to  ensuring  fairness,  the  facilitators  help  establish  ground  rules,  keep  the  
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discussion  on  track,  summarize  points  of  agreement,  encourage  shared  learning,  and  
provide  detailed  summaries  of  the  negotiations  (Harter,  1982;  Sabatier,  1988;  Susskind  
and  McMahon,  1985;  Weible  et  al.,  2009).  I  recommend  the  agency  continue  to  use  highly  
trained  and  skilled,  neutral  facilitators.  This  is  money  well-­‐‑spent.  Stakeholders  were  
universally  supportive  of  the  facilitators.  
“I  think  that  they  helped  tremendously  in  keeping  the  process  moving  in  a  
direction  and  not  getting  hung-­‐‑up  whenever  it  did  breakdown  and  you  get  
emotional  about  some  particular  issue.  That  was…probably  the  most  important  
aspect  of  the  process,  to  me,  was  the  fact  that  there  were  professionals  mediating  
it.”  –Fisherman    
  
“I  think  the  moderators  have  been  very  good  in  recognizing  people  and  letting  
them  speak...you  have  a  chance  to  raise  your  concerns.”  –Federal  employee  
  
“I  think  maintaining  the  high  quality  of  the  facilitators  will  help  stakeholders  to  
get  to  a  place  where  they  can  agree  is  important.  So  it'ʹs  not  necessarily  a  place  
where  we  can  improve  it  but  it'ʹs  a  place  where  we  should  be  vigilant  about  not  
letting  the  quality  of  the  process  to  slide.”  –Researcher    
  
“The  facilitation  definitely  helped.  A  neutral  facilitator  who’s  trying  to  work  out  
things  …  makes  a  big  difference”  –Fisheries  manager  
  
“The  effectiveness  of  the,  of  a  meeting  is  very  much  dependent  upon  the  
facilitators”  –State  manager  
  
“And  skilled  facilitators  cannot  be  underestimated...  It  makes  such  a  difference.  It  




4.4.2 When PBR of Endangered Species is Extremely Low (less than 
five), Manage Teams Under the Endangered Species Act 
Stakeholders  disagreed  about  the  appropriateness  of  the  precautionary  nature  of  
PBR.  However,  they  agreed  on  the  need  for  requiring  a  bycatch  target  and  on  the  
difficulty  of  trying  to  negotiate  when  PBR  is  very  low.  Negotiating  parties  require  a  
range  of  options  to  make  the  possibility  compromise  feasible  (Susskind  and  McMahon,  
1985).  When  PBR  is  near  zero,  however,  options  are  limited  and  there  is  no  room  for  
negotiation.  The  only  way  to  ensure  zero  bycatch  would  be  to  remove  all  gear  and  close  
the  fisheries.  Therefore,  fishermen  feel  a  greater  threat  to  their  livelihoods  when  PBR  is  
extremely  low.  Environmentalists,  on  the  other  hand,  believe  that  a  low  PBR  or  ZMRG  
provide  a  target  toward  which  the  teams  can  strive  to  achieve.  
"ʺSuccess  would  be  getting  it  to  zero.  Do  I  think  it'ʹs  achievable  to  get  to  zero?  
Heck  no.  That  ain'ʹt  gonna  happen."ʺ  –Fisherman    
  
“…does  it  make  sense  to  structure  a  negotiation  where  you  have  so  little  
potential  zone  of  agreement?  Negotiation  theory  would  say  no.  You  want  to  
figure  out  how  to  add  value  and  make  the  potential  zone  of  agreement  bigger.  
You  know  at  some  level,  it  is  a  little  bit  of  a  one-­‐‑dimensional  problem.  We’re  not  
really  talking  about  trade-­‐‑offs  between  fishing  communities  and  marine  
mammals  or  catch  in  marine  mammals,  it’s  about  the  marine  mammals.  It’s  a  big  
challenge."ʺ  –Facilitator    
  
”My  personal  opinion  is  that  when  you  have  such  low  PBRs  that  it  doesn'ʹt  make  
sense  to  have  that  be  the  focus  of  the  Take  Reduction  Team  because  there  is  no  
room  to  negotiate.  So  I  don'ʹt  think  that  Section  118  was  ever  envisioned  to  




"ʺAs  long  as  ZMRG  is  there  whether  you  enforce  or  not,  it  serves  as  a  forcing  
mechanism.  And  you  may  not  be  able  to  get  down  to  four  dolphins  coast-­‐‑wide  or  
whatever  but  as  long  as  it’s  there  we  can  keep  pushing  fisheries  toward  it  so  that  
things  are  truly  accidental  and  not  a  wanton  disregard."ʺ  –Environmentalist  
  
"ʺYou  might  get  100%  compliance,  but  you'ʹre  not  going  to  get  zero  PBR…  It’s  a  
much  more  difficult  process  when  you  have  those  tight  restraints  on  what  you  
can  actually  get  away  with...  Finding  consensus  when  you’re  up  against  zero  
PBR  is  never  going  to  be  easy."ʺ  –Fisherman    
  
"ʺWhen  you'ʹre  trying  to  reduce  1,000  to  100,  …  you  have  a  lot  more  options.  
When  you'ʹre  trying  to  reduce  the  3  to  0,  you  don'ʹt  have  any  options…  For  
endangered  species  like  north  Atlantic  right  whales,  [PBR  is]  probably  not  the  
best  way  to  regulate  the  fishery."ʺ  –Federal  employee    
  
"ʺ…the  ultimate  deal  is  we  are  not  going  to  get  to  total  zero  PBR.  We’re  not.  As  
long  as  we  have  gear  in  the  water,  there’s  going  to  be  the  chance  that  it’s  going  to  
happen."ʺ  –Fisherman    
  
In  support  of  a  suggestion  made  by  a  few  stakeholders,  I  recommend  that  when  
PBR  is  extremely  low  (e.g.,  less  than  five)  and  the  stocks  are  endangered,  the  agency  not  
convene  a  Take  Reduction  Team.  Rather,  bycatch  should  be  addressed  under  the  
Endangered  Species  Act  through  implementation  of  rules  or  Recovery  Plans.  If  recovery  
measures  are  proven  effective  and  PBR  increases,  the  agency  could  then  convene  a  Take  
Reduction  Team.  
"ʺI  think,  my  personal  opinion,  is  that  with  the  ESA-­‐‑listed  species  that  you  need  
to  take  more  drastic  measures  up-­‐‑front  than  you  might  need  to  do  while  awaiting  





4.4.2.2  Disband  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  Take  Reduction  Team  –  mitigate  bycatch  
under  the  Endangered  Species  Act  
"ʺI  just  noticed  that’s  the  team  where  we  have  the  strongest  laws,  we  actually  
have  the  Endangered  Species  Act  on  our  side  here.  And  we’re  doing  less  than  we  
are  doing  with  harbor  porpoises  for  God’s  sake.  It  just  seems  bizarre."ʺ  –
Researcher    
  
"ʺI  think  in  those  instances  where  you  have  something  like  the  Large  Whale  team  
that’s  been  in  existence  for  15,  close  to  20  years  now,  where  they  have  yet  to  come  
anywhere  close  to  meeting  their  obligations,  what  they  were  supposed  to  
accomplish,  there  needs  to  be  some  mechanism  other  than  the  teams,  to  address  
the  issue...that  the  team  will  be  disbanded  and  replaced  with  something  like  a  
Recovery  Team,  maybe  a  team  of  scientists  who  will  come  up  with  
recommendations  for  developing  a  new  Take  Reduction  Plan."ʺ  –Federal  
employee  
  
"ʺ…large  whales  should  not  be  managed  under  the  MMPA  Take  Reduction  
process.  They  should  be  managed  under  ESA.  They  are  listed  species...if  we'ʹve  
learned  anything  in  the  Take  Reduction  process  is  that  it  does  not  work  for  large  
whales…I  don'ʹt  think  we  should  be  managing  under  the  MMPA  with  right  
whales.  We  should  be  managing  under  the  ESA."ʺ  –Researcher    
  
The  Atlantic  Large  Whale  Take  Reduction  Team  has  been  fighting  an  uphill  
battle  from  the  beginning.  First,  PBR  is  extremely  low,  especially  for  north  Atlantic  right  
whales,  which  is  often  zero  or  less  than  one.  As  described  above,  this  leaves  no  room  for  
negotiation.  Even  one  take  will  exceed  PBR.    
“The  one  that  comes  to  my  mind  as  being  perhaps  not  as  fair  to  the  resource  was  
the  large  whale  TRT.  But  I  think  that  that  was  partly  because  you  had  a  situation  




”When  you  talk  about  zero  PBR,  it  changes  entirely  the  framework.  You'ʹre  
almost  afraid  to  put  anything  in  the  water  because  you  might  be  the  guy  who  
puts  everybody  out  of  business.  You  can'ʹt  operate  that  way."ʺ  –Fisherman    
  
"ʺWe  haven'ʹt  achieved  PBR  certainly  ZMRG  at  all  in  the  large  whales  [in]  
forever,  and  we  have  not  done  what'ʹs  required  by  the  law  to  get  there…It'ʹs  
[PBR'ʹs]  almost  immeasurable  when  you  talk  about  1.  If  you  have  1,  that'ʹs  an  
accident  but  we  know…that  right  whales  and  lobster  gear  are  not  accidents.  It'ʹs  
just  not  an  accident.  We'ʹve  proven  that  over  a  decade  now.  It  happens  regularly.  
It  has  no  teeth.  You  have  to  put  the  teeth  into  it  to  make  it  work."ʺ  –Researcher      
  
“And  I  would  argue  that'ʹs  one  of  the  reasons  that  the  large  whale  team  has  been  
unsuccessful  is  that  because  the  …  reference  point  is  unattainable,  so  you  are  in  
this  weird  limbo  because  nobody  thinks  you  [can]  get  below  a  PBR  that  low…"ʺ  –
Researcher    
  
Secondly,  the  team  has  never  reached  consensus,  defaulting  to  the  agency  to  
create  Take  Reduction  regulations.  As  described  in  Chapters  2  and  3,  these  regulations  
have  been  neither  effective,  nor  perceived  as  effective.      
"ʺThe  large  whale  plan  was  a  complete  and  utter  disaster.  You  had  each  side  
bringing  their  plan  forward  and  in  some  cases,  the  industry  doing  a  not  great,  
but  not  horrible  proposal...And  the  agency,  rather  than  going  back  and  looking  at  
some  of  the  plans  or  the  areas  of  consensus,  drafted  something  that  was  
completely  ludicrous.  And  I  think  that  already  started  to  dig  the  ditch  that  that  
team  has  never  gotten  out  of"ʺ  –Environmentalist      
  
"ʺBut  when  you  have  such  different  dynamics  around  what'ʹs  causing  the  bycatch  
especially  with  each  of  those  gear  types,  it'ʹs  a  waste  of  time  really  to  bring  those  
groups  together  and  try  to  solve  it  as  a  group  because  everyone  is  just  trying  to  
figure  out  how  to  position  themselves  to  get  the  least  amount  of  regulations  
associated  with  their  group  and  blame  it  all  on  the  other  group,  that  they  are  the  
ones  that  are  causing  all  the  bycatch  and  they  are  the  ones  that  should  carry  the  




"ʺAnd  even  in  the  stock  assessment  reports,  the  agency  cites  published  scientific  
literature  showing  that  what  they'ʹve  done  hasn'ʹt  worked,  and  yet  getting  
anything  to  change  is  difficult."ʺ  –Environmentalist      
  
The  lack  of  consensus  has  caused  stakeholders  to  resort  to  the  best  alternatives  or  
defect  from  the  negotiations  –  environmentalists  have  sued  the  agency  and  fishermen  
have  lobbied  their  legislators.  This  reinforces  resentment  and  erodes  trust  among  the  
stakeholders  and  between  the  stakeholders  and  the  agency.    
"ʺIf  they'ʹre  threatening  court  action,  everybody  has  to  worry  because  courts  can  
put  us  out  of  business.  It  shouldn'ʹt  be  part  of  the  equation  but  I  understand  their  
frustration  because  they  feel  fishermen  are  not  giving  their  all  and  if  they  took  
that  threat  away  they'ʹd  be  more  willing  to  give  their  all.  It'ʹs  sort  of  a  catch  22  
you  know  what  I  mean?"ʺ  –Fisherman    
  
“…because  we’ve  sued  not  infrequently,  and  in  that  case  what  happens  
sometimes  is  that  they'ʹll  [NMFS  will]  go  with  the  industry  knowing  we'ʹre  going  
to  sue  them  and  then  they  can  say  'ʹwell  guys  we  tried  to  do  what  we  could,  but  
those  damned  enviros.  They  just  keep  suing  us.'ʹ  And  I  think  they  count  on  it  in  
some  cases  that  we’re  going  to  sue  them  and  that  they'ʹre  going  to  have  to  back  off  
a  little  bit  and  that  way  their  ass  is  covered  with  the  industry  and  the  politicians  
because  they  tried  and  we  enviros  just  interfered  with  that."ʺ  –Environmentalist      
  
”They  recognize  they  can  go  to  Congress,  or  they  can  reach  a  different  result  
outside  of  the  TRT,  which  has  made  a  couple  of  them  [TRTs]  almost  completely  
ineffective…I  don'ʹt  think  we'ʹve  altered  fisheries  to  the  point  that  they  are  
completely  going  out  of  business  just  from  the  TRT  process,  but  I  can  understand  
that…a  lot  of  commercial  fisheries  have  to  manage  one  hell  of  a  lot  of  
management  strategies  on  top  of  them,  but  it  seems  like  there  [are]  still  folks  that  
say…let'ʹs  have  no  communication  and  we’ll  solve  this  with  our  Congressman.  
You  know  Congress  will  bring  pressure  on  NMFS  and  that'ʹs  where  the  decisions  




Thirdly,  the  Atlantic  Large  Whale  team  deals  with  stocks  primarily  in  the  
northeastern  U.S.  Statistically,  teams  in  the  northeastern  U.S.  were  significantly  less  
successful  than  others  (Chapter  3),  and  members  perceived  these  teams  as  less  successful  
than  others  (Chapters  2  and  3).  As  described  in  Chapter  3,  stakeholders  believe  this  
region  historically  has  been  influenced  by  politics.  There  is  a  general  lack  of  trust  in  the  
region  by  stakeholders  from  all  sides.  Some  feel  NMFS  has  sided  with  the  fishing  
industry  with  regard  to  marine  mammal  bycatch.  Others  do  not  have  faith  in  the  
information  generated  by  agency  scientists.    
"ʺI  think  that  this  is  a  systemic  problem  with  the  Northeast  Regional  Office.  They  
have  their  political  agenda  and  that’s  what  they’re  going  to  act  on…I  think  the  
Northeast  Region,  they’re  under  political  pressure  to  respond  to  fishermen  and  I  
think  unlike,  certainly  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  any  other  region  and  
perhaps  unlike  most  other  regions…they  view  this  Take  Reduction  Team  process  
as  an  additive  complicating  matter  for  addressing  their  fisheries  issues.  Since  
they’ve  got  so  many  stocks  that  are  over-­‐‑fished  in  that  area  and  putting  what  
fishermen  consider  draconian  restrictions  on  the  amount  of  fish  that  they  can  
catch,  they  consider  this  Take  Reduction  Team  process  as  a  pawn  to  lessen  the  
objections  that  they’ll  get  from  fishermen,  so  they  will  be  more  likely  to  comply  
with  the  fisheries-­‐‑related  restrictions."ʺ  –Federal  employee  
  
"ʺThe  Northeast  generally…puts  fisheries  on  top  and  the  Southeast  puts  marine  
mammals  on  top."ʺ  –Researcher    
  
"ʺAnd  they’re  using  faulty  equipment.  They  won’t  believe  a  word  we  tell  them  
unless  it  can  be  backed  up  by  some  antiquated  science.  That’s  very  aggravating.  
We’ve  had  to  sue  the  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  because  the  data  that  
they  are  putting  in  front  of  us  is  so  opposite  of  what  we  see  out  there  on  a  daily  
basis  that  we  had  to  prove  to  them  certain  species  of  fish  were  not  in  decline  that  
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they’re  actually  more  than  adequate.  And  that  shouldn’t  have  to  happen."ʺ  –
Fisherman      
  
"ʺIn  the  Northeast,  I  view  that  as…very  vulnerable  to  political  influence."ʺ  –
Researcher    
  
"ʺI  think  that  NMFS  could  be  less  cagey  about  information.  I  think  that  they  
could  be  more  practical  and  less  driven  by  what  their  lawyers  are  going  to  say.  I  
think  they  could  be  more  forthcoming  with  information."ʺ  –State  manager    
  
Because  of  regional  politics,  some  members  feel  the  agency  has  implemented  
measures  too  slowly,  which  has  been  detrimental  to  the  marine  mammals,  especially  
north  Atlantic  right  whales.  
"ʺIt'ʹs  just  been  forever  and  ever  and  ever.  In  that  situation  I  think,  it’s  just  simply  
the  agency  has  been  at  it  for  so  long,  they'ʹre  just  looking  for  time...	  we’re  in  this  
supposedly  six-­‐‑month  thing  that'ʹs  trailed  on  to  10,  15,  20  years  now."ʺ  –
Researcher    
  
"ʺWe  still  keep  coming  up  with  stuff.  And  so  to  me  that  means  [NMFS]  didn'ʹt  do  
enough  at  the  outset.  [They]  didn'ʹt  do  enough  initially  to  reduce  bycatch.  [They]  
should  have  gone  further."ʺ  –Federal  employee    
  
"ʺMy  complaint  is  the  agency  hasn'ʹt  taken  meaningful  enough  steps.  It'ʹs  such  a  
politically  charged  issue  for  them  that  they,  they'ʹre  doing  something  akin  to  
taking  off  a  Band-­‐‑Aid...Often  the  Band-­‐‑Aid  will  come  off  but  you'ʹre  causing  
maximum  pain  by  taking  tiny  little  bits  of  it  off  at  a  time...And  I  think  what  
happens  is  right  now  they'ʹre  ripping  it  off  one  hair  at  a  time,  like  okay  well  we’ll  
require  this.  And  we  know  that'ʹs  not  going  to  work  but  that'ʹll  be  the  first  step.  
And  then  we'ʹll  think  of  this  other  thing…"ʺ  –Environmentalist    
  
"ʺLarge  whale  is  totally  different,  we'ʹre  talking  about  a  whole  different  animal,  a  
whole  different  approach  to  what  we  do  to  prevent  entanglements.  I  think…from  
being  a  fisher-­‐‑person,  we  are  reluctant  to  put  everything  on  the  table  at  once  
because  we  knew  we  could  be  out  of  business  tomorrow  if  that  didn'ʹt  work.  So  we  
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sort  of  fed  them  a  little  bit  at  a  time,  tweaking  things  as  we  went  trying  to  make  
improvements…If  you  took  the  threat  away  from  the  fishing  industry  and  you  
said  let’s  do  the  best  we  can  as  soon  as  we  can  and  keep  fishing,  I  think  we  could  
get  the  whole  thing  done  a  whole  lot  faster."ʺ  –Fisherman      
  
"ʺI  don’t  think  that’s  what  Congress  intended  for  these  plans  or  for  these  teams,  as  
the  purpose  of  these  teams  was  not  something  they  were  supposed  to  just  keep  
chipping  away  at  this  gradually  and  hopefully  come  up  with  an  answer."ʺ  –
Federal  employee  
  
"ʺIt  is  mind-­‐‑numbingly  perverse  to  see  the  extent  of  fisheries  mortality  that  has  
been  well  documented  in  endangered  large  whale  species  being  managed  under  a  
decadal,  wait  and  see,  plan."ʺ  –From  survey  comments    
  
4.5 Take Reduction Plan Implementation 
4.5.1 Double-Check the Enforceability Before Voting on an Action or 
Regulation  
Regulated  parties  have  little  incentive  to  comply  with  regulations  that  cannot  be  
enforced  (Asmustis-­‐‑Silvia,  2009;  Cox  et  al.,  2007;  Gunningham,  2009).  Recognizing  that  
there  are  contextual  factors  during  negotiations  that  may  hamper  the  following,  I  
recommend  that  during  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings,  the  agency  try  to  ensure  that  
bycatch  mitigation  regulations  created  by  the  teams  are  enforceable  prior  to  the  
consensus  vote.  One  way  to  facilitate  this  approach  is  to  require  the  presence  of  a  
member  of  the  Office  of  Law  Enforcement  and  the  Office  of  General  Counsel  at  every  
Take  Reduction  Team  meeting  in  which  plans  will  be  created  or  amended.  As  discussed  
above  (4.3.5),  coordination  with  other  agency  divisions  is  important  to  ensuring  the  
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creation,  implementation,  and  monitoring  of  effective  Take  Reduction  Plans.  This  would  
require  coordination  at  higher  levels  within  NOAA.  In  the  interest  of  streamlining  
existing  Take  Reduction  Plans,  teams  should  consider  eliminating  current  unenforceable  
regulations  that  are  ineffective.    
"ʺIf  the  government  is  present  during  the  negotiations,  one  of  their  key  roles  in  
those  negotiations  is  to  ensure  that  what  is  developed  is  enforceable.  That'ʹs  their  
job.  And  then,  once  the  plan  becomes  law,  their  job  is  to  enforce  it."ʺ  –Facilitator    
  
"ʺIt’s  definitely  enforcement  and…always  better  communication  between  the  
agency  and  the  stakeholders  of  what  will  work  and  what  won’t  work.  It’s  hard  
when  you  think  you’re  coming  up  with  effective  measures  and  then  the  agency’s  
legal  teams  get  a  hold  of  it  and  say  no,  you  can’t  say  that  or  we  would  have  to  
interpret  it  like  this."ʺ  –Environmentalist    
  
"ʺI  think  that  one  of  the  roles  of  a  good  facilitator  is  to  ask  clarifying  questions  and  
one  question  could  be  well,  is  that  enforceable?  I  think  that  the  facilitator,  still  
within  the  bounds  of  neutrality,  can  ask  good  questions  about  scientific  rationale  
and  implementation  feasibility  and  I  would  say  that  enforcement  is  a  subset  of  
implementation  feasibility."ʺ  –Facilitator    
  
"ʺI  think  when  you  don'ʹt  have  enforcement  you  don'ʹt  get  compliance…  when  you  
have  depth  of  set  or  length  of  duration  of  set,  those  kinds  of  requirements  can'ʹt  be  
enforced  and  therefore  you'ʹre  relying  on  voluntary  compliance...	  You  have  to  
have  a  regulation  and  you  have  to  enforce  it  because  voluntary  compliance  
doesn’t  work...  look  at  the  dynamic  management  stuff  for  speed.  Over  and  over,  
we’ve  got  multiple  papers  showing  that  in  the  dynamic  management  areas,  they  
don’t  slow  down,  because  you  can’t  do  anything  to  them.  It’s  voluntary."ʺ  –




4.5.2 Provide Support for Testing the Effectiveness of Gear 
Modifications 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  3  and  Section  4.3.5  above,  determining  effective  
mitigation  measures  is  difficult  in  the  absence  of  compliance  and  enforcement  
monitoring.  When  feasible,  NMFS  should  leverage  its  relationships  and  coordinate  with  
private  entities  and  foundations  to  encourage  and  support  studies  to  test  the  
effectiveness  of  gear  modifications  or  new  technologies.  Results  will  then  indicate  the  
potential  effectiveness  of  these  mitigation  measures  under  ideal  conditions.  
"ʺSome  of  these  mitigation  measures  that  we’ve  talked  about  on  some  of  the  teams,  
they  just  don’t  have  the  funding  to  experiment  with  them.  I  think  there  are  a  
number  of  instances  where  some  further  research  on  weak  hooks  and  testing  them  
is  needed.  I  think  …  if  you’re  going  to  rely  on  length  of  longlines  as  a  mitigation  
measure,  then  there  should  be  some  testing  done  to  figure  out  a  way  to  monitor  
compliance  without  having  to  send  boats."ʺ  –Federal  employee    
  
4.5.3 Minimize Agency Actions That Will Undermine Take Reduction 
Plan Implementation  
4.5.3.1  Eliminate  from  Take  Reduction  Plans,  the  “Other  Special  Measures”  or  similar  
provisions  that  have  the  potential  to  undermine  team  decisions  
As  a  result  of  recent  agency  actions,  the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  transformed  from  
a  model  of  successful  Take  Reduction  planning  to  a  team  that  is  polarized,  and  
apparently  now  unable  to  achieve  consensus.  The  team  has  lost  longtime  members  who  
had  built  trust  and  created  social  capital  (Chapter  3).  The  Northeast  Regional  
Administrator  (John  Bullard)  undermined  the  consensus-­‐‑based  Take  Reduction  Plan  by  
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invoking  a  stipulation  of  the  plan  called  the  "ʺOther  Special  Measures  Provision"ʺ  (50 CFR 
229.34(d)).  This  provision  allowed  NMFS  to  alter  plan  requirements  without  convening  
the  team  or  requiring  consensus.  The  agency  has  modified  the  language  to  require  the  
NMFS  to  consult  with  the  team  prior  to  using  the  provision,  but  does  not  require  a  
consensus  agreement  (50  CFR  229;  78  FR  61821).  The  agency,  thus,  would  retain  the  
authority  to  overturn  a  consensus-­‐‑based  regulation  created  by  the  team  and  is  merely  
obligated  to  consult  with  the  team  prior  to  doing  so.  One  point  of  agreement  of  Harbor  
Porpoise  team  members  since  the  “Bullard  decision”  was  to  sunset  the  "ʺOther  Special  
Measures  Provision”  from  the  Harbor  Porpoise  Take  Reduction  Plan  (CONCUR,  2013b).  
I  recommend  the  agency  remove  this  or  any  similar  provision  from  all  Take  Reduction  
Plans.  If  the  agency  has  the  ability  to  undermine  the  consensus-­‐‑based  decisions  created  
by  the  team  (even  in  consultation  with  the  team),  then  members  will  lose  any  existing  
trust  in  the  agency  and  faith  in  the  Take  Reduction  Planning  process.  
"ʺConsensus  was  hard-­‐‑won  and  so  when  a  consensus  decision  is  then  not  carried  
out,  the  expectation  is  that  it  will  come  at  a  fairly  high  price."ʺ  –Facilitator      
  
"ʺAnd  then  the  Regional  Administrator  stepped  in…and  kind  of  superseded  the  
TRT  process  and  promulgated  different  rules  than  the  Take  Reduction  Team  had  
agreed  to.  And  so  that  really  was  the  unraveling  of  that  one.  We  had  Take  
Reduction  Team  members  that  resigned.  It  got  pretty  adversarial  pretty  quick…	  
the  Harbor  Porpoise  team  now…members  are  going  to  become  more  entrenched  




"ʺThey  took  something  that  worked  and  broke  it  on  purpose.  I  don'ʹt  see  it  being  
fixed."ʺ  –Environmentalist    
  
"ʺWell  I  think  one  of  the  ways  in  which  the  Take  Reduction  planning  process  
could  be  improved  is  if  the  agency  took  a  stronger  stance  in  agreeing  to  eliminate  
political  interference.  So  if  Regional  Administrators  and  the  Assistant  
Administrator  said  we  will  -­‐‑  as  much  as  we  can  -­‐‑  abide  by  the  decision  of  the  
Take  Reduction  Teams  and  we  will  not  make  decisions  that  affect  the  Take  
Reduction  planning  process  without  the  agreement  of  the  Take  Reduction  Teams,  
I  think  that'ʹs  the  one  thing  that  would  improve  the  process.  And  that  would  
mean  that  team  members  would  have  to  work  harder  at  the  table  and  spend  less  
time  going  outside  the  process  to  subvert  it."ʺ  –Researcher  
    
4.5.3.2  Ensure  support  from  agency  leadership  
Support  from  agency  leadership  conveys  to  members  that  the  agency  believes  in  
the  process,  feels  it  is  important,  and  will  not  undermine  the  teams'ʹ  consensus-­‐‑based  
decisions.  In  turn,  this  should  improve  trust  and  confidence  in  the  agency  by  the  
membership.  Support  at  higher  levels  in  NOAA  also  will  facilitate  intra-­‐‑  and  inter-­‐‑
agency  cooperation,  compliance  monitoring,  and  enforcement.  Young  (2001)  made  this  
recommendation  based  on  early  reviews  of  the  process  and  all  of  her  arguments  hold  
true  today.  
"ʺLeadership  support  within  the  agency,  I  think,  is  the  number  one  thing.  The  
Fishery  Management  Council  process  has  the  involvement  of  the  Regional  
Administrator  and  the  Center  Director  of  every  single  region,  at  every  single  
meeting,  and  I  never  saw  that  level  of  support  for  the  TRTs.    So  if  the  agency  
doesn’t  take  it  seriously,  the  fishermen  aren’t  going  to  take  it  seriously.  So  I  think  
when  you  started  to  see  General  Counsel  show  up,  enforcement  show  up,  
occasionally  the  Regional  Administrator  show  up,  I  think  people  started  to  take  it  
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a  little  bit  more  seriously,  but  when  you  have  a  Regional  Administrator  that  
decides  to  back  off  on  regulations  that  were  agreed  to  by  consensus,  you  really  
harm  the  process."ʺ  –Federal  employee  
  
Data  collected  by  the  observer  program  is  critical  to  the  creation  and  successful  
implementation  of  Take  Reduction  Plans.  The  NMFS  extrapolates  bycatch  and  
compliance  rates  from  the  observer  data,  and  relies  greatly  on  descriptions  by  observers  
of  marine  mammal  interactions  with  fishing  gear.  These  descriptions  are  critical  for  the  
team  and  agency  to  devise  safe  methods  of  disentanglement  and  for  devising  creative  
gear  modifications  or  other  solutions  to  mitigate  those  interactions.  Close  coordination  
between  the  Office  of  Protected  Resources  and  the  observer  program  should  occur  at  the  
highest  levels  within  the  agency  to  ensure  that  the  observer  data  are  being  used  
consistently  across  regions  and  to  minimize  data  lags.  
“Having  a  strong  relationship  between  the  observer  program  and  the  Take  
Reduction  Team  coordinator  in  terms  of  mobilizing  information  and  being  
available  not  only  to  make    presentations,  but  perhaps  give  comments  on  the  
feasibility  of  different  options,  and  really  having  the  observer  team  understand  
the  Take  Reduction  Team  process.  That  really  seems  like  an  asset  as  well.”  –
Facilitator    
  
4.5.3.3  Minimize  agency  delays  in  disseminating  research  results  and  rulemaking,  and  
be  forthright  about  timelines  to  team  members  
Several  stakeholders  have  voiced  frustration  over  the  time-­‐‑lags  between  when  
fishing,  bycatch,  and  stock  assessment  data  are  collected  and  verified,  versus  when  they  
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are  disseminated  to  members.  Often  teams  are  making  decisions  based  on  data  that  may  
be  the  best  available,  but  are  a  few  years  old.  Fishing  effort  can  change  in  the  interim,  
making  the  consensus  agreements  obsolete  as  soon  as  they  are  made.  When  possible,  
NMFS  should  expedite  the  turn-­‐‑around  time  on  research  results.  Again,  to  facilitate  this  
would  require  support  and  cooperation  of  agency  leadership.  
"ʺIt  would  be  great  to  figure  out  how  to  really  accelerate  the  turn-­‐‑around  of  
scientific  research  and  its  availability  to  the  team.  And  I  know  that’s  something  
that  there’s  really  kind  of  bipartisan  interest  in  that."ʺ  –Facilitator  
  
“It’s  amazing  how  cumbersome  their  process  is,  their  review  process.    Everything  
they  have  to  go  through.  Every  year,  NMFS  puts  out  an  analysis  of  the  
entanglement  and  ship  strike  of  large  whales  and  there’s  like  a  4-­‐‑year  time-­‐‑lag  on  
that…”  –State  manager  
  
"ʺSo  there  would  be  a  good  plan  that  would  come  out  …  and  then  you’d  end  up  
with  delays  in  implementation.  Implementation,  but  no  enforcement,  and  then,  
again  delays  between  when  you  could  reconvene  the  team  because  you  see  that  
you’re  not  meeting  the  mark.  And  then  the  team  gets  together  and  it  essentially  
comes  up  with  additional  measures.  Again,  you’re  back  to  delays…And  so  there  
wasn’t  kind  of  this  quick,  iterative  process  that  was  envisioned  when  the  law  was  
put  together  and  that’s  really  hurt  the  team...they’re  all  meant  to  fit  together  like  
a  set  of  gears  and  when  one  doesn’t  move,  then  the  other  ones  tend  to  not  
function  well."ʺ  –Environmentalist    
  
As  described  above  (Section  4.3.1),  scheduling  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  in  
a  way  to  minimize  the  demands  on  agency  researchers  who  serve  multiple  teams  could  
also  increase  efficiency  and  minimize  turn-­‐‑around  times.    
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“I  think  it'ʹs  really  hard  when  you  have  a  number  of  teams  in  the  Atlantic  for  
example,  that  are  relying  on  the  same  scientists  to  analyze  data  and  give  you  
what  you  need  to  hold  a  team  meeting.  It'ʹs  hard  to  have  that  all  happen  at  the  
same  time.”  –Federal  employee    
  
Despite  the  very  tight  (and  unrealistic)  deadlines  of  the  MMPA  (GAO,  2008),  lag  
times  occur  between  the  time  the  team  agrees  to  plan  amendments  and  when  those  rules  
are  implemented.  These  lag  times,  referred  to  as  the  “ossification”  of  the  rulemaking  
process,  are  the  unintended  consequence  of  efforts  by  all  three  branches  of  government  
to  increase  agency  transparency  and  accountability  (McGarity,  1992;  Susskind  and  
McMahon,  1985).  Rulemaking  delays  postpone  their  intended  benefits  (Balla  and  
Wright,  2009),  in  this  case  increased  protections  for  marine  mammals.  For  example  the  
Harbor  Porpoise  team  amended  their  plan  in  2007,  but  those  amendments  were  not  
implemented  until  2010.  In  the  interim,  fisheries  management  in  New  England  was  
transformed  into  Sectors,  which  likely  impacted  those  amendments.  One  way  to  
streamline  the  rulemaking  process  is  for  NMFS  to  continue  to  encourage  the  Take  
Reduction  Teams  to  create  detailed  regulatory  language  during  the  meetings.  This  
would  minimize  confusion  and  delays  when  agency  staff  must  translate  the  consensus-­‐‑
based  agreement  into  regulatory  language,  and  was  successfully  implemented  by  the  
EPA  in  the  mid-­‐‑1980s  (Susskind  and  McMahon,  1985).  This  minimized  the  number  of  
public  comments  received  by  the  EPA,  which  had  the  added  benefit  of  saving  time.  
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“I  would  say  that  the  more  detailed  a  plan  [the  agency  gets]  from  a  team,  the  
easier  the  rulemaking  process  is…  and  the  faster  it  goes.  So  if  a  team  gives  
something  …  ambiguous,  and  then  [the  agency  is]  trying  to  figure  out  all  of  the  
different  possibilities  and  how  this  goes  through  the  entire  fishery  management  
process  and    ESA,  and  MMPA,  and  NEPA  …  and  economically  what  does  it  
mean?  The  more  detailed  stuff  [the  team  provides]  the  easier  it  will  make  [the]  
analysis  and  the  faster  the  process  will  go…The  complexity  matters.”—Federal  
employee  
  
In  addition,  NMFS  should  be  forthright  with  the  members  about  the  delays  of    
rulemaking.  This  would  minimize  members'ʹ  expectations  of  fast  turn-­‐‑around  times,  
which  could  increase  trust  in  the  agency  and  minimize  hostility  and  frustration.  In  their  
initial  survey  of  Take  Reduction  Team  members,  RESOLVE  (1999)  found  that  60%  of  the  
respondents  were  dissatisfied  with  the  plans  because  of  agency  delays  in  rulemaking.  
“I  think  the  agency  almost  needs  to  come  and  say  this  is  really  feasibly  how  long  
it’s  going  to  take  for  us  to  complete  this  and  get  it  through  clearance  process  and  
then  get  it  back.  So  knowing  that,  it  would  help  and  it  would  also  help,  I  think  
that’s  something  that  has  to  be  seriously  looked  at  if  anybody  ever  picks  up  the  
MMPA  to  amend  it  again.  It  all  goes  to,  I  don’t  want  to  get  on  all  of  the  other  
things  they  need  to  amend  in  that  section,  but  that’s  kind  of  the  biggest  one,  is  
the  timetable  and  the  expectation.”  –Environmentalist    
  
“So  it’s  the  nature  of  the  beast,  but  maybe  setting  those  expectations  from  the  
beginning  –  saying  yes,  we  really  want  your  input  and  it’s  important  for  us  to  
get  it  done  quickly  because  this  process  is  a  long  process,  and  make  sure  they  
know  that  so  the  expectation  isn’t  that  they’re  just  going  to  see  regs  within  the  
next  month...  and  maybe  laying  out  and  communicating  what  that  process  looks  
like…because  the  NGOs  have  sued  over  slow  implementation.  And  that,  I  think,  
has  been  good  actually,  to  get  the  resources  focused  back  on  getting  those  regs  out  
because  complacency  is  the  number  one  problem  within  the  government.  There  
are  just  too  many  crises,  too  many  things  that  people  are  working  on.  You  just  




4.6 Future Evaluations 
4.6.1 Periodically Evaluate Ecological Success Using the Ecological 
Ranking Method  
"ʺWhy  don'ʹt  we  apply  science  more  frequently  in  evaluation?  Did  the  intervention  
achieve  what  it  claimed?  Why  or  why  not?"ʺ  (Burchfield,  2001,  p.  241).  In  addition  to  
addressing  these  questions,  MMPA  mandates  and  the  substantial  human  and  economic  
costs  incurred  by  marine  mammal  take  reduction  planning  support  evaluation  of  its  
ecological  effectiveness  (Koontz  and  Thomas,  2006;  Newig,  2007;  Weiss,  1972).  
Fortunately,  the  challenges  of  gathering  and  analyzing  long-­‐‑term  monitoring  data  have  
been  overcome;  marine  mammal  Stock  Assessment  Reports  provide  useful  tools  with  
which  to  evaluate  take  reduction  planning.  The  formulas  for  Metrics  1  and  2  to  evaluate  
the  ecological  effectiveness  of  marine  mammal  Take  Reductions  Plans  are  
straightforward  and  easy  to  replicate.  The  required  information  is  included  in  the  
annual  Stock  Assessment  Reports.  I  recommend  that  NMFS  periodically  (every  five  
years  or  as  necessary)  evaluate  the  ecological  effectiveness  of  the  plans  using  the  
formulas  provided  in  Chapter  1.  These  evaluations  can  be  incorporated  into  the  agency’s  
take  reduction  Monitoring  Strategies.  As  information  becomes  available,  it  will  be  
particularly  important  to  conduct  the  analyses  for  the  False  Killer  Whale  plan  and  for  
additional  stocks  of  the  Bottlenose  Dolphin  plan.  Moreover,  the  agency  should  convey  
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the  results  to  the  Take  Reduction  Team  members  so  that  if  necessary,  they  can  amend  
their  plans  in  response.  
4.6.2 Periodically Survey Members   
Regarding  the  social  evaluation,  I  recommend  the  agency  or  a  neutral  third  party  
periodically  survey  current  Take  Reduction  Team  members  about  their  views  of  the  
Take  Reduction  planning  process.  In  addition  to  questions  about  the  negotiation  
process,  outputs,  and  outcomes,  the  survey  should  include  questions  about  compliance  
and  enforcement.  Using  the  current  study  as  a  baseline,  it  would  be  interesting  to  see  if  
opinions  change,  especially  if  the  agency  implements  any  of  the  recommendations  in  
this  document.  Because  actual  ecological  success  affects  perceived  success,  it  follows  that  
if  the  teams  have  reduced  bycatch,  the  members  will  be  more  optimistic  about  Take  
Reduction  planning,  which  should  improve  buy-­‐‑in  of  all  members.  
4.7 Conclusions 
It  has  been  20  years  since  marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Planning  was  
incorporated  into  the  MMPA.  Early  evaluations  were  promising,  but  identified  several  
challenges  (RESOLVE,  1999;  Young,  2001).  In  the  past  decade  or  more,  NMFS  has  
implemented  measures  to  set  up  the  teams  for  success.  Although  actual  and  perceived  
ecological  outcomes  have  varied  across  teams,  the  process  has  the  essential  ingredients  
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for  successful  multi-­‐‑stakeholder  negotiations.  The  recommendations  described  here  are  
based  upon  the  ecological  and  social  evaluations  described  in  this  dissertation.  If  NMFS  
implements  these  suggestions,  both  perceived  and  actual  ecological  effectiveness  of  
marine  mammal  Take  Reduction  Teams  should  improve,  allowing  these  teams  to  








Appendix A: Structural Equation Models 
Structural  Equation  Models  (SEMs)  provide  a  framework  to  examine  correlated  
variables  in  terms  of  cause  and  effect.  They  calculate  relationships  among  variables  
using  a  combination  of  path  analysis,  multiple  regression  analysis,  and  factor  analysis  
(Bollen  1989).  SEMs  are  composed  of  two  sets  of  models  –  the  latent  variable  model  and  
the  measurement  model  (Bollen  1989).  Latent  variables  are  characteristics  that  cannot  be  
measured  directly,  but  are  comprised  of  a  combination  of  variables  that  can  be  directly  
measured  (called  “observed  effect”  or  “measurement”  indicators).  An  example  of  a  
latent  variable  in  ecology  would  be  ocean  health,  while  an  example  in  the  social  sciences  
would  be  economic  health.  Ocean  or  economic  health  is  typically  assessed  using  a  
combination  of  several  measurable  indicators  that  are  monitored  over  time.      
There  are  two  types  of  latent  variables  –  endogenous  and  exogenous.    
Endogenous  latent  variables  are  determined  within  the  model  and  represent  the  effect  of  
one  latent  variable  on  another.  Exogenous  latent  variables,  on  the  other  hand,  are  not  
explained  by  the  model,  but  rather  determined  outside  the  model  by  the  exogenous  
indicators  (Bollen  1989).  The  general  structural  equation  for  the  latent  variable  model  is  
essentially  a  regression  equation  (Bollen  1989).  
Measurement  models  relate  the  measured  or  observed  effect  indicators  to  the  
latent  variables,  and  contain  variables  that  explain  either  endogenous  or  exogenous  
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latent  variables  (Bollen  1989).  In  this  study,  the  measurement  indicators  are  the  
responses  to  the  survey  questions.  Measurement  model  equations  are  factor  analysis  
equations  (Bollen  1989).  The  factor  loadings  (λ)  indicate  the  direct  effects  of  the  latent  
variables  on  the  observed  variables  (Bollen  1989).  They  are,  “the  magnitude  of  the  
expected  change  in  the  observed  variable  for  a  one  unit  change  in  the  latent  variable”  
(Bollen  1989,  p.  17).  The  model  also  calculates  a  squared  multiple  correlation  coefficient  
for  each  measurement  indictor  (r2).  This  value  reflects  the  amount  of  variance  in  the  
measurement  indicator  that  is  accounted  for  by  the  latent  variable,  and  also  measures  
the  reliability  of  the  measurement  indicators/survey  questions  (see  below).  Variables  in  
both  the  structural  and  measurement  models  can  be  correlated,  as  can  their  
disturbances.  
Finally,  independent  covariates  can  be  used  to  clarify  either  observed  effect  
indicators  or  latent  variables.  According  to  Bollen  and  Bauldry  (2011,  p.  266),  “covariates  
are  variables  that  are  not  measures  of  a  latent  variable,  but  they  are  nonetheless  
important  to  include  to  avoid  biased  estimates  of  the  relations  between  latent  variables  
and  indicators.”  Covariates  can  directly  influence  the  latent  variable  without  being  
causal  indicators  because  their  impacts  are  less  influential  (Bollen  and  Bauldry,  2011).  
Causal  indicators,  on  the  other  hand,  “correspond  to  the  theoretic  definition  of  the  latent  
variable…  are  hypothesized  to  cause  changes  in”  the  latent  variable,  and  their  effects  
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should  be  relatively  stable  (Bollen  and  Bauldry,  2011,  p.  269).  Mathematically,  there  is  no  
difference  between  covariates  and  causal  indicators  -­‐‑  the  latent  variable  is  regressed  on  
both  types  of  variables.  The  investigator  determines  whether  or  not  the  variable  is  a  
covariate  or  causal  indicator  by  deciding  if  it  is  theoretically  related  to  the  latent  variable  
(Bollen  and  Bauldry,  2011).  In  this  study,  covariates  include  Take  Reduction  Team  
identity,  age,  and  size,  stakeholder  affiliation,  and  U.S.  geographic  region.  Because  the  
covariates  are  dummy  variables  (categorical  variables),  the  regressions  are  essentially  
ordered  Probit  equations  (Muthén  and  Muthén,  1998-­‐‑2010).  The  model  also  calculates  
the  squared  multiple  correlation  coefficients  (r2)  for  each  latent  variable.  This  value  is  the  
amount  of  variance  in  the  latent  variable  that  is  accounted  for  by  the  covariates  and  in  
the  case  of  endogenous  latent  variables,  the  variance  accounted  for  by  other  latent  
variables.  
SEMs  are  calculated  by  simultaneous,  linear  equations  that  represent  a  
hypothesis  about  the  relationships  (covariances  or  correlations)  among  the  observed  and  
latent  variables  (http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/soc203b/lectures/identify.html).  The  
equations  consist  of  known  and  unknown  parameters.  The  known  parameters  can  be  
estimated,  in  this  case,  by  using  the  WLSMV.  We  may  or  may  not  be  able  to  estimate  the  
unknown  parameters  (Bollen,  1989).  To  solve  the  simultaneous  equations,  we  must  have  
enough  information  to  estimate  each  unknown  parameter.  One  way  to  solve  for  
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unknown  parameters  is  to  write  each  unknown  parameter  as  a  function  of  the  known  
parameters.  In  addition,  these  functions  must  lead  to  a  unique  solution  (Bollen,  1989).  If  
a  value  for  one  or  more  unknown  parameters  cannot  be  calculated,  the  model  is  
unidentified  and  model  fit  cannot  be  calculated.  If  there  is  only  one  way  to  solve  for  each  
unknown  parameter  (all  parameters  are  identified),  the  model  is  perfectly  identified  and  
again,  model  fit  cannot  be  calculated.  If  there  is  more  than  one  way  to  solve  for  at  least  
one  unknown  variable,  that  parameter  is  over-­‐‑identified  and  therefore,  the  model  is  
over-­‐‑identified  and  model  fit  can  be  tested  (Bollen,  1989).  
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Appendix B:  Survey Code Book 
TRT Please  indicate  all  TRTs  of  which  you  are/were  a  participant  or  facilitator  (check  all  
that  apply).    Please  answer  the  appropriate  block  for  every  TRT  on  which  you  serve(d).    
The  block  number  for  each  team  is  listed  next  to  the  team  name.       
ALWTRT       Atlantic  Large  Whale  Take  Reduction  Team  (ALWTRT)  –  go  to  Block  1  
ATGTRT   Atlantic  Trawl  Gear  Take  Reduction  Team  (ATGTRT)  –  go  to  Block  2    
BDTRT   Bottlenose  Dolphin  Take  Reduction  Team  (BDTRT)  –  go  to  Block  3  
FKWTRT   False  Killer  Whale  Take  Reduction  Team  (FKWTRT)  –  go  to  Block  4  
HPTRT   Harbor  Porpoise  Take  Reduction  Team  (HPTRT)  -­‐‑  includes  the  former  
Gulf  of  Maine  and  Mid-­‐‑Atlantic  Harbor  Porpoise  TRTs  –  go  to  Block  5  
POCTRT   Pacific  Offshore  Cetacean  Take  Reduction  Team  (POCTRT)  –  go  to  Block  
6  
PLTRT   Pelagic  Longline  Take  Reduction  Team  (PLTRT)  –  go  to  Block  7  
AOCTRT   Atlantic  Offshore  Cetacean  Take  Reduction  Team  (AOCTRT)  -­‐‑  disbanded  
in  2001  –  go  to  Block  8  
  
AFFIL  I  represent(ed)  the  following  sector(s)  at  the  negotiation  table  of  the____  Take  
Reduction  Team  meetings  (check  all  that  apply).         
RES  Academic/scientific community 
FISH  Fishing Industry (includes processors) 
ENV  Environmental/conservation 
STATE State agency representative 
FED  Federal agency representative 
FMC  Interstate Fishery Management Council 
FACIL  Facilitator 
OTHER Other. Please specify ____________________ 
 
Please  select  the  number  of  ____  Take  Reduction  Team  meetings  and/or  webinars  you  




3 4 or more 
If None Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block
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